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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary discourses and representations of automation stress the impending “autonomy” 
of automated technologies. From pop culture depictions to corporate white papers, the notion of auton-
omous technologies tends to enliven dystopic fears about the threat to human autonomy or utopian po-
tentials to help humans experience unrealized forms of autonomy. This project offers a more nuanced 
perspective, rejecting contemporary notions of automation as inevitably vanquishing or enhancing hu-
man autonomy. Through a discursive analysis of industrial “deep texts” that offer considerable insights 
into the material development of automated media technologies, I argue for contemporary automation 
to be understood as a field for the exchange of autonomy, a human-machine autonomy in which auton-
omy is exchanged as cultural and economic value. Human-machine autonomy is a shared condition 
among humans and intelligent machines shaped by economic, legal, and political paradigms with a stake 
in the cultural uses of automated media technologies. By understanding human-machine autonomy, this 
 project illuminates complications of autonomy emerging from interactions with automated media tech-
nologies across a range of cultural contexts.  
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1     INTRODUCTION 
In late 2016, the popular reality show Duck Dynasty (2012 - 2017) premiered an episode entitled 
"Automation Frustration." In this episode, Willie (CEO of the Duck Commander company) buys a 3D 
printer in the hopes of enhancing in-house productivity of the company's duck calls. Willie introduces 
the printer to his small cadre of employees (who also happen to be part of his family) by describing it as 
a "co-worker" that will come to be their "best friend." A cutaway to Willie, however, reveals a more ad-
versarial relationship. "I haven't even plugged it in and already it's my most productive employee," he 
says. Indeed, after his employees use the printer for prototyping throwing stars and wiffle balls, Willie 
describes to them the industrial sensibility of opting for more printers as a potential replacement for hu-
man labor, extolling the printer's ability to produce duck calls 24 hours per day. This is preferable to hu-
man labor since, as he tells them, humans can't work 24 hours per day and machines likewise do not 
play wiffle ball on the job or take time off work due to illnesses. The episode subsequently plays up the 
expandability of the Duck Commander employees due to the potential full automation of the duck-call-
producing enterprise. Alongside this expandability is the fearfulness exhibited towards advanced au-
tomative technology, replete with suggestions from the employees that the machines will not only take 
their jobs, but ultimately become autonomous in the vein of terminator machines as depicted in the Ter-
minator franchise of films. The employees decide to expend more energy on their labor output, promot-
ing Willie in a cutaway scene to reveal that he intentionally played into their fears of advanced technol-
ogy as a motivational technique.   
 "Automation Frustration" taps into a recurring theme coursing throughout cultural de-
pictions: as technologies increasingly become capable of performing physical and intellectual tasks tradi-
tionally the purview of human beings, the dignity and social utility of humans decreases. This relation-
ship is often posited as a negative correlation, one epitomized by "Automation Frustration." As ma-
chines increase their capabilities to perform tasks such as the physical rendering and replication of duck 
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calls, human dignity, laboring capacities, and social utility invariably decrease. Such tasks occur through 
a complex array of interlocked automated technologies and processes, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 
algorithms, machine learning, and other advanced computational processes that enable both 
knowledge-based and manual tasks to be performed by these automated techniques as a scale, speed, 
and efficiency in excess of human capability. In addition to the often incomprehensible nature of the 
techniques and processes constituting automation in the contemporary moment, the result is a ten-
dency to posit automation as an escalation of machine prowess that forges an adversarial relationship 
between humans and machines, one in which humans must attempt to overcome, subdue, and gain 
mastery over technologies. Failing to do so places humans on the cusp of obsolescence, not only in 
terms of laboring agents but also - as posited in many cultural depictions - as the dominant life-form on 
earth. It is, in other words, humans versus machines, us versus them, machine prowess versus human 
dignity, a contemporary iteration of technological dystopian in which highly-automated technologies are 
pitted against humans in a zero-sum struggle for a critical condition of defining significance: autonomy.  
1.1 Dystopias of Autonomous Technologies in Contemporary Culture  
One of the primary fears addressed in “Automation Frustration” is the potential inability of these 
workers to enact a sense of choice, purpose, and fulfillment in their employment and productive tasks. 
More profoundly, however, the 3D printer threatens not only their employment but their autonomy, 
both as employed workers and as human beings striving for dignity through productive capacities. Au-
tonomy, as traditionally conceived, is the ability to exercise and enact directive purpose free from coer-
cion, restraint, or other impeding forces. It is a critical capacity for controlling and directing the circum-
stances of one’s own life, often conceived as the ability to self-determine and self-direct.  
Where “Automation Frustration” depicts automated technologies as distinctly non-humanoid de-
vices with sophisticated functions that threaten the autonomy of warehouse workers, other pop culture 
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tends to extrapolate from this sophistication to depict highly-intelligent synthetic (often humanoid) be-
ings whose increasingly autonomous potential threatens the autonomy of humans as uniquely-intelli-
gent life forms. These depictions are new iteration of a recurrent cycle of “autonomous technology,” a 
“belief that somehow technology has gotten out of control and follows its own course, independent of 
human direction.”1 Autonomous technology is a ongoing cultural fear associated with the loss of human 
mastery over machines that tends to recur alongside impending technological disruption, often con-
ceived as occurring through a break or rupture that divests autonomous potential from humans and 
transfers autonomy to machines controlling all facets of human life. From human mastery to machine 
masters, as the trope commonly goes.  
In many depictions of autonomous technology, the threat of automation escalates from the poten-
tial displacement of warehouse workers to the offsetting of human autonomous potential at the hands 
of intelligent mechanical beings capable of exercising their own autonomy. In this way, contemporary 
culture is profuse with a dystopia of autonomous technology that dovetails with common dystopic 
themes while foregrounding and embodying artificial intelligence (AI), robots, and other autonomous 
technologies as the contemporary source of dystopic paradigms.  
Technological dystopianism commonly appears as three narrative themes: hegemonic (a privileged 
group of people use technology to dominate and control others), apocalyptic (technology as a harbinger 
of unparalleled widespread doom), and satiric (technologies defy expectations in a manner that makes 
life worse or leads to undesirable outcomes).2 Across all three narratives, dystopian fears emphasize a 
loss of control, overdependence, and inability to halt the change made manifest by technologies.3 Two 
                                                             
1 Winner, Langdon. Autonomous technology: Technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought. MIT Press 
(1978): 13.  
2 David Nye, “Technological Prediction: A Promethean Problem," Technological Visions: The Hopes and Fears that 
Shape New Technologies, eds. Marita Sturken, Douglas Thomas, and Sandra Ball-Rokeach (Temple University Press, 
2004): 171. 
3 Nancy Baym, Personal Connections in the Digital Age (John Wiley & Sons: 2015): 28.  
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common scenarios represent a contemporary manifestation of these themes and fears in popular me-
dia, trade press, and futurist discourse (as well as their points of overlap). The first scenario – what I will 
refer to as the “robot overlord” motif – imagines advanced AI becoming autonomous from human con-
trol as it seeks to control humans through totalized domination of society. The second scenario – what I 
will refer to as the “job-stealing robot” motif – imagines the autonomous capabilities of advanced AI as 
being able to perform many (or most) formal job roles better than humans, thereby rapidly ushering in 
mass unemployment and destitution.  
1.2 Contemporary Technological Dystopia: The Autonomous Robot Overlord 
Based on recent developments, the horror and threat posed by the xenomorph creatures of the Al-
ien media franchise now primarily belongs to an aspirant robot overlord that is the focus of recent Alien 
film prequels. Recent additions to the Alien film franchise focus more on the dangers from non-human 
robotic autonomy than the non-human threat of the titular alien creatures. The android character David 
8 introduced in Prometheus (2012) is as a servile creation designed to follow the directions of human 
counterparts. Over the course of Prometheus and the follow-up Alien: Covenant (2017), David 8 first un-
dermines his human teammates at the behest of surrogate father (and corporate scion) Peter Wyland as 
part of an effort to identify and understand humanity’s creators and, upon the death of Wyland, breaks 
from human servility and ultimately uses human bodies as a means of progenerating the Alien crea-
tures. While manipulative androids figured into the first Alien film and its three sequels, Prometheus and 
Alien: Covenant shifts the primary antagonistic threat from the alien creatures to David 8 and his fasci-
nation with the alien creatures as forms of life superior to human beings. The more autonomous David 8 
becomes, the grander and more severe his threat to all human life, notably since an early scene in Alien: 
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Covenant makes it clear that David 8 interprets human biological infinitude as evidence of human inferi-
ority when compared to the hypothetical infinitude4 of androids and the superior biological prowess of 
the alien creatures. 
The popular superhero franchise The Avengers features its own recent take on the robotic overlord 
motif. In The Avengers (2012), the film continues a trend introduced in the Iron Man film series counter-
part of the Marvel Cinematic Universe: the depiction of J.A.R.V.I.S. (an acronym for “Just Another Rather 
Very Intelligent System”) as an advanced artificial intelligence. This depiction is a turn from the human 
“Jarvis” who initially appeared in Marvel Comics books in 1964 and continually appeared as a human be-
ing in Marvel Comics media until the introduction of J.A.R.V.I.S. in Iron Man (2008). Where the robotic 
replacement of a human being in The Avengers epitomizes dystopian notions of job-stealing robots, its 
sequel The Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015) advances dystopian themes through the depiction of a sen-
tient AI intent on destroying all human life. In this film, the titular Ultron is initially a program designed 
by Tony Stark to assist with global peace-keeping. Upon gaining sentience, Ultron quickly decides hu-
mans are earth’s greatest threat and therefore must be rendered extinct.  
Ultron’s sentience occurs as a flashpoint moment when Tony Start uses a cosmic “gem” with quasi-
magical powers to finalize the Ultron’s code. Alighted by human-like sentience through this gem, the 
flashpoint moment transforming Ultron from a highly-intelligence computer to a sentient being allego-
rizes the concept of the technological singularity (alternately: the singularity). First posited by computer 
scientist Vernor Vinge5 and popularized6 by futurist Ray Kurzweil, the singularity conceives of technologi-
                                                             
4 The name “David 8” is a nod to this notion of infinite life, as “8”is not only the numeric number “eight” but a 90-
degree rotation of a horizontal mobius strip often used to indicate “infinity.” 
5 Vinge coined the term “technological singularity” and outlined its components in a 1993 essay. See: Vernor Vinge, 
“The Coming Technological Singularity,” Whole Earth Review 81 (1993): 88-95.  
6 In addition to Kurzweil’s titular book on the singularity, two documentaries have been made about Kurzweil and 
the singularity: The Transcendent Man (2005) and The Singularity Is Near (2012) (directed by Kurzweil). He has also 
discussed his ideas in many other documentaries and televisions programs such as The Daily Show (1999-2015), 
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cal autonomy as a conditioned accelerated by rapid emergence of sentience, as when these technolo-
gies attain the analytic, emotional, moral, and intellectual prowess associated with the human brain, 
they will achieve full autonomy by breaking from human dominance and determining courses of action 
based on their independent purposive will. Many dystopic robot overlords, such as Ultron, embody au-
tonomous potential via a flashpoint moment transitioning synthetic intelligence to a sentient state em-
blematic of human capacities for intelligence and autonomy. The significance of the singularity for au-
tonomous technology, however, extends beyond its influence on pop culture narratives. Where Vinge 
and Kurzweil postulate the theory of the singularity based on real-world technological design, progress, 
and theorems (such as Moore’s Law7), other non-fiction writers have followed suit to stress dystopic im-
plications for humankind predicated on material developments in automated prowess.  
Notably, James Barrat’s Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era 
(2013) seeks to explore the consequences of a potential near-future world in which critical societal deci-
sion-making is the exclusive purview of increasingly autonomous technologies capable of rapid, efficient, 
and error-free decision-making. To Barrat’s mind, this world is a “computer hegemony” predicated on a 
technological sophistication “advanced enough to act with human-level intelligence” and therefore “un-
predictable and inscrutable all of the time.”8 Evoking the hegemonic theme of dystopian narratives and 
                                                             
The Colbert Report (2005-2014), and Real Time with Bill Maher (2003 – present). Moreover, in September 2008, 
Kurzweil co-founded the think tank Singularity University.  
7 Briefly stated, Moore’s law posits increases in computer processing speed, power, and efficiency that grow with 
exponential magnitude over short-term and longer-term intervals (i.e. doubling of speed every two years over a 
period of 30 years).  
8 James Barrat, Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era (Thomas Dunne Books: 
2013), 4. 
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Antonio Gramsci’s notion of culturally-hegemonic “intellectuals” striving to be conceived as “autono-
mous and independent from the dominant social group,”9 Barrat similarly conceives of intelligent com-
puters as autonomous and independent from human beings and the ability of humans to ascertain the 
motivations and machinations of these robotic overlords.  
In addition to the robot overlord motif, the dystopic conception of job-stealing robots appears 
prominently in cultural discourses. Unlike the robot overlord motif, the notion of job-stealing robots 
manifests most prominently among business trade texts, economic forecasting, and policy reportage.  
1.3 Contemporary Technological Dystopia: The Autonomous Job-Stealing Robot 
Recent books such as Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future (2013), The 
Glass Cage: Automation and Us (2014)10, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a 
Time of Brilliant Technologies (2014), Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age 
of Artificial Intelligence (2015) are just a handful of recent popular press tomes that situate technological 
autonomy as a breakpoint for the mass displacement of employment opportunities for all types of labor, 
including jobs predicated on the performance of human cognitive tasks once believed impossible to rep-
licate with automated sophistication. Notably, Martin Ford’s Rise of the Robots describes the conse-
quences of an “automation wave” as the mass disruption and displacement of workers permanently ex-
cised from the labor market as industries scale up automated work processes while scaling down human 
workforces.11   
While less alarming in their rhetoric, even the measured intonations of think-tank white papers and 
reports often posit automated innovation as a force acting in direct opposition to human vitality.  The 
                                                             
9 Antonio Gramsci, “The Revolutionary Intellectual,” in An Anthology of Western Marxism, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb 
(Oxford University Press: 1989): 113.  
10 While “Automation and Us” was the original hardcover subtitle, this changed to “How Our Computers Are 
Changing Us” for the paperback version.  
11 Ford, Martin. Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. Basic Books (2015): 1-28.  
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McKinsey Institute's 2017 report "A Future that Works: Automation, Employment, and Productivity" 
stresses the potential for automation to positively impact productivity and financial ledgers for private 
enterprises, since computers are increasingly capable of "making tacit judgments" and "sensing emo-
tion" on par with humans while requiring no leisure or sick time or expenditures for health care or re-
lated expenses.12  
Likewise, the central premise of a March 2017 working paper from the National Bureau for Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) posits labor as a field of contestation between human and robotic workers.13 
Broadly speaking, this report suggests that the integration of automated capacities reduces employment 
and wage opportunities for humans in a geographically approximate zone. It further elaborates on the 
distinctive impact of automation on employment and wages compared to off-shoring, importation, and 
other economic and industrial variables.  
A 2013 Oxford University study also estimated 47 percent of all U.S. jobs were at risk due to auto-
mation over the same amount of time (two decades).14 Widely-cited by trade press, think tanks, and ac-
ademic scholarship,15 the Oxford 47 percent statistic appears so frequently by both proponents and de-
tractors of dystopian orientations around automated job loss that it has practically become a talking 
point among journalists and policy wonks, even as this estimated proportionality subsequently received 
a measure of validation from the White House.  
In Dec. 2016, the Executive Office of the President released Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and 
the Economy, an economic report attempting a sober analysis of “the effects of AI-driven automation on 
                                                             
12 McKinsey Global Institute, "Harnessing Automation for a Future that Works." Jan. 2017. http://www.mckin-
sey.com/global-themes/digital-disruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works 
13 Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. "Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets." (2017). 
http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Robots-and-Jobs-Evidence-from-US-Labor-Markets.pdf  
14 Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computer-
isation?,” Sep. 17, 2013, https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employ-
ment.pdf.  
15 As of early 2018, Google Scholar notes over 1,800 citations among academic literatures, in addition to its wide 
circulation among trade press, institutional blogs, and industry reports.  
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the U.S. job market and economy” in addition to recommending policy responses.16 One of its chief find-
ings estimates the range of jobs potentially lost due to automation over the next two decades, cited as 
anywhere from 9 percent to 47 percent.17 Giving context to this range, the report notes that jobs dis-
placed by automation tend to be those performed by “lower-paid, lower-skilled, and less-educated 
workers.”18 Despite the report’s measured claims, journalistic reportage tended to stress the upper limit 
of this range, aligning the report’s findings with the Oxford 47 percent statistic via headlines such as 
“The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation.”19 and “White House Warns of AI Making 
Swaths of Jobs Redundant”20 leaning into (if not outright capitulating to) dystopian notions of job-steal-
ing robots. Dystopic conceptions of autonomous technologies as hegemonic overlords and job-stealing 
interlopers ultimately gained enough visibility and traction that common knowledge of these motifs and 
the grandiosity of their claims led both tech industry magnates and Marxist-oriented theorists to assert 
their utopian potentials if the underlying determinants can be properly harnessed. One on hand, the 
technology industry downplayed the dystopic character of autonomous technologies to stress job crea-
tion and enhanced human productive intellect, even as Marxist theorists envisioned totalized automa-
tion as the gearwork for a fully-automated life beyond capitalism. Thus, from the twin motifs of autono-
mous technologies as robot overlords and job-stealing robots, a political economy of dystopic techno-
logical autonomy emerges.  
                                                             
16 Executive Office of the President, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, Dec. 20, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/EMBARGOED%20AI%20Economy%20Report.pdf.  
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
19 Claire Cain Miller, “The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation.,” The New York Times, Dec. 21, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html.  
20 Anthony Cuthbertson, “White House Warns of AI Making Swaths of Jobs Redundant,” Newsweek, Dec. 22, 2016, 
http://www.newsweek.com/artificial-intelligence-white-house-ai-inequality-disparity-535093.  
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1.4 Downplaying Dystopia: Enterprise Opportunities in Automated Economies 
A tendency among business enterprise leverages the job-stealing robot motif and the potential 
scale of labor market disruption to offer economic solutions for withstanding marketplace tumult. In 
many cases, these narratives follow a similar arc: acknowledging cultural fears of automation and auton-
omous technology, citing the potential material reality of an “automation wave,” and reassuring market 
sectors that disruptive turbulence can be minimized through sound business and economic recalibra-
tion. In other words, these narratives tend to downplay dystopia by playing up economic opportunities 
to capitalize on socio-economic circumstances surrounding automation. In Humans Need Not Apply, 
Jerry Kaplan offers the concept of a “job mortgage” as a “modernized free-market version of the histori-
cal apprenticeship or internship model” in which a worker secures the sponsorship of a potential em-
ployer who agrees – on good faith - to hire that worker in the intermediate future based on a projected 
need for that worker’s particular skills. In the context of automated worker displacement, a shift from 
liberal arts collegiate education to vocational training would enable skills-based training to be more 
closely aligned with unstaffed non-automated jobs, thereby making the job mortgage a viable prospect, 
especially for employers who can reap the benefits of a “self-regulating” system requiring no govern-
ment intervention in the form of accreditation.21 In this scenario, the cultural fear of autonomous tech-
nologies is resolved by the institutional autonomy of businesses with greater latitude to staff non-auto-
mated jobs via hypothetical future employment to which the employer is only theoretically obligated.  
Klaus Schwab, founder and chairman of the World Economic Forum, is also apt to downplay dysto-
pia. Schwab is the chief proponent for the “fourth industrial revolution,” his term for the emergence of 
increasingly autonomous technologies across all facets of existence. In his book The Fourth Industrial 
Revolution (2017) and other writings, Schwab notes the potential vast disruption of labor markets and 
industrial sectors, while also stressing the opportunity presented by a world enlivened by autonomous 
                                                             
21 Ibid 155.  
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technologies, such as global connectivity and drastic improvements in organizational efficiency. The 
pratfalls of mass disruption to labor and economic markets, as well as the social inequality stemming 
from the hollowing out of such markets, can be alleviated by businesses and governments collaborating 
“across geographies, sectors and disciplines to grasp the opportunities it presents,” and by paying heed 
(and dollars) to “ideas, insights and wisdom from the World Economic Forum’s global network of top 
leaders from business, government and civil society and young leaders.”22 
Beyond macro-economic assessments and futurist forecasting, downplaying dystopia is a marketing 
tactic for companies developing automated technologies, especially AI. For IBM CEO Ginny Rometty, 
speaking to “robot takeovers” and “job stealers” is a necessary strategy to ensure the maintenance and 
maximization of IBM’s business model, company esteem, and opportunities for third-party collabora-
tions with Watson, the company’s AI business-to-business (B2B) platform. When Rometty seizes an op-
portunity at the World Economic Forum to explain to a room of business and political leaders that AI 
“won’t prompt a robot takeover” as reported under the headline “At Davos, IBM CEO Ginny Rometty 
Downplays Fears of a Robot Takeover”23 her strategy is twofold: disassociate Watson (and AI more gen-
erally) with hostile robotic takeovers of both human life and employability. In these circumstances, 
Rometty attempts a discursive tight-rope as she must tout the vast sophistication of Watson while re-
buking the possibilities of a robot takeover and “fears that the technology will displace human workers 
entirely.”24 Chapter 3 illuminates the complications of worker and corporate autonomy among IBM’s 
discursive strategies around Watson. This next section, however, outlines the other side of the coin for 
the political economy of downplaying dystopias around automation and autonomous technologies. Just 
                                                             
22 “The Fourth Industrial Revolution, by Klaus Schwab,” https://www.weforum.org/about/the-fourth-industrial-
revolution-by-klaus-schwab.  
23 Claire Zillman, “At Davos, IBM CEO Ginni Rometty Downplays Fears of a Robot Takeover,” Fortune, Jan. 18, 2017, 
http://fortune.com/2017/01/18/ibm-ceo-ginni-rometty-ai-davos/.  
24 Ibid.  
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as business analysts and magnates stress the marketplace opportunities arising out of full automation, 
Marxian theorists envision totalized automation as the foundations for a post-capitalist social solidarity.  
1.5 Downplaying Dystopia: A Fully-Automated Workers’ Utopia 
In his recent book The Automatic Society: The Future of Work (2017), philosopher Bernard Stiegler 
conceives of a full automation as the grounds for “dis-automization,” a process of collectivizing the to-
talized digital infrastructure constituting automation and asserting, invigorating, and realizing a 
knowledge of social solidarity and organization that resists the production and commodification of “in-
telligence” in contemporary automated capitalism. To his mind, full automation and the “knowledge” it 
produces can be seized to establish socio-economic life beyond capitalism. As an interpretive framework 
for contemplating life after capitalism, “postcapitalism” correlates similar notions around full automa-
tion and the possibilities for renewed economic flows to alleviate inequalities of wealth and labor ex-
penditures.  
The cover to Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World With-
out Work (2015) succinctly summarizes how to realize this world: “demand full automation,” “demand 
universal basic income,” “demand the future.”25 Srnicek and Williams argue for a post-work, post-capi-
talist society emerging from our interrelated demands: full automation, a reduced working week, appor-
tioning of a basic income, and undermining the capitalist work ethic.26 Automation, for these authors, 
does not steal or take jobs but instead can alleviate humans from the burden of work, so long as wealth 
redistribution and other non-capitalist economic frameworks are in place. Implicitly, the job-stealing ro-
bot motif is reworked for utopian ends. Robots won’t steal your job; they’ll help create the conditions 
for liberation. Srnicek and Williams’ insistence on demanding for basic income (also known as “universal 
                                                             
25 Srnicek, Nick, and Alex Williams. Inventing the future: Postcapitalism and a world without work. Verso Books, 
2015. 
26 Ibid 127.  
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basic income”) corresponds to a wider call for such economic principles, especially one that can bring 
social equilibrium to a fully-automated world.  
A basic income is money provisioned and apportioned by the state to all applicable recipients free 
from obligation to remuneration or indebtedness. It is, quite literally, a recurring lump payment from 
the state. A universal basic income (UBI), as the name implies, is the universal application of a basic in-
come – applicable recipients are all existing human beings. In addition to a veritable cottage industry of 
popular press books arguing the merits of universal basic income in the context of fully-automated en-
croachment,27 advocates for basic income also emanate from industrial sectors that produce increas-
ingly autonomous technologies. Just as IBM CEO Ginny Rometty downplays dystopia for the sake of her 
company’s economic advantage, Elon Musk - as the CEO of a company developing autonomous vehicles 
– is economically incentivized to urge UBI as a protective gauge against job-eradicating dystopias.  
Citing the impending reality of robots capable of performing most jobs better than humans, Tesla 
CEO Musk describes UBI as a “necessary” measure to offset the potential polarity of wealth inequality 
caused by automation’s ability to generate an abundance of wealth that is vested in small class of elite 
entrepreneurs controlling the automated means of production.28 Similarly, despite his admonition that 
global economic circumstances do not yet warrant the implementation of UBI and a preference for in-
come tax accreditation, Bill Gates believes the U.S. and other countries will eventually generate enough 
wealth capable of producing little or no hard when redistributed as a UBI or similar form. Post-capitalism 
arguments for full automation and redistributed wealth also orient back towards communist imagi-
naries, as “fully-automated luxury communism (FALC)” proposes a realization of communist aims free 
                                                             
27 See: Stern, Andy. Raising the floor: How a universal basic income can renew our economy and rebuild the Ameri-
can dream. Public Affairs, 2016; Bregman, Rutger. Utopia for Realists: And How We Can Get There. Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2017; Van Parijs, Philippe, and Yannick Vanderborght. Basic income: A radical proposal for a free society 
and a sane economy. Harvard University Press, 2017; Mason, Paul. Postcapitalism: A guide to our future. Macmil-
lan, 2016. 
28 Chris Weller, “Elon Musk doubles down on universal basic income: ‘it’s going to be necessary,’” Business Insider, 
Feb. 13, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-universal-basic-income-2017-2.  
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from the impulses of its 20th century failures in conjunction with consumer accoutrements of capitalism. 
Beyond a nominal working week and basic income, FALC could provide free and equal access to housing 
education, healthcare, and even non-essential services and goods, engendering a “cybernetic meadow, 
tended to by machines of loving grace” that realizes a Marxian productive paradise.29  
1.6 Beyond Human and Machine Autonomy: Human-Machine Autonomy 
Thus, as automated technologies increasingly encompass autonomous possibilities, cultural narra-
tives tend to posit pendulum-like swings. Autonomous technologies are potentialized robot overlords or 
job-stealing robots of dystopic proportions. The widespread recognition of these dystopias is also the 
grounds for differing strands of utopian thinking. On one hand, the overdetermination of dystopic auto-
mation is the backdrop against which business analysts and corporate scions stress the unique qualities 
of their respective market sectors, companies, goods, and services as uniquely capable of leveraging au-
tomation for economic gains of workers and producers alike. On the other hand, rather than an oppor-
tunity for capitalist marketplace supremacy, full automation is the concomitant grounds for a post-capi-
talist world of significantly-reduced work, redistributed wealth, and a foothold for establishing socio-
economic transcendence (i.e. fully-automated luxury communism). Between utopic and dystopic poles 
subsuming technological, economic, legal, and political paradigms, two prominent interpretations 
emerge. As automated technologies escalate towards autonomy, human autonomy is either repressed 
in diametrical contrast or enlivened in tandem with ascendant technological autonomy. In other words, 
human autonomy is either snuffed out or achieves unparalleled heights. While these narratives provide 
welcome imaginings, and provoke considerations of alternative uses for automated technologies to re-
fresh socio-economic conditions, such thinking does not account for nuances of autonomy as a shared 
variable condition among humans and highly-automated technologies. Likewise, these conceptions are 
                                                             
29 Brian Merchant, “Fully automated luxury communism,” The Guardian, Mar. 18, 2015, https://www.theguard-
ian.com/sustainable-business/2015/mar/18/fully-automated-luxury-communism-robots-employment.  
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primarily the product of either industrial power brokers with an economic stake in promulgating ideas 
favorable to corporate bottom lines or theorists approaching industrial machinations as a predominantly 
philosophical condition.  
To more precisely account for the cultural stakes of a world alighted by automation, I argue for hu-
man-machine autonomy, defined as a field for the exchange of autonomy between humans and intelli-
gent machines. As I will demonstrate, human-machine autonomy resists purely dystopic or utopian con-
ceptions of human autonomy as positively or negatively correlated towards a heretofore unrealized 
vista of technological autonomy. Instead, human-machine autonomy is the ebbing and flowing, waxing 
and waning, heightening and diminishing of autonomy that courses among encounters between humans 
and highly-automated technologies. It is an exchange of economic and cultural values, as technology 
companies develop autonomous technologies amidst material economic realities and imagine their cul-
tural uses in corporate and marketplace motivations. Human-machine autonomy also pulls from a con-
ception of autonomy that supersedes notions of individualistic pursuit or determinative potential 
couched in a singular vessel (such as a human mind or technological apparatus). Extending beyond self-
determination, autonomy is an analytical and actionable prowess for assessing conditions governing an 
environment, determining potential courses of action, and carrying out willful actions indicative of such 
circumstances. While for autonomous vehicles the conditions of an environment might include road 
conditions transformed into datafied units through sensing technology, for humans such conditions in-
clude economic, legal, and other social paradigms constituting the possible parameters by which as-
sessing, determining, and carrying out is conceived as possible and realizable.   
Humans, as rational beings attempting to make informed decisions regarding how they will enact 
their will, must make judgments about the potential benefits, drawbacks, and consequences of their ac-
tion in relation to a plethora of social phenomenon. My ability to rob a convenience store and avail my-
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self to its wares is not restricted by an ever-present entity physically restraining me from taking this ac-
tion. Instead, I am likely reluctant to rob the store because I have weighed my actions (both as social 
consequence and individual benefit) against laws that prohibit this action, institutions that will repri-
mand me if I carry out this action, and the dignity I will lose as a result of committing an asocial act, to 
say nothing of other avenues I may pursue as alternatives to the perceived gains of robbing the store 
(such as paying for the goods).  
In this sense, humans often gauge the exercise of autonomy against societal norms and frame-
works, be it laws that restrict robbery or social mores that designate robbery an immoral act (except, 
perhaps, under extenuating circumstances). These forces, then, should not necessarily be considered an 
imposition against the enactment of autonomy, but circumstances that shape how determinations can 
be made about ways to direct one's will and therefore potentially maximize their autonomy (and, for 
that matter, how to conceive of autonomy).   
Just as humans experience (and are bound up in) phenomena that influence determinations about 
their course of actions, automated technologies are likewise situated amongst a series of phenomena 
informing decisions about possible and realizable actions. In this sense, human-machine autonomy is a 
field that both shapes - and is shaped by - economic, political, and social informants. Likewise, autono-
mous technologies allegorize and analogize cultural conditions inflecting upon the ability for humans to 
experience and enact autonomy, especially as these technologies penetrate contexts with established 
cultural practices bound up with presiding power constructs. In arguing for human-machine autonomy 
as the most viable means of understanding the cultural significance of automated technologies, my ap-
proach draws from industrial discourse to illuminate ideologies and complications of autonomy suffus-
ing the development, proliferation, and uptake of such technologies.  
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1.7 Methodology: Discourse and Industrial Ideologies of Autonomy 
Human-machine autonomy arises out of industrial discourse illuminating multifaceted conceptions 
of autonomy and the embeddedness of such conceptions amidst the production, governance, market-
ing, and cultural penetration of automated technologies. In conceptualizing human-machine autonomy, 
my analysis focuses on “deep texts,” a term John Caldwell uses to describe texts that emanate from in-
dustrial practitioners and institutions, indicate a shared source of meaning and practice, and illuminate 
“a constant churn of critical and theoretical ideas” incorporated into industrial outputs that maintain as 
these outputs enter avenues of cultural life.30 As a “social force” that permeates all facets of life in con-
temporary society,31 industry’s critical and theoretical ideas imbue durable meanings and associations 
on the products and services at the heart of their productive undertaking. In this way, deep texts offer a 
wellspring of insights into industrial ideologies shaping not only the development of automated technol-
ogies, but the persistence of industrial ideologies in milieus at a remove from industry itself. My interest 
in deep texts, however, is less concerned with the content contained within a single deep text and more 
concerned with a deep text as a significant “nodal point” within a broader network of relevant discourse 
branching off from this text. In other words, autonomy emerges from discourse analyses of deep texts 
and other texts constituting an interlocked pattern of rhetorical significance.  
A “nodal point,” as described by Laclau and Moueffe, is a privileged site among a broader network 
of discursive formations.32 Assessing discursive nodal points pulls loose threads to unravel the complexi-
ties of autonomy emerging from the meshwork of industrial practice, especially when “autonomy” is 
used implicitly as opposed to otherwise explicit applications of “autonomy” afforded to highly-auto-
                                                             
30 Caldwell, John. "Cultural studies of media production: Critical industrial practices." Questions of method in cul-
tural studies(2006): 145.  
31 Govil, Nitin. "Recognizing" industry," Cinema Journal 52.3 (2013): 172. 
32 Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
(Verso Books, 1985): 112.  
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mated technologies (i.e. autonomous vehicles). Discursively, “autonomy” is symptomatic of how indus-
try conceives of highly-automated technologies as conceptualizing, allegorizing, and defining conditions 
for human beings in the context of industry’s imagined uses for such technologies. A symptomatic read-
ing "divulges the undivulged,"33 revealing “autonomy” as a critical force among significant discursive 
networks despite the relative infrequency of its literal appearance in textual practice. In this way, my 
approach exemplifies “thick description,” an "intellectual effort" and "elaborate venture" that super-
sedes instrumental approaches to discourse analysis to assess "meaningful structures" that shape the 
way discourse is produced, perceived and interpreted.34 
In addition to extended networks of meaningfully-structured discourse, my approach also extends 
the notion of a “deep text” to include texts that do not necessarily emanate from industrial actors and 
institutions yet nonetheless constitute significant nodes of industrial discourse. In the case of this pro-
ject, I situate formal policy and regulatory texts as deep texts, notably since industrial practice and 
meaning-making transpire in close contact with policymaking and regulator schemas, influence legal 
provisions and recommendations, and incorporate anticipated ideologies and political beliefs of presid-
ing policymaking bodies. Formal policy and regulation incorporate, govern, and influence industrial busi-
ness models, corporate priorities, cross-sector collaboration, and productive capacities, often realized as 
mutually-reinforcing policy and industrial aims. In other words, policy and regulatory texts are both gov-
erning structures and discursive structures, constituting critical nodes in networks of discourse account-
ing for co-constituted political and economic realities, particularly as corridors of legal and corporate 
power tend to entail close contact. Chapters 1 and 2 (see more below) situate policy texts as critical 
nodal points for illuminating nuanced conceptions of autonomy (and for whom such conceptions are 
beneficial) among interlinked practices of industry and policymakers. In these chapters, my approach 
                                                             
33 Althusser, Louis, et. al. Reading Capital. New Left Books (1970): 28.  
34 Geertz, Clifford. The interpretation of cultures. Basic books (1973): 6-7.  
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intervenes in critical policy studies literatures that add levity to my approach as I seek to address aspects 
unaccounted for in such literatures.  
Across all chapters, however, I add levity to my approach by leveraging digital media theory and re-
lated theoretical frameworks to contextualize and clarify the relevancy of pertinent discourse. By engag-
ing with digital media theory, the relationship between industry’s conceptual notions of autonomy and 
implications for cultural life are more precisely and clearly rendered, especially given the viability of digi-
tal media theory to analogically or allegorically align digital media logics, affordances, interactions, and 
materialities with conditions of lived reality, imparting precise implications for industrial conceptions of 
autonomy on lived reality and the ways industry attempts to account for the uses and viability of auto-
mated technologies in cultural paradigms. Furthermore, while I draw from software studies, conver-
gence theory, interface theory, and other sub-sectors of digital media theory, my approach also de-
mands intervention with histories and philosophies of media technologies critical to placing discourse 
around contemporary automated technologies in appropriate contexts. In this way, I draw from televi-
sion studies, technology studies, media historiography, and other adjacent fields to identity the ways 
contemporary ideologies of autonomy stemming from the development of automated technologies col-
lide and repel with preceding socio-economic modes of integrating emerging technologies into presiding 
cultural domains. In this project, discourse analysis opens up avenues of insights deepened, contextual-
ized, and qualified by appropriate theoretical application. In other words, discourse analysis excavates 
and preserves important tombs; theory decodes its hieroglyphics. This two-pronged approach – dis-
course analysis and theoretical application – is necessary to illuminate the breadth, scope, and signifi-
cance of automated media as a field for the exchange of autonomy. In each chapter, I precisely account 
for the particular theoretical frameworks with which I engage and intervene. With that in mind, it’s also 
important to clarify the parameters of “contemporary” automation at play in this project and how this 
contemporary moment fits into histories of automation as a concern for media scholarship and culture 
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at large. Thus, the next section provides a brief history of automation. This history is necessary for two 
primary reasons. First, it lays the groundwork for clarifying distinctions between contemporary automa-
tion and its 20th century antecedents. Second, this history accounts for critical media studies scholarship 
addressing automation over the course of this timeline, thereby clarifying how my project addresses 
gaps unresolved by this scholarship. Subsequent to this history, I clarify the time period under scrutiny 
at the heart of this “contemporary” moment and the significance of this time period, setting the stage 
for chapter summaries that include critical moments corresponding to this timeframe.  
1.8 A Brief History of Automation: 1946 – Present 
This current moment of automation is preceded by modalities of automated conditions and interre-
lated socio-economic conditions stretching back to the immediate post-WWII era of the 20th century. As 
David Nye notes in his monograph on the American assembly line, the term "automation" gained trac-
tion after a 1946 Fortune magazine story "The Automatic Factory." In 1948, the trade magazine Ameri-
can Machinist defined "automation" as  
"the art of applying mechanical devices to manipulate work pieces into and out of equip-
ment, turn parts between operations, remove scrap, and perform these tasks in times se-
quences with the production equipment so that the line can be put wholly or partially under 
pushbotton control at strategic stations."35  
Nearly 10 years later, writers and researchers described both the instrumental character of auto-
mation and its aims and outcomes.36 With regard to its instrumentality, Friedrich Pollock understood au-
tomation to be "the use of certain methods of automatically producing and preparing goods; of produc-
ing information; and of making calculations...methods which are characteristic of our present stage of 
                                                             
35 Nye, David E. America's Assembly Line. MIT Press (2013): 159 [quoted in].  
36 Diebold, John. Automation: The advent of the automatic factory. van Nostrand, 1952; Strehl, Rolf. The Robots 
Are Among Us. Acro Publishers, 1955.  
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technical development.37" Its aims and outcomes, on the other hand, were to "replace men by machines 
in operating and directing machines as well as in controlling the output of the products that are being 
manufactured."38 The reference to information and calculation is important, as in the decade-long inter-
val between the definitions of American Machinist and Pollack, automation transitioned from a frame-
work for describing uniform control of factory assembly procedures to a broader conception of automa-
tion as a feedback mechanism that also produces and leverages information as a means of standardizing 
work procedures and outcomes.  
As conceptual notions of automation integrated informational production and outcomes alongside 
tangible factory procedures and goods, concerns around automation's implications for labor (and there-
fore economic and social life) became more prominent during the "automation crisis" of the 1960s. 
Broadly speaking, this "crisis" was characterized by social anxieties around the escalating prowess of au-
tomated technologies to perform tasks once deemed the natural purview of human beings, anxieties 
particularly potent among workers fearful of losing their job and future employment prospects.  
While this "crisis" gained some traction in popular press, others were more sanguine about the ef-
fects of automation, given a mid-century belief in the ability of the U.S.'s burgeoning economic and gov-
ernmental enterprises to "manage the future."39 Lyndon B. Johnson indicated as much in 1964 when, 
remarking on the formation of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Pro-
gress, he insisted that "automation is not our enemy" and instead held the potential to be "the ally of 
our prosperity if we will just look ahead, if we will understand what is to come, and if we will set our 
                                                             
37 Pollock, Friedrich. The economic and social consequences of automation. Blackwell (1957): 5.  
38 Ibid 5-6.  
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https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2014-where-have-all-the-jobs-gone/theres-much-learn-from-past-
anxiety-over-automation/. Accessed July 1, 2017.  
22 
 
course wisely after proper planning for the future."40 That same year, Herbert Marcuse described the 
full automation of necessary production as a moment of "historical transcendence toward a new civiliza-
tion"41 in which private and social lives could be more profoundly experienced through leisure as op-
posed to capitalist labor.42 
If Marcuse and LBJ seem strange bedfellows in the realm of automation optimism, it is worth noting 
that Marcuse's hopes were pegged to the realization of a Marxist-style worker's paradise in contrast 
with President Johnson's attempt to spur gross domestic product (GDP) and other measures of capitalist 
growth informed by fomenting neoliberal ideologies. Beyond philosophical musings, Marcuse had some 
cause to believe in the potential of automation to lead to better labor conditions, as economist John 
Maynard Keynes had predicted as early as 1930 that technological innovation leveraged towards eco-
nomic efficiency could increasingly reduce the average work week until, by approximately 2030, only a 
15-hour work week would be necessary.43  
But, into the 1970s, the maximum 40-hour work week mandated by 1937's Fair Labor Standards Act 
had barely been reduced. In fact, from 1976-1993, the average work week increased by one hour for 
men, two hours for women, and the percentage of people working 49 hours or more steadily increased 
over that same period.44 During this time, the economic recession of 1973-1975 signaled the end of the 
post-World War II U.S. economic boom and further signaled the changing character of automation and 
                                                             
40 The American Presidency Project. " Remarks Upon Signing Bill Creating the National Commission on Technology, 
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its relationship to industrial frameworks. In 1973, as the economy began stagnating, Daniel Bell pub-
lished The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, a work that reconceived the nature and importance of 
automated technological performance. 
For Bell, the post-industrial society marked a shift from goods-based manufacturing to an infor-
mation-based service economy. In this sense, industries would become less concerned with manufactur-
ing tangible goods and instead reorient their business models to prioritize an economics of information. 
Integral to this notion of a post-industrial society is the valorization of science-based rationality as a 
means of improving on human capabilities for decision-making processes. Rather than rely on human 
intuition to make informed decisions, Bell indicated that more reliable (i.e. rational) decisions were pos-
sible through what he termed "intellectual technology." An intellectual technology is one that enables 
complex calculations and analyses of information through algorithms and computers.45 These technolo-
gies are distinguished by "efforts to define rational action and to identify the means to achieving it," ef-
forts that involve the "substitution of algorithms...for intuitive judgments" as a move away from the pre-
sumably less rational and more unaccountable machinations of human intellectual judgment.46  
As post-industrial discourses considered “automation and ideology” and “the myth of automatism” 
in the 1980s and onwards,47 the centrality of information, knowledge, and intellect as the means and 
outcomes of post-industrial work performance factored into the way information society and network 
society theorists addressed concomitant shifts in automated technologies, the globalization of economic 
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46 Ibid 29-30.  
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markets, and organizational labor modalities oriented around work performed through advanced com-
putational technologies.48 When Frank Webster notes the centrality of “theoretical knowledge/infor-
mation” to the machinations of everyday life in the information society, he cites utopian cultural imagin-
ings around the “automated factory” and 1970s-1980s micro-processing breakthroughs as feeding into 
cultural enthusiasm for technologically-driven change proffered by industry and cultural adherents 
alike.49 Armond Mattelart notes the origins of the information society lie in the invention of automated 
artificial intelligence and the formal usage of “information age” among WWII-era researchers.50 In a sim-
ilar vein, network society theories cite “workflow automation”51 as a principal means of organizing and 
streamlining office work made possibly by networked computers as “technologies of automation par ex-
cellence.”52  
Concurrent with the increasing address of automation by information society and network society 
theories, David Noble’s landmark Forces of Production: A Social History of Automation (first published in 
1984) undertakes a concrete historical analysis to methodologically validate the social construction of 
technology. He focuses on automation because it is “the hallmark of twentieth-century manufacturing 
technology” (xiv) and provides fruitful grounds for examining the ways “technical possibilities have been 
delimited by social constraints.”53 Both drawing from and pushing back against social constructivism, the 
                                                             
48 Clement, Andrew. “Office Automation and the Technical Control of Information Workers.” In Mosco, Vincent, 
and Janet Wasko, eds. The political economy of information. Univ of Wisconsin Press (1988): 217-246; Mattelart, 
Armand. The information society: An introduction. Sage, 2003; Masuda, Yoneji. The information society as post-
industrial society. World Future Society, 1980; Webster, Frank. Theories of the information society. Routledge, 
2014; Lyon, David. The information society: Issues and illusions. John Wiley & Sons, 2013; Van Dijk, Jan. The net-
work society. Sage Publications, 2012; Hassan, Robert. Media, politics and the network society. McGraw-Hill Educa-
tion (UK), 2004; Barney, Darin. The network society. Vol. 2. Polity, 2004. 
49 Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 9.  
50 Mattelart, The Information Society, 2.  
51 Van Dijk, The Network Society, 69.  
52 Barney, The Network Society Vol. 2, 91.  
53 Noble, David. Forces of production: A social history of industrial automation. Routledge (2011): xiv.  
25 
 
social shaping turn for science and technology studies (STS) and its concerns for “socio-economic pat-
terns embedded in both the content of technologies and the processes of innovation”54 explore indus-
trial cultures of factory automation55 and the “age of automation” online education beginning in the 
1980s.56 In the increasingly automated office, another “age of automation” was reshaping the organiza-
tional and productive capacities of workers undertaking knowledge-based work through increasingly so-
phisticated and networked computers.  
Manuel Castells accounts for three phases of office automation beginning in the 1970s and evolving 
in approximate correspondence to the 1980s and 1990s.  In the first phase, characteristic of the 1970s, 
office work was increasingly managed by specialists using batch processing capabilities of mainframe 
computers. Office work functions thus became "standardized, routinized, and deskilled for the majority 
of clerical workers,"57 even though many of these clerical workers were not necessarily directly interact-
ing with computers.  
Nonetheless, when a 1983 Christian Science Monitor article christened "the new automation" as 
one "combining robots and quickly adjusted computer control,"58 it implicitly referenced the increasing 
dependency on robots and computers for undertaking standardized approaches to decision-making 
based on complex interactions with data. While algorithmic capabilities didn't necessarily replace hu-
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man intelligence and judgment, technological automation became increasingly linked with a level of in-
telligence that suggested the intellectual versatility of human cognition. In this sense, "intelligence" (or, 
"intellect," as Bell preferred) would increasingly become associated with automation, especially as com-
puter automation became more prominent as a circumstance of office work in the 1980s.  
By the mid-1980s, Castells' second phase of office automation had taken hold, a phase character-
ized by the move from mainframe computers to micro-computing and the networking of microcomputer 
workstations. Widespread adoption of this brand of office automation was slow, however, and because 
the institutional will to implement the full possibilities of computer networking lagged behind techno-
logical capability, it would take another decade or so until office automation was more universally real-
ized. Castells' third phase of office automation speaks to this realization, as the 1990s saw the escalating 
integration and networking of microcomputers so that they ultimately formed an "interactive web that 
is capable of processing information, communicating, and making decisions in real time, "a web trans-
cending the mere use of computers by office workers and instead offices themselves became "interac-
tive information systems."59 As a result, office work became increasingly dislocated from material office 
spaces so that office work now trickled into the home, coffee shop, and other "virtual offices" enabled 
by the remote capabilities of computational networking.  
Alongside Castells' phases of office automation from the 1970s to 1990s, the field of artificial intelli-
gence research was undergoing a series of turbulent phases, including two "AI Winters" in the late 1970s 
and late 1980s/early 1990s, each characterized by a chill on investment after periods of progress and 
hype around AI's technological feats.60 Nonetheless, after IBM's Deep Blue defeated world-renown 
chess champion Garry Kasparov in 1997, cultural awareness of artificial intelligences gradually began to 
move away from conceptions of niche tinkering to more readily consider the social implications of AI. 
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Moreover, the Deep Blue-Kasparov chess matches epitomized the potential of AI as technologies pos-
sessed with fluid and versatile intelligence seemingly on par with human counterparts. In this way, artifi-
cial intelligence in the late 1990s and into the 2000s seemed poised to more profoundly realize Bell's 
"intellectual" technologies and the specter of their substitution for humans, especially as the Deep Blue-
Kasparov affair and subsequent developments brought "machine learning" to the fore of automated 
possibilities alongside artificial intelligence and algorithms. 
Concurrent with this timeline, from the early 1980s to the present, human-computer interaction 
(HCI) focuses on automation as a dynamic among the interface of human performance on computers 
and the design of computers for such performance, in addition to closely-related interdisciplinary sub-
fields branching off from HCI: human-machine interaction (HMI), human-machine collaboration/commu-
nication (HMC), human-robot interaction (HRI), human-robot collaboration/communication (HRC), hu-
man-automation interaction, and human-automation collaboration. Incorporating scholarship and 
methodologies from computer science, engineering, anthropology, sociology, communication, and other 
(primarily social science) disciplines. Anthropologist Lucy Suchman looms large over HCI and its dub-dis-
ciplines, as her Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-machine Communication (1987) and 
its follow-up Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Action (2007) respectively constitute 
the intellectual groundwork for HCI analysis and an overview of HCI’s progress and adaptability over a 
period of two decades. While the particulars of my concerns and methodological practice differ from 
Suchman and central tendencies of HCI scholarship, I align with concerns for shared conditions among 
human and intelligence machines, as my evocation of human-machine autonomy stresses autonomy as 
a shared condition rather than a circumstance differently situated for humans and automated counter-
parts. Moreover, my use of human-machine autonomy borrows from Suchman’s recent use of “human-
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machine autonomies” to analyze automated weapons systems with autonomous potentials and implore 
considerations of autonomy as realized within human-machine interfacing.61 
Building off these developments, automation in the contemporary moment is often predicated on 
"artificial intelligence, 'mechanical minds,' and smart bots that can teach themselves things they aren't 
pre-programmed to do."62 If mid-century automation was characterized by pushbutton controls and in-
formational feedback loops, and a subsequent iteration saw advances in the sophistication of auto-
mated computational processes to streamline and rationalize decision-making processes, the current 
moment of automation is primarily characterized by possibilities for automated processes to achieve 
(and supersede) intelligence on par with human beings.  
Whereas previous iterations of automation suggested the replication of blue-collar manual labor 
and then low-skilled white-collar clerical tasks, the contemporary moment conceives of a forthcoming 
automated intelligence capable of performing complex functions and jobs historically understood to be 
the sole province of human intellect. Moreover, today's automation is not merely about the ability to 
perform in accordance with sophisticated programming instructions; rather, today's automation under-
stands machine learning, deep learning, artificial intelligence, algorithms, and other computational con-
structs increasingly program technologies to learn and evolve at a remove from direct human control. In 
this sense, contemporary automation goes beyond the performances and techniques emerging technol-
ogies streamline, standardize, and otherwise make more efficient.  
Instead, today's automation distinguishes itself based its capacity to undertake intellectual, cogni-
tive, and social traits that allows humans to see automation as a framework impeding on not only their 
laboring capacity, but their uniqueness as highly-intelligent beings. If automation would first "replace 
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men by machines"63 and then entailed the "substitution of algorithms...for intuitive judgments"64 con-
temporary automation is conceived by many as a replacement or a substitute for human intellect be-
yond just the tasks humans perform through such intellect. In this context, automated technologies are 
oriented towards autonomous states as they become more intelligent and demonstrate increasing 
prowess for self-determining courses of action. Through this intelligence, they intake vast amounts of 
information and undertake fluid decision-making processes akin to a human being's capacity to situa-
tionally-analyze and make self-determinations based on their understanding of the world. Nonetheless, 
the intelligence of contemporary automation does not break or rupture human autonomy and dignity, 
as human-machine autonomy entails variability and nuance as to the way intelligence among humans 
and automated machines experiences shared alternating intensities of autonomous potential. While hu-
man-like intelligence is central to the technological character of contemporary automation, “contempo-
rary” in this context entails a period from 2011-2017 in which the confluence of significant innovations, 
industrial milestones, and socio-economic circumstances elevated the cultural visibility and awareness 
of automation and autonomous potentiality.  
1.9 Contemporary Automation 
This project is primarily concerned with a six-year timeframe from 2011-2017, a stretch of time in 
which the contemporary character of automation took shape, "autonomy" and "autonomous" were in-
creasingly used as descriptors for emerging technological conditions,  notions of "algorithmic" and "au-
tomatic" turns began to foment in academic literatures, industry and trade discourse began to forecast 
and prognosticate around the implications of advanced automation, social and economic frameworks 
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were increasingly proposed as a means of offsetting potential pratfalls of automation, and cultural rep-
resentations across media increasingly pitted humans in conflict against machines possessed with high 
degrees of intelligence and agency.   
The timeframe 2011-2017 is critical to understanding automated technologies as increasingly ori-
ented towards autonomous conditions and how this orientation interlocks with motivations of actors 
stretching across private institutions, legislative and regulatory entities, governance bodies, and public 
and domestic spheres. Notably, during this timeframe, automated technologies increasingly become au-
tomated media technologies, as automation proliferates among interactions with media texts (i.e. auto-
mated recommendations on Netflix), cultural practices associated with media texts (autoplay features 
encouraging binge-watching), media marketing (tie-in transmedia narratives accessed through Alexa 
“skills”65), and creative media labor (using IBM’s Watson to deliver a reliable first-cut composite of a film 
trailer66), among others. Further, automated platforms and applications are increasingly a primary medi-
ating force among tax preparation services and income tax filers, oncology doctors and patients, Dom-
ino’s Pizza and people with deplorable taste in pie-shaped foodstuffs. Automated media is both auto-
mated interactions with media and automated interaction as media, as indicated by “automated media” 
as a recent designation for the importance of automated processes to “the production and consumption 
of media content.”67 
Likewise, as automated technology became increasingly enmeshed with media content and prac-
tices, "automation" increasingly became the subject of forecasts, predictions, and prognostications 
around the potential consequences of increasingly autonomous technologies. As previously noted, these 
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foresights manifested across a wide array of forms, from think tank white papers to science fiction nar-
ratives, each extrapolating - in their own way - the present moment of technological capability towards 
a highly mechanized and mechanically-administered future, often conceived as “robot overlords” and 
“job-stealing” robots. These dystopic motifs both oriented a sense of the cultural implications of increas-
ingly autonomous technologies and provided the means for utopian socio-economic counternarratives 
emanating from both neoliberal marketplaces and postcapitalist collectivists. Beyond extrapolated de-
pictions and suppositions of automation-based implications, the tech and media industry witnessed sig-
nificant moments that grounded automation in lived realities and enabled a more culturally-accessible 
means of experiencing automation with human-like intelligence firsthand.  
From 2011-2017, a number of automated technologies either became publicly or selectively availa-
ble, yet in both cases achieved widespread awareness as to potential implications for everyday life, no-
tably four that constitute separate analysis in each chapter of this project: Uber’s mobile application for 
facilitating ridesharing (2011), IBM's Watson (2013), Tesla's Autopilot (2014), and Amazon's Alexa 
(2015). There were also institutional circumstances that shaped how some entities were understood as 
significant movers in the world of increasingly autonomous technologies, including their business goals, 
technological innovations, and incumbency as marketplace entities increasingly broadening their pro-
ductive sweep. This includes the transition from UberCab to Uber Inc. (2011), the first full calendar year 
of Tesla Motors as a publicly-traded company (2011), IBM’s release of Watson's open API (2013), Uber 
founder Travis Kalanick resigning as CEO (2017), and Tesla Motors CEO Elon Musk expanding his institu-
tional portfolio to include the non-profit OpenAI (2015) and the for-profit Solar City (2016), The Boring 
Company (2016), and Neuralink (2016).  
The years 2011-2017 also saw the release of research, trend, and forecasting reports on the impli-
cations of automation and its attendant technologies, including reports by the Oxford Martin School 
(2013), Pew Research Center (2014; 2016; 2017), World Economic Forum (2016), Price Waterhouse 
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Cooper (2017), and McKinsey Global Institute (2017). Government bodies likewise became increasingly 
involved in formal moves to address policy and regulatory implications of automation. This includes 
state-level bills that address autonomous technologies and cars in NV (2011), MI (2013; 2016), FL (2012, 
2016), TN (2016, 2017), GA (2017), alongside many others all considered and/or enacted between 2011-
2017. The federal government also interjected itself to address both the thicket of these state-level au-
tonomous vehicles laws (such as the Department of Transportation’s Federal Automated Vehicles Policy 
2017) and, more broadly, the economic implications of automation and artificial intelligence. On this lat-
ter front, the White House released reports on artificial intelligence (Oct. 2016) and automation and AI 
(Dec. 2016) during a two-month span in late 2016.  
It was also during 2011-2017 that a number of popular and trade press books stressed concerns re-
garding human beings and increasingly autonomous technologies. These include Our Final Invention 
(2013), Second Machine Age (2014), The Glass Cage (2014), Rise of the Robots (2015), Humans Need Not 
Apply (2015), Machines of Loving Grace (2015), Only Humans Need Apply (2016), The Industries of the 
Future (2016), and Fourth Industrial Revolution (2017). Popular media representations also stressed the 
relationship between humans and increasingly autonomous technologies in films such as Eva (2011), Her 
(2013), Sully (2016), Kill Command (2016), Ex Machina (2015), Morgan (2016), The Machine (2013), Au-
tomata (2014), Chappie (2015), Uncanny (2015), Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015), Transcendence  (2014), 
Blade Runner 2049 (2017), Prometheus (2012), and Alien: Covenant (2017); television shows such as Per-
son of Interest (2011 - 2016), Almost Human (2013-2014), Humans (2015 - present), Westworld (2016 - 
present) and Black Mirror (2011 - present); video games such as The Talos Principle (2014), Deus Ex: 
Mankind Divided (2016), and Horizon: Zero Dawn (2017); and comic books such as Alex + Ada (2013-
2015), Avengers A.I. (2013-2014), The Vision (2015-2016), and Descender (2015 - present).  
Furthermore, the timeframe 2011-2017 finds accords with recent calls to examine connective me-
dia and ecosystems beyond the first decade of their development and mass uptake in the 2000s. When 
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Jose van Dijck in The Culture of Connectivity analyzes the history of social media platforms between ap-
proximately 1999-2012, she offers 2012 as the year that significantly links this first decade of platform 
sociality to a forthcoming epoch with "automated connectivity at its core."68 Where her timeframe is a 
necessary arc to "comprehend current tensions in the ecosystem in which platforms and ever-larger 
groups of users operate,"69 my historical arc of 2011-2017 similarly unpacks tensions stemming from au-
tomation as a connective technological paradigm and how cultural discourses tend to connect imagin-
ings around automation to social paradigms emerging in the next decade and beyond. Furthermore, this 
project is a natural progression of cultural analyses seeking to impart the complications of industry and 
social buzzword necessitating surefooted scholarly inquiry. Just as Henry Jenkins offers “cultural conver-
gence” to explicate the implications of technologically-converged Web 2.0 paradigms70 and Van Dijck 
deepens and clarifies nuances of “connectivity” favored by social media entrepreneurs, I likewise expli-
cate the complications of “autonomy” amidst the foundational era of automated media, offering hu-
man-machine autonomy as a viable frame for explicating the dynamics of this era and laying a founda-
tion for subsequent inquiry.  
In the next section, the chapter outlines for my case studies – Autopilot, Watson, Alexa, and the 
Uber mobile application - more thoroughly evoke the importance of the 2011-2017 timeframe in rela-
tion to each object.  
1.10 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 1 (this chapter) identities unresolved questions around contemporary automation and au-
tonomy, sets up the argument, and outlines methodologies, stakes, and relevant contexts.  
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Chapter 2 focuses on notions of autonomy leveraged by policymakers and Tesla CEO Elon Musk as 
the company attempts to design and rollout cars with highly-automated and autonomous capacities. Via 
a discursive analysis of the first formal federal policy to recommend consolidated practices for outlining 
regulatory scope, enacting state-level policies around highly-automated vehicles, and urging design 
specifications – the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (FAVP) – I demonstrate complications of human 
autonomy as imagined by policymakers constructing and anticipating legal recommendations for state-
level policy makers and designers of automated vehicles. These imaginings contrast with Musk’s discur-
sive tendency to leverage “full autonomy” as a technological state extended to humans who undertake 
transport in Autopilot-powered vehicles.  
I begin with this chapter in order to drive towards a more nuanced conception of human autonomy 
amidst highly-automated vehicles possessed with the potential for technological autonomy. Elsewhere 
in this project, I stress a transition from automation to autonomy. Here, however, the prominent inter-
play of advanced automation and autonomous agency among technological systems and processes war-
rant an address of both autonomous and automated conditions, especially as Autopilot-powered Tesla 
cars and other automated vehicles display evidence of autonomous potential. Moreover, the popular 
imagination and early reception around highly-automated vehicles tends to deploy autonomy as a short-
hand for these vehicles and cultural implications. Therefore, unique to this chapter is the necessity of 
urging a more nuanced conception of human autonomy that addresses questions outside the purview of 
autonomous agents and automated interaction as described in scientific literatures and circulated 
across popular arenas. In short, as made clear by this chapter, it is necessary to address autonomy and 
automation, rework them both, and conceptualize a more precise understanding of human autonomy. 
Musk’s conception of full autonomy reworks cultural fears around autonomous technology, yet 
does so in a manner definitionally and theoretically insufficient to describe the complications of human 
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autonomy that can emerge from rigorous analysis. Thus, I use the FAVP as a nodal point among interre-
lated policy and Tesla discourse to build towards a more nuanced conception of human autonomy, argu-
ing for an ideology of human autonomy as a condition modeled in policy stipulations for technological 
and social control; modulated in its intensities and opportunities by political power struggles; and modu-
lated in accordance with implications for the intersection of driving and media usage as cultural activi-
ties transpiring during passage in automated vehicles.  
Chapter 2: 2011-2017 timeline: 2011 was the year of the first government policy for self-driving 
cars. On June 23, 2011, Nevada passed Assembly Bill 511. Section 8 of Assembly Bill 511 authorized the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to "adopt regulations authorizing the operation of autonomous vehicles 
on highways."71 Nearly a year later, in May 2012, the state issued its first self-driving car license. Even 
though Google's self-driving concept car was the recipient of this license, Tesla's Autopilot technology 
has rapidly ascended to the forefront of speculation around possibilities for autonomous driving ever 
since it debuted Autopilot in 2014. That same year, Tesla founder and CEO Elon Musk first claimed that 
some degree of autonomous driving would be possible by the end of 2017, as Musk planned a cross-
county expedition "all the way from a parking lot in California to a parking lot in New York with no con-
trols touched in the entire journey”72 that, as of mid-2018, has yet to materialize. The notion of "de-
grees" of autonomous driving was encoded in the Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) International's 
Oct. 2014 information report "Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle 
Automated Driving Systems."73 The report outlined six levels of automated driving, ranging from "No Au-
                                                             
71 https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/76th2011/Bills/AB/AB511_EN.pdf  
72 https://futurism.com/elon-musk-teslas-autonomous-car-will-drive-coast-to-coast-by-2018/  
73 http://standards.sae.org/j3016_201401/ 
36 
 
tomation" (0) to "Full Automation" (5). While the official report does not designate its levels as "auton-
omy" or “autonomous," SAE elsewhere refers to these levels as "automated/autonomous."74 These lev-
els and definitions were subsequently adopted by the U.S. Department of Transportation as part of their 
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, released in September 2016. The Policy not only signaled a need to 
standardize definitions and classifications around autonomous capabilities, but also gestured towards 
the need for federal intervention stemming from an increasing number of state government bills that 
addressed autonomous vehicles between the passing of Nevada's 2011 bill and the 2016 Federal Auto-
mated Vehicles Policy, including Florida's House Bill 7027 which permits the operation of autonomous 
vehicles on public roads. As it currently stands, 41 states have considered legislation relating to autono-
mous vehicles, in addition to Washington D.C.  
Chapter 3 concerns the relationship between the centrality of IBM’s Watson AI to the company’s 
business portfolio and the company’s motivations to leverage policy to economically underwrite the 
training and upskilling of high-tech “New Collar” workers capable of working with Watson. When the 
New Collar Jobs Act was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2017, the Act re-
flected IBM’s cultural construction of New Collar Work and provisions central to its corporate goals, par-
ticularly as the Act enables IBM to seek remuneration for its encroachment into vocational training and 
cybersecurity initiatives in tandem with the importance of Watson to these and related company initia-
tives. In doing so, IBM situates Watson as an enhancer of human autonomy in the context of employa-
bility and productive vitality, even as the Act and the logics of New Collar speak to IBM’s corporate au-
tonomy as the company attempts to navigate shifts to its business model and digital economies.  
As I will demonstrate through analysis of the New Collar Jobs Act, New Collar work emerges out of 
IBM’s strategic use of “augmentation” to describe the productive and intellectual capacities of humans 
enhanced by collaboration with Watson and “cognitive” as a rubric for reconceptualizing Watson and 
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IBM’s contemporary marketplace prowess. On this latter front, IBM’s insistence on the augmentative 
capacities of Watson stems from a preference for “cognitive” as opposed to “artificial” intelligence, a 
means of reversing AI-based dystopian implications for human vitality and stressing the ability of Wat-
son to inflect tech workers with its automated cognition. Moreover, “cognitive” also exemplifies IBM’s 
attempt to assert its prowess in contemporary digital economies by stressing Watson as the signifier of 
the “cognitive era” of computing and IBM as the progenitor and corporate titan of this era. Ultimately, 
this chapter stresses the importance of autonomy as a critical attribute among IBM’s politico-economic 
motivations and ensuing implications for emerging tech workers.  
Chapter 3: 2011-2017 timeline. In 2011, Watson appeared on the television game show Jeopardy in 
competition against accomplished Jeopardy alums Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter. By the end of multiple 
rounds that aired on Feb. 14 and 15 of this year, Watson emerged victorious, prompting a groundswell 
of discourse aimed at the broader social implications of artificial intelligence and IBM's specific institu-
tional plans for Watson's deployment in sectors such as health care and business enterprise. IBM's an-
nouncement of an open application programming interface (API) in 2013 facilitated both the technologi-
cal integration of Watson into third-party technologies and also facilitated IBM's institutional goals for 
revenue generation. As of 2017, Watson appears to be the bright spot for these goals, as despite IBM 
reporting 20 straight quarters of year-over-year overall revenue declines in April 2017, revenues at-
tributable to Watson increased for the fourth quarter in a row.75 
Chapter 4 shifts from government policy to corporate marketing, exploring complications of auton-
omy arising from Amazon’s intent to market Alexa as the go-to consumer device for home automation. 
The considerable presence of Alexa at the 2017 Consumer Electronics Show (CES) and ensuing trade 
press is the primary means of allegorizing the relationship between notions of autonomy built into a 
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gendered technology and cultural ideologies of women’s autonomy among public and private spheres. 
By demonstrating the ways new domestic technologies tend to both resist and capitulate to gendered 
conceptions of power and autonomy across public and private life, I argue that Alexa should be under-
stood as possessed with complicated and contrasting autonomous potentials with respect to home au-
tomation and interrelated gender dynamics of domesticity and technology. As a gendered technology, 
Alexa allegorizes autonomy as an alternately ennobled and restricted condition for social life.  
One of the first compilations is Alexa’s autonomy in relation to software and hardware. As a singu-
lar software agent widely interoperable with a vast array of hardware devices and systems, Alexa en-
compasses gendered associations of software and soft power, associations with unthinking bodily auto-
maticity, ineffectiveness for political change, and a highly diminished autonomy. On the other hand, Am-
azon markets Alexa as the “brain” of its Echo device, uplifting Alexa as highly-intelligent and politically 
empowered, a soft empowerment ennobling of autonomous potential that can be constructed, mobi-
lized, and shared in accordance soft power’s quest for affinity, kinship, and political plurality. In the con-
text of work performed within the automated home, Amazon marketing dovetails with circumscribed 
notions of women as domestic laborers performing servile undertakings readying the home for respite 
from the workaday masculine world. Contrarily, however, Alexa is construed as possessing mastery of 
creative and flexible traits that enable her to determine mediated interactions, an autonomy in which 
Alexa is endowed with decision-making capacities for cultivating media, mediated interactions, and the 
professional and creative expertise associated with such capacities.  
When Alexa’s mobile capabilities are brought to bear, a tripartite dynamic emerges. In one view, 
Alexa possesses little autonomy to move from the domestic sphere into public life, as the Alexa mobile 
app transforms public life into a virtual domestic “room” such that Alexa is cordoned off from public life 
even when transported via mobile hardware out of the home. In another view, Amazon’s insistence that 
Alexa “lives” in the computational cloud situates Alexa as omnipresent among public and domestic life, 
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autonomously moving in space and time, permeating the nonspace of the cloud and carrying with it uto-
pian ideals of derealized and deconstructed social and spatial power dynamics. Finally, public APIs that 
enable third-party “hobbyist” developers to integrate Alexa into non-Amazon products and enhance 
Alexa skills resurface separations between an economic and technologically savvy masculine public and 
an emotional and technologically-consumptive feminized home. In this view, hobbyists writing and com-
piling code for public APIs associates with long-standing notions of public masculine work that drives 
economic vitality, as Alexa’s skills become associated with emotional work, the invisibility of this work, 
and the declining recognition of women as integral and foundational to the inception of profound com-
putational paradigms. In this way, Alexa’s autonomy is not only diminished, but risks a similar paradoxi-
cal decline if Alexa’s increasing prolificacy and capabilities likewise become disassociated with the foun-
dational attributes of women’s contributions and characteristics.  
Chapter 4: 2011-2017 timeline: The 2011 availability of Apple's Siri for iPhone 4S marked a signifi-
cant moment for public awareness and uptake of personal intelligence assistants. By the time Amazon's 
Alexa was released in late 2014, Siri had become somewhat synonymous with mobile voice assistance, 
perhaps one significant reason why Amazon heavily promotes Alexa for its in-home capabilities as real-
ized through the company's Echo hardware. Amazon's aggressive move to assert the viability of Alexa as 
consumer choice for automating smart homes suggests an ambition to make Alexa as synonymous with 
smart homes as Siri is with smart phones. Given recent reports that Amazon controls 70% of the voice-
controlled speaker market,76 Amazon has both achieved rapid dominance in the personal voice assistant 
field and proved highly influential in defining the contours of the marketplace. Mike George's presenta-
tion at the January 2017 Consumer Electronic Show (CES) and the company's rollout and presentation of 
advancing Alexa capabilities at the show, a move seen by many the company's most aggressive move yet 
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to make itself synonymous with smart homes and practical everyday experiences with domestic auto-
mation. Only a few months after the show, Brookfield Residential partnered with Amazon to build a se-
ries of smart homes that integrate the Alexa framework, a partnership intended to "demonstrate that 
smart home technology isn’t reserved for expensive houses."77 When viewed as evidence of Amazon's 
success at CES, the Brookfield partnership and subsequent accomplishments seem to epitomize a Wired 
headline that appeared shortly after CES 2017: "Alexa Just Conquered CES. The World is Next."78  
Chapter 5 analyzes an Uber application to patent a process for integrating and automating social 
media information as part of the company’s ridesharing services. By conceptualizing Uber’s interface as 
iconic and the persistence of its iconic dimensions within the typographical and pictorial components of 
the patent application, this analysis yields three interrelated complications that stress the implications 
of autonomy amidst intensified automated sociality.  
First, Uber’s intention to incorporate the social while maintaining a simplified interface entails a 
simplicity that both masks the complexities of automated sociality and enables users to see through this 
process, alternately restricting user autonomy by obfuscating the complex economic, technological, and 
legal circumstances informing Uber’s automated sociality and granting autonomy through an overreli-
ance on simplicity that enables users to reveal these otherwise masked complexities. Second, Uber’s 
iconic interface coheres invisible orders of neoliberal society, inducing a neoliberal imaginary that struc-
tures the increasing privatization of social actors and information as the logical means of conceptualizing 
social interaction. Whereas the neoliberal imaginary proffers autonomy as a condition for neoliberal 
power brokers or consumeristic variability, the coherence of the Uber iconic interface also enables the 
iconoclastic rejection of neoliberal imaginaries, investing social actors with autonomy through prosocial 
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imaginaries that both destroy iconicity and create the means to envision social solidarity. Finally, the 
Uber iconic interface is a relay for abstraction that casts into opposing directions of inequitable propor-
tionality the real conditions of social life and an automated sociality that self-replicates the commoditi-
zation of this capital. If subject to a real abstraction that understands the immaterial nature of commod-
ified sociality as the real conditions of social life, social autonomy becomes neutralized not because of 
the increasing autonomous sophistication of automated technology, but because of the instantiated be-
lief that techno-economic autonomy is the way autonomy can be experienced.  
Chapter 5: 2011-2017 timeline: In 2011, UberCab rechristened itself Uber Inc. and over the course 
of 2011 rapidly expanded its operations in U.S. and international cities and also expanded the availability 
of its mobile application. Uber also in 2011 received from the San Francisco Municipal Transportation 
Agency a cease-and-desist letter claiming the company was operating as an unlicensed taxi service. By 
the time Uber co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick resigned in 2017 amidst controversies surrounding 
the company's corporate culture and business practices, Uber had in the intervening years been em-
broiled in a number of legal challenges regarding the company's designation as a transportation enter-
prise subject to regulatory frameworks, the designation of Uber drivers as non-employee independent 
contractors, and, notably, alleged patent infringement of Waymo autonomous vehicle technology. The 
company likewise faced social protests stemming from these issues, as well as accusations of sexual har-
assment engrained in its corporate culture and the seemingly rapacious deployment of surge-pricing.  
These developments increasingly underscored the importance of the Uber mobile application, including 
Uber's attempts to position the company as a facilitator of transportation services via app-based inter-
facing rather than a transportation service per se, and the deleting of the app during a widespread social 
media campaign (#deleteUber) in early 2017.  
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By shifting the frame from automation to autonomy, and arguing for human-machine autonomy, I 
complicate presiding dystopic and utopian conceptions of automation that cast autonomy into diametri-
cally-opposed quarters and, instead, evoke a series of intertwined complexities striking at the heart of 
life in highly-automated times. In this way, I also lay the groundwork for further assessments stemming 
from the economic, technological, political, and social conditions at the heart of my analysis, an espe-
cially critical factor given the fast-moving nature around the development and cultural inception of au-
tonomous technologies.  
Chapter 6 summarizes key points, reinforces the viability of this approach, and offers suggestions 
for subsequent scholarship to build off the insights offered herein.  
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2     TESLA’S AUTOPILOT 
For engineers, computer scientists, and other specialists in fields related to scientific design and re-
search, autonomy is an ongoing concern with respect to highly-automated technological performance. 
Among robotics researchers, autonomous systems have received increasing focus since the 1980s. The 
journal Robotics launched in 1985 and by 1988 had changed its name to Robotics and Autonomous Sys-
tems,79 preceding the 1994 debut of the journal Autonomous Robots.80 Within autonomous systems and 
robotics research, autonomous software agents receive significant attention. Autonomous software 
agents are a class of software with imbedded abilities to determine an appropriate course of action in 
pursuit of a pre-determined goal. They are autonomous in the sense that they can self-determine – free 
from direct control or oversight – how to achieve the pre-determined goal. In the early to mid 1990s, au-
tonomous software agents increasingly became the focal point of robotics researchers.81 This trend con-
tinued with the 1997 launch of the MIT Press series “Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Agents”82 and 
the 1998 debut of the journal Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems and through the contempo-
rary moment, a moment that includes very recent media studies research on autonomous software 
agents and the attribution of autonomy to highly-automated technologies and techniques (such as 
bots).  
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A 2016 special section of International Journal of Communication (IJoC) entitled “Automation, Algo-
rithms, and Politics” begins with “Political Communication, Computational Propaganda, and Autono-
mous Agents,” an article that interrogates the role of autonomous agents in “computational propa-
ganda,”83 including the use of these agents as “proxies for political actors hoping to sway public opinion 
through the spread of propaganda and misinformation,” particularly through social media platforms.84 
The 2017 collection Socialbots and Their Friends – Digital Media and the Automation of Sociality features 
several essays that reference autonomy among human and socialbots. In this collection, Keiko Nishi-
mura describes the creation of “semi-autonomous fan faction” between humans and character bots, a 
type of socialbot that can make decisions about how to converse with humans yet does not attempt to 
pass as a human being.85 These bots are semi-autonomous since their ability to determine conversa-
tional flow and illicit a “non-human affect” depends on a “combination of operating programs, human 
understanding of these programs and interpretive activities.”86 Similarly, Adrienne Massanari accounts 
for the semi-autonomous function of bots among Reddit communities and attempts to understand “so-
cial ramifications of bots as semi-autonomous actors” in the context of Reddit’s playful habitus.87 Else-
where in this collection, Guillaume Latzko-Toth refers to an “imaginary of autonomy” suggested by In-
ternet Relay Chat (IRC) bots capable of interaction and information generation free from the directing 
hand of human programmers and IRC users.88 Also in Socialbots and Their Friends, Andrea Guzman coins 
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the term “vocal social agent” [(VSAs)] to describe Siri and other VSAs “designed to be autonomous and 
adapt to and assist users.”89 Writing in 2017 on the “blockchain dreams” of Bitcoin adherents, Lana 
Swarts gestures towards Bitcoin’s economic and institutional and the insistence by these adherents that 
the digital currency is intended to “function autonomous of states or banks.”90 Where these recent me-
dia studies analyses gesture towards autonomy as a condition among human interaction and automated 
sophistication, scientific specialists consider an array of interactions among humans and automation 
that demand further scrutiny through a media studies lens – particularly issues of “control” manifest 
among scientific automation literatures.  
Among scientific literatures on autonomous agents and other-highly automated technologies, a pri-
mary concern is the degree of control exercised by – and between – humans and automated technique. 
The research area “human-automation interaction” (HAI) is particularly concerned with control as an 
operative function performed by humans and/or machines among automated systems.91 In 2017 article 
drawing from key insights gleamed from research on human-automation interaction, author Mica Ends-
ley describes an “automation conundrum” whereby the increasing autonomy of technology causes hu-
mans to become less situationally aware and less apt to assume control of the technology when neces-
sary.92 Part of this conundrum addresses the potential “full autonomy” of technology, as complete tech-
nological autonomy renders human control impossible. As Endsley notes, even the most advanced au-
tonomous technology still requires humans to serve as “supervisory controllers,” with responsibilities 
                                                             
89 Andrea L. Guzman, "Making AI safe for humans: A conversation with Siri," In Socialbots and Their Friends (2017): 
70.  
90 Lana Swartz, "Blockchain dreams: Imagining techno-economic alternatives after Bitcoin," in Eds. Manuel Cas-
tells Another Economy Is Possible: Culture and Economy in a Time of Crisis (2017): 92.  
91 See: Parasuraman, Raja, Thomas B. Sheridan, and Christopher D. Wickens. "A model for types and levels of hu-
man interaction with automation." IEEE Transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Hu-
mans 30, no. 3 (2000): 286-297; Parasuraman, Raja, and Victor Riley. "Humans and automation: Use, misuse, dis-
use, abuse." Human factors 39, no. 2 (1997): 230-253; Lee, John D., and Katrina A. See. "Trust in automation: De-
signing for appropriate reliance." Human factors 46, no. 1 (2004): 50-80. 
92 Endsley, Mica R. "From here to autonomy: lessons learned from human–automation research." Human fac-
tors 59, no. 1 (2017): 5. 
46 
 
for oversight and cooperation when circumstances warrant human intervention.93 When, for example, 
autonomous software is at play in a technological system, the role of a human “becomes one of moni-
toring and intervening in situations that the software cannot handle.”94 In other words, control is at the 
heart of the automation conundrum: as technological autonomy increasingly assumes more control, hu-
mans are less apt to maintain vigilance and assume control under necessary conditions. And, paradoxi-
cally, the potential for totalized control through “full autonomy” induces human passivity as technologi-
cal autonomy ascends towards this totalized state. Although HAI research is measured in its modes of 
inquiry, assessment, and results, the automation conundrum leans into a predominant cultural idea that 
autonomous technology is “out of control” and “follows its own course, independent of human direc-
tion.”95 While scholars in technology studies acknowledge the ongoing presence of this cultural idea, the 
use of “autonomous technology” as an explanatory framework is largely derided for its myopic depend-
ence on ideologically-imposed causality and technological determinism.96 Nonetheless, issues of control 
persist among recent scientific literatures addressing autonomous agents, highly-automated technology, 
and human interaction. In this context, control is especially important as scientific researchers and a 
range of social actors attempt to grapple with the emergence of autonomous cars manifest through 
technological convergence of autonomous agents, automated digital connectivity, and vehicular engi-
neering, particularly with respect to Tesla’s Autopilot.  
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2.1 Tesla’s Autopilot 
Autopilot is Tesla’s converged suite of hardware and software features that enable Tesla-produced 
vehicles to perform driving functions free from direct human operation. In the context of control, Auto-
pilot controls varying degrees of vehicular performance free from direct human control. In September 
2014, Tesla announced that all newly-produced Model S vehicles (Tesla’s luxury-class car) would include 
Autopilot as a standard feature, and later added Autopilot as an optional feature for Model X cars 
(Tesla’s mid-sized crossover SUV). Tesla’s Autopilot takes its name from a more generalized assemblage 
of technologies enabling a vehicle to operate independent from direct human control, acknowledged by 
the company as a naming scheme chosen for its similarity to autopilot systems used by pilots to cede 
vehicular control of airplanes under particular circumstances.97 In other words, the distinct technological 
features that comprise Tesla’s intellectual property (Autopilot) advance from – and refer to – a broader 
universe of technological features enabling vehicles (planes, cars) to operate free from direct human 
control under certain conditions (autopilot). As of early 2018, the current version of Autopilot software 
is version 8.1, the most recent in a series of iterative releases beginning with the initial release of version 
6.0 in September 2014.98 While software updates add new features and expand upon existing features, 
a Tesla sales brochure for Model S summarizes Autopilot’s baseline technological specifications, capabil-
ities, and affordances: 
“Autopilot combines a forward looking camera, radar, and 360 degree sonar sensors with real time 
traffic updates to automatically drive Model S on the open road and in dense stop and go traffic. Chang-
ing lanes becomes as simple as a tap of the turn signal. When you arrive at your destination, Model S 
will both detect a parking spot and automatically park itself. Standard equipment safety features are 
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constantly monitoring stop signs, traffic signals and pedestrians, as well as for unintentional lane 
changes.”99 
Version 8.1 adds new features and expands upon many baseline functions, including advanced ca-
pabilities for autosteering, parallel parking, and “summon,” a feature that allows owners to initiate (via 
mobile application) the car’s ability to park itself and, alternately, navigate from a parked position to the 
owner.100  
Autopilot is one of many attempts by a range of incumbent and emerging companies and conglom-
erates to develop autonomous cars and/or software capable of performing autonomous functionality. 
As of early 2018, development and production of autonomous cars is underway at incumbent automo-
bile manufactures (Aptiv, Audi, BMW, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, 
Volkswagen), and computer technology companies (Alphabet, Intel, Tesla, Lyft, Uber), in addition to 
computer technology companies focused more exclusively on the production of software undergirding 
autonomous functionality (Apple, Microsoft) and those that have made public gestures towards pursuit 
of autonomous cars (Amazon, Facebook). Increasingly, vertical and horizontal integration are driving 
forces behind such development, as incumbent automobile companies have purchased and/or invested 
in smaller (often startup) companies focused on developing software for autonomous cars,101102 and 
computer technology companies absorb companies more precisely focused software and computer 
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technologies for automobiles,103in addition to partnerships among incumbent automobile manufactures 
and computer technology companies.104  
In the onrush to capitalize on a forthcoming marketplace for autonomous cars, the rapid consolida-
tion of companies with a potential stake in this market blurs the lines between automobile and technol-
ogy company, as the technological convergence of automated digital connectivity and automotive engi-
neering necessitates an interdependence on infrastructural and production capacities of companies op-
erating in market sectors typically differentiated along lines of products (cars, computers) and services 
(software, mobile applications, transport). One of the primary reasons Tesla stands out among this rap-
idly-expanding field is its inhouse production of both automobiles and the software agent (Autopilot) 
powering autonomous capabilities, to say nothing of its self-designation as the “world’s only vertically 
integrated energy company,”105 and in addition to the cultural prominence and celebrity status of Tesla 
CEO Elon Musk. More pertinently, however, as an early and aggressive entrant into the budding autono-
mous car marketplace, Tesla’s attempts to bring autonomous vehicles to market invites opportunities to 
understand how the cultural uses of Autopilot – and autonomous cars more generally – are prefigured 
by policymakers, regulators, engineering experts, business leaders, and others involved in the process of 
initiating policy recommendations for the cultural rollout of autonomous cars. Before these cars appear 
on roadways (outside of limited test-run exercises), federal and state regulatory scope, legal applications 
of technological “autonomy” and “automation” (as well as related terminology), and human interaction 
with and within these vehicles will already have been designated by political, scientific, and corporate 
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powerbrokers. Thus, it is critical to analyze policymaking for what it portends as a loadstone for concep-
tualizing notions of autonomy built into Autopilot, political frameworks governing Autopilot, and how 
these technological and political aspects of autonomy anticipate possibilities for human autonomy as in 
relations to autonomous cars.  
2.2 Autonomy, Control, and Freedom 
These notions of autonomy supersede technological autonomy described by scientific research and 
invoke the contested and contrasting dynamics of human autonomy animated by attempts to legally 
codify imaginings for the autonomous potentials of human beings interacting with autonomous vehicles. 
My primary aim is to situate Autopilot as an autonomous agent beyond mere technological concerns 
and instead argue for Autopilot as a software agent inflected with both imbedded and explicit concep-
tions of freedom and control indicative of how human autonomy is imagined, contested, and transi-
tioned amidst political conceptions around the legal and technological status of automated vehicles. This 
notion of control acknowledges and tarries with technological control and other aspects of both human 
and vehicular control analyzed by scholarship on autonomous agents and human-automation interac-
tions. But, my method goes further to draw in control and freedom as cultural conditions ensnarled 
among corporate and political actors attempting to maximize their own control over legal definitions, 
regulatory scopes, and human uses for Autopilot and other autonomous technologies. Thus, my argu-
ment hinges on autonomy as a human condition emerging from the correspondence between control 
and freedom, a tension between control as an imposed power restricting freedom and control as a 
means of asserting power to maximize freedom. Where Autopilot invites opportunities to address these 
critical aspects of autonomy, the primary object of analysis that enlivens these aspects of autonomy is 
the first formal attempt to recommend policies and regulations for autonomous cars – the 2016 Federal 
Automated Vehicles Policy (FAVP).  
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2.3 The Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (FAVP) 
Released in September 2016, the FAVP is the first federal policy to acknowledge the “digital era in-
creasingly reaches deeper into transportation” and grapple with this technological convergence through 
formal federal recommendations.106 The FAVP is a guidance document, in that it does not attempt to 
implement rulemaking. Instead, it offers recommendations that can “speed the delivery of an initial reg-
ulatory framework” necessitated by the rapid speed of automated vehicle development and numerous 
ramifications posed by the mass uptake of these vehicles.107 These recommendations are primarily 
aimed at state-level policymakers, manufacturers, and others directly involved in the production, design, 
testing, and rollout of “highly-automated vehicles” and therefore are bracketed into four sections: Vehi-
cle Performance Guidance; Model State Policy; NHTSA’s Current Regulatory Tools; and New Tools and 
Authorities.”108 One of its most significant facets receives the bulk of my analytical attention: levels of 
automation that stipulate technological function and human interactions across a six-tiered strata. Prior 
to their integration into FAVP, these levels were developed by DOT and reworked by SAE amidst at-
tempts to build legal and technological consensus around automated vehicle policy. Thus, the con-
sistency of these levels across policy formulations provide telling insights into the political struggles, 
contestations, and alterations that entailed conceptions of human autonomy prone to shift in intensity 
and possibility.  
2.4 Methodology 
In terms of my analysis, and with regard to policy language and policymaking processes, my meth-
odological approach treats FAVP as a “nodal point” among a series of preceding and successive attempts 
to initiate and revise policies that imbed conceptions of human autonomy along lines of control and 
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freedom. A nodal point, as described by Laclau and Moueffe, is a privileged site among a broader net-
work of discursive formations.109 While the FAVP could be read as a standalone text, the discourses 
feeding into, coursing through, and emanating from FAVP are not solely parked in the text of this singu-
lar policy and instead represent a significant moment among a series of policymaking and regulatory 
struggles over taxonomic definitions, regulatory scope, and technological design, performance, and op-
eration. Two preceding documents -  the 2013 Department of Transportation (DOT) Statement of Policy 
(henceforth: 2013 DOT Statement) and the 2014 Society of Automotive Engineers International (SAE)’s 
Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles 
(henceforth: 2014 SAE Taxonomy) – initiated a process of contested terminology, foci, and functionality 
germane to both human operation of an automated vehicle and the vehicle’s technological capability. 
Among these contestations, differing designations and applications of “automated,” “autonomous,” 
“driver,” “user,” and “control” reveal conflicting ideas as to the focal point of policy frameworks (vehi-
cles or drivers), when (and if) drivers should be considered “users,” distinctions among degrees of auto-
mated technique, and control as technological functionality, human operation, and social phenomena at 
the interface among contesting power brokers.  
Thus, by treating FAVP as a nodal point, it marks FAVP as significant for what it brings together and 
what it reveals about autonomy in the context of freedom and control rather than what it merely pos-
sesses. Beyond reaching across domains internal and external to FAVP for discursive meaning, my ap-
proach also enables – via Bruno Latour – discourse itself to be understood not as a fixed realm floating 
separately from societal (read: political, economic, technological) domains but rather a “population of 
actants that mix with things as well as with societies, uphold the former and the latter alike, and hold 
onto them both.”110 In other words, my methodology situates FAVP as a significant moment in a series 
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of significant discourses that embed notions of autonomy among intermixed ideologies of control and 
freedom when “things” (digitally-connective and automotive technology) and corresponding economic, 
political, and ideological paradigms converge and form cohabitated relations.  
While my objective is to read FAVP and related policy texts for what they reveal about human au-
tonomy, my analysis of a policy aimed at regulatory scope gestures towards areas of media policy stud-
ies similarly concerned with cultural implications emerging outs of attempts to regulate and drive politi-
cal consensus around federal and state legal address of media technologies and systems.  In this con-
text, media regulation and its political, social, and economic informants and effects has been signifi-
cantly analyzed by Jennifer Holt,111 Robert McChesney,112 Des Freedman,113 Susan Crawford,114 and 
Philip Napoli,115 among others.116 Where these scholars underscore the importance of regulatory and 
policymaking texts, bodies, ideologies, and power struggles on cultural implications for media and tech-
nology, I endeavor to likewise unmask the implications for human autonomy as encoded in early at-
tempts by political power brokers to imagine and influence the cultural uptake of automated vehicles.  
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2.5 Convergence Culture and Digital Media Theory 
My methodological approach is levitated by incorporating pertinent strands of digital media theory. 
Notably, convergence culture speaks to popular and policymaking conceptions of human autonomy as 
transitional and fluctuating along lines of cultural uses for Autopilot and other vehicles enlivened by au-
tomated connectivity. As popularized by Henry Jenkins and taken up widely by other digital media schol-
ars,117 convergence culture moves beyond the integration of otherwise distinct technologies and techno-
logical function to analyze a “cultural shift” between those who produce and develop technologies and 
those who use and consume them.118 Jenkins’ concept describes the convergence of “old” media (film, 
television, other media texts) with “new” media (online interactivity, digital platforms) and stresses the 
increasingly blurred line between “producer” and “consumer” as a significant paradigm in this cultural 
shift, as convergence is a process occurring “within the brains of individual consumers and through their 
social interactions within others” and therefore endowing consumers with degrees of power that upturn 
historical demarcations between producers and consumers.119  
As I will demonstrate, the imagined cultural uses of Autopilot correspond to popular conceptions 
and legal stipulations for when and how humans intervene to control driving operations, the extent to 
which humans are expected to maintain situational awareness for operation control, and the extent to 
which humans are free to pursue other activities when levels of automated functionality control the 
bulk of vehicular operation. While technological convergence of automated vehicles has been signifi-
cantly analyzed by scientific scholars and researchers, my application of convergence culture illuminates 
and complicates demarcations among “drivers” and “users” (as well as the application of “automation” 
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to describe “driving” or “vehicles”) between FAVP and its provisional policy forerunners (2013 DOT 
Statement and 2014 SE Taxonomy), particularly as these designations correlate with how human auton-
omy is alternately enabled or restricted by controlling vehicular operation or ceding control to techno-
logical operation. Thus, where convergence culture invokes the rupture of “producers” and “consum-
ers,” I draw from Jenkin’s use of convergence culture and other digital media theory that directly or indi-
rectly leverages this logic to offer similar ruptures along lines of “production” and “user,”120 “audience” 
and “user,”121 and “participation” and “consumption.”122 While convergence culture illuminates the rela-
tionship between Autopilot and human autonomy, other pockets of digital media theory situate human 
autonomy as not only shifting, but continually modulated with respect to cultural uses and implications 
of software, as well as contaminant notions of control and freedom. In this vein, , the relationship 
among software, control, and freedom has been explicitly analyzed by Alexander Galloway123 and 
Wendy Chun,124 whose work I leverage, in addition to digital media and social theorists concerned with 
software, socio-techno control, and cultural implications.   
My analysis begins with Elon Musk’s publicly-stated ambition for Autopilot to enable Tesla cars to 
achieve “full autonomy.” It is necessary to begin with the wider cultural usage of autonomy in order to 
reveal the incomplete nature of this popular usage and move towards a more nuanced conception of 
autonomy emerging from Musk’s economic motivations, conceptions of human autonomy among FAVP 
and preceding policy texts, and the ways autonomy is modulated through these conceptions. By begin-
ning my analysis with complications of autonomy and automation across popular and political arenas, I 
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set the stage for more profound ways of understanding the complications of autonomy among ma-
chines, their makers and governing forces, and those who socially interact with them.  
2.6 Convergence: Elon Musk and Full Autonomy 
Elon Musk prolifically uses “autonomous” and “autonomy” in explicit reference to Autopilot’s tech-
nological ability to control most – if not all – vehicular operations. He’s especially apt to make predic-
tions about Autopilot’s ability to enable “full” (or, alternately, “complete”) autonomy. From a technolog-
ical standpoint, Musk considers full autonomy not just a future possibility but a “solved problem.” At the 
2016 Recode conference, Musk announced that Tesla resolved questions of if and when autonomous 
driving will be technologically realized, as he indicated “we’re less than two years from complete auton-
omy.”125 The “solved problem” quote reverberated widely across popular press,126 as did Musk’s an-
nouncement in October 2016 that all forthcoming new Tesla vehicles will come standardized with Auto-
pilot hardware and software capable of “full autonomy” and its social benefits: “full autonomy will ena-
ble a Tesla to be substantially safer than a human driver, lower the financial cost of transportation for 
those who own a car and provide low-cost on demand mobility for those who do not.”127 Through the 
integration of cameras with 360-degree visibility, ultrasonic detectors with thorough environmental 
sensing capabilities, and “enhanced processing” of environmental conditions, Autopilot’s full autonomy 
is one that promises to provide “a view of the world that a driver alone cannot access, seeing in every 
direction simultaneously and on wavelengths that go far beyond human senses.”128 Musk’s predications 
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regarding his company’s ability to achieve full technological autonomy employs a combination of hyper-
bole, exaggeration, and showmanship. When Mush predicts a Tesla car will make an autonomous cross-
country trip entirely independent of human operation by the end of 2017,129 or declares SpaceX will ena-
ble human transport to the planet Mars by 2024,130 he exudes a combination of guileless charm and pro-
motional bravado that combine with his engineering and business pedigree to command attention, 
credibility, and a sense of wonder around a utopian technoscape peeking above a near-future horizon. 
In this sense, when Musk describes “full autonomy” as Autopilot’s ability for complete vehicular opera-
tion, the explicit application of “autonomy” to describe his company’s intellectual property undergirds 
implicit notions of full autonomy embedded in this discourse and concomitant notions of human free-
dom rendered unchecked by full-on technological control.  
By positing full technological autonomy as a paradigm poised to render enhanced safety, affordabil-
ity, and mobile accessibility, Musk’s explicit reference to full technological autonomy imbeds notions of 
fully-realized autonomy for humans seeking transport in Autopilot-powered Tesla cars. For Musk, the 
ascent and realization of technological autonomy positively correlates with human autonomy and fur-
ther positively correlates with the ability for Autopilot and human beings to exercise control. Where Au-
topilot’s full technological autonomy corresponds to the technological convergence of automated con-
nectivity, computer programming, and automotive engineering, Musk’s implicit references to human 
autonomy correspond to aspects of cultural convergence (note: henceforth, I use “convergence” to refer 
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to convergence culture and otherwise specific “technological convergence” when I intend its usage) re-
wiring and reworking social norms, logics, and presiding frameworks for conceptualization cultural sig-
nificance, especially in the context of control. If convergence pulls together “participants who interact 
with each other according to a new set of rules that none of us fully understands,”131 Musk’s use of “full 
autonomy” attempts to write the “rules” for how fully technological autonomy is culturally received as a 
boon for human safety, economic viability, and access to cultural goods and services. Significant to this 
cultural reception is the way Musk’s “full autonomy” upturns cultural notions of autonomous technol-
ogy as a harbinger of suppressive control wrought by advanced technologies that have slipped the con-
trolling grasp of human beings.  
In Langdon Winner’s conception, autonomous technology is a philosophical framework for cultural 
anxieties "haunted by the fear that somehow technology has "run amok," is "no longer guided by hu-
man purposes," is "self-directing," or has "escaped all reasonable limits.”132 Prior to the widespread con-
temporaneous application of autonomy to describe technological performances and designations of au-
tomated vehicles (and other highly-automated technologies), the “autonomous” in “autonomous tech-
nology” did not describe any particular technology or technological ability and, instead, represented an 
cultural fear about technological operation breaking from human control and asserting its own purpos-
ive direction independent of human purposes. This notion of autonomous technology as “out of control” 
is redirected by Musk’s usage of “full autonomy,” as a fully-autonomous car’s ability to fully control all 
vehicular functions is a source of relief, assurance, and newfound possibilities for human beings, as 
Musk’s “full autonomy” provides assurances of bodily, economic, and social vitality positively correlating 
with increasing technological autonomy until fully-automated vehicles enable humans to likewise enact 
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unrealized autonomous capacities. If, as a cultural anxiety, autonomous technology is “ultimately noth-
ing more or less than the question of human autonomy held up to a different light,”133 “full autonomy” 
is Musk’s answer to this question, casting human autonomy in the warm glow of Musk’s illuminated 
conception of Autopilot as the harbinger of heretofore unrealized individual, social, and economic au-
tonomy, recalibrating and reorienting the traditional notion of autonomous technology as cultural anxi-
ety towards a contemporary notion of autonomous technology as the source of relief from overlapping 
socio-economic anxieties.  
Where convergence locates the cultural significance of technologically-convergent systems at de-
stabilized and dissolved borderlines between producer and consumer (both as terminological constructs 
and aggregated groupings) and what this portends for social power,134 Musk situates “full autonomy” as 
social power, simultaneously destabilizing and dissolving cultural anxieties around autonomous technol-
ogy while reconstructing cultural implications as diametrically oppositional to the deleterious conse-
quences proffered by “out of control” narratives and fears. If emerging media and technological para-
digms are best understood not just through transitional definitions and redefinitions of “production” 
and “consumption” (and related terms), but by intricately understanding “the whole social context 
within which production and consumption get defined,”135 Musk attempts to redefine “full autonomy” 
by redefining the social context, placing Autopilot’s autonomous capabilities as a palliative to anxieties 
about technological control, social ills, and material barriers to human autonomous potential. Musk, in 
other words, leverages “full autonomy” to control the social context for how Autopilot’s full vehicular 
control will enable humans to more fully control the circumstances of everyday life, alongside generat-
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ing consumer goodwill for Autopilot, Tesla, and Musk. Redefining this social context rests on Musk’s abil-
ity to render “control” synonymous with “freedom” as readied by technological autonomy, a dynamic 
best understood through the lens of Wendy Chun’s “control-freedom.”  
Similar to the way in which convergence emphasizes recalibrations to traditional couplings of “pro-
ducer” and “consumer,” Wendy Chun’s concept of “control-freedom” enjoins “control” and “freedom” 
to stress the imbricated relationship between their conceptual and lived parameters, primarily in the 
context of politics and digital technology. Chun argues for the mass inception of the internet as the ex-
ample par excellence of a politically and technologically structured power, a control-freedom that “sub-
verts the promise of freedom” yet “does not forever render freedom innocuous, for if anything cannot 
be controlled it is freedom.”136 For internet users and a culture increasingly prone to experience social 
life as digitally-mediated, control-freedom’s recombinant logics gesture towards the possibilities for hu-
man autonomy to be alternately enlivened and restricted: “the forms of control the Internet enables are 
not complete, and the freedom we experience stems from these controls; the forms of freedom the In-
ternet enables stem from our vulnerabilities, from the fact that we do not entirely control our own ac-
tions.”137 In addition to the inextricable relationship between control and freedom supposed by control-
freedom, autonomy also enmeshes with control and freedom to reinforce and influence how each are 
understood and experienced. Winner notes autonomy is a “political or moral conception that brings to-
gether the ideas of freedom and control,”138 while Alfred Mele situates self-control of reasoning, intent, 
and action as the primary condition for the ontological basis of human autonomy.139 But where Chun’s 
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control-freedom convincingly situates the entanglements and limitations of human control and freedom 
amidst imposing power structures of digital connectivity, Musk’s “full autonomy,” oversimplifies this re-
lationship, as his positive correlation of technological autonomy with human autonomy presupposes the 
latter as emerging via control as freedom and freedom as control.  
Per Musk’s conception, when Autopilot exercises totalized vehicular control, humans experience 
the freedom to control their activities during transport, opening up self-determining capacities under-
girding the enactment of human autonomy. Musk situates Autopilot control as synonymous with human 
control which is synonymous with human freedom – this, for Musk, is how full autonomy emerges for 
humans amidst Autopilot-powered transport. If, for Chun, control-freedom is a recombinant struggle for 
power wherein power must continually be questioned as a source of possibility for control of freedom, 
Musk’s “full autonomy” is all-empowering control and freedom, for all facets of life – for individual hu-
mans, for cultural life, for social arenas, and for Tesla and Musk once the aggregate of these paradigms 
recognizes Autopilot as an agent of human autonomy. Despite these limitations, however, the cultural 
uptake of “autonomy” to describe Autopilot and other highly-automated vehicles reflects Musk’s ability 
to ideological situate “full autonomy” as the alignment of mutually-beneficial industrial drives and con-
sumptive empowerment. In other words, his use of “fully autonomy” is an ideological usage in which the 
power dynamics of cultural convergence are flattened into an egalitarian autonomy between Tesla and 
would-be Autopilot passengers.  
2.7 Musk’s Ideology of Autonomy 
While the term “ideology” has a general usage indicative of a system of idealized beliefs guiding in-
tention and action, my usage here invokes ideology as used in critical theory and media studies to indi-
cate a cultural power construct exerting and inducing control through its embeddedness in political, eco-
nomic, and technological systems. Ideology is best understood via Louis Althusser’s definition of ideol-
ogy as “a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence. 
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”140 Even though convergence is not necessarily an ideology per se, its claims about digital systems and 
the ability to recuperate social power by enlivening user control and diminishing corporate control make 
it susceptible to ideological mystifications. In addition to stressing the increasing inadequacy of “produc-
ers” and “consumers” to describe who makes media, accesses media, interacts with media, and exer-
cises power through media, convergence also speaks to the convergence of industrial interests and pro-
social outputs, a convergence with a built-in allure for the workings and reception of ideology.  
Noting the productive capacities of consumers empowered to craft and influence industrial media 
products, Mark Deuze describes convergence as a “mechanism to increase revenue and further the 
agenda of industry, while at the same time enabling people…to enact some kind of agency regarding the 
omnipresent messages and commodities of this industry.”141 Control and freedom are central to this 
mechanized approach. Convergence “signifies increased as well as diminished corporate control over 
the creative media process,”142 as the shift from closed mass media consumption to open digital systems 
built on creative and participatory interaction endowed consumers with productive capacities tradition-
ally accorded to industry and its gatekeepers. Where industry cedes degrees of control to users granted 
freedoms to shape media forms, objects, and systems, this ceding of control is, on one hand, a loss of 
corporate power and recuperation of social power and, on the other hand, a corporate strategy for mar-
shalling the freedoms of productive users towards economic boons that are the sole province of indus-
trial coffers. Thus, even if Jenkins, Deuze, and other scholars recognize convergence as “both a top-
down-corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process,”143 they also recognize 
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power and control remains mostly vested among corporations even if consumers have more freedom to 
manipulate and access media systems. 
Autopilot’s “full autonomy” is freighted with an ideological weight that flattens corporate and so-
cial power vestings into an egalitarian conception of autonomy equally at hand among Tesla, Autopilot, 
and passengers in Tesla cars. In addition to Musk reworking cultural fears of technological autonomy by 
touting the safety, financial, and social benefits of Autopilot’s “full autonomy,” Tesla corporate discourse 
situates notions of human autonomy around a similar sense of cultural relief that demonstrates the ide-
ological workings of Autopilot’s full autonomy. Tesla corporate blog posts repeatedly tout the ability of 
Autopilot to “relieve drivers of the most boring and potentially dangerous aspects of road travel.”144 
While this quote shares many similarities to Musk’s use of “full autonomy,” the “relieve drivers” either 
approximates or directly precedes the material reality faced by drivers of pre-autonomous Autopilot-
powered cars: “the driver is still responsible for, and ultimately in control of, the car.”145 Per Althusser, 
Tesla’s ideology represents human autonomy – under the aegis of “driver relief” – as an imaginary rela-
tionship with real technological conditions, as potential Autopilot consumers are induced to imagine hu-
man autonomy emerging out of a technological system that does not yet bear the technological and le-
gal conditions for vehicular autonomy. Concomitantly, this representation posits an imaginary relation-
ship between the consumer and Tesla born from suppositions of egalitarian power in convergence, 
wherein Tesla accrues power in the form of economic capital while consumers accrue power through 
the would-be ability to relinquish vehicular control and exercise freedoms otherwise unattainable.  
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In this sense, ideology is cultural information that “constitutes our interests and works against 
them,”146 inducing social absorption and internalization of ideological norms about how Autopilot and 
Tesla can foster social and individual autonomous potential even as its economic strivings cleave at this 
potential. But where an Althusserian reading illuminates the representational facilities of ideology, 
Wendy Chun a way of understanding how ideology operates through Autopilot. For Chun, computers 
are “ideology machines” that mimic and simulate ideology, operating through the “externalization of 
our beliefs onto objects that act for us,” be it beliefs built about autonomy and control built into Autopi-
lot or beliefs about how Autopilot should carry out technological control functions that enable human 
autonomy to emerge from newfound vehicular freedoms.147 The use of “autonomy” by Musk and Tesla 
is therefore incomplete, inadequate, and ideologically compromised, even as culture at large is far more 
apt to use “autonomy” and “autonomous” to describe highly-automated vehicles and this usage persists 
as a shorthand to describe the stratification of automated operation and human control outlined in the 
FAVP. Having demonstrated why the popular usage of “autonomy” is inadequate, I move now to assess 
the complications of autonomy arising from FAVP stipulations, beginning with a continued focus on ide-
ology amidst the differentiation of technological performance, human control and freedom, and autono-
mous potential.  
2.8 FAVP Levels of Automation and Political Ideologies of Autonomy 
The FAVP is primarily concerned with “automation” as a terminological construct applied to vehi-
cles and driving performances, with only tangential references to “autonomy”, as this latter term ap-
pears only a few times in the text of the policy amidst direct quotes from external sources and in refer-
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ence to the State of California’s regulatory form for automated vehicles testers, “Report of Traffic Acci-
dent Involving an Autonomous Vehicle (form OL 316).”148 FAVP’s recommendations encompass techno-
logical design and regulatory scope across four areas: Vehicle Performance Guidance; Model State Pol-
icy; NHTSA’s Current Regulatory Tools; and New Tools and Authorities.”149 One of the most significant 
aspects of FAVP is its adoption of the Society for Automotive Engineers’ International (SAE) levels of au-
tomation. While the next subsection will focus on contestations around the creation of these levels, ac-
companying terminology, and implications for human and technological autonomy prior to FAVP adop-
tion, I will first focus on the formal federal adoption of these levels and how their stratification of tech-
nological and human control imposes ideological notions of human autonomy.  
Even though “automation” and “automated” describe varying degrees of technological technique, 
their usage in this context do not fully signify the varying degrees of political ideologies, human strivings 
for freedom and control engrained in these ideologies, and ideological predispositions for material reali-
ties around technological design and function that anticipate the cultural reception and significance of 
Autopilot and other highly-automated technologies. My mobilization of “autonomy,” as embedded in 
and emerging from these dynamics, more precisely invokes this significance, while also adding depth 
and clarity to “autonomy” as a means of reworking and reinvigorating a popular tendency by Musk and 
other cultural actors to attach misguided notions of “autonomy” to automated cars more so than most 
other automated technologies and automated performances. In other words, I de-privilege the popular 
usage of “autonomy” in relation to Autopilot and other automated vehicles and give privilege to a more 
nuanced conception of autonomy emerging from aspects of automated control and human freedom. 
This nuanced conception includes FAVP’s differentiation of automated vehicular control and human in-
teraction with these differentiated levels.  
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The SAE levels of automation encompass six distinct levels based on when control is exercised by 
automated operation, human operation, or some combination of the two. The levels range from “0” 
(zero) to “5.”150 At level zero, the human controls all driving functions and monitoring of environmental 
and vehicular conditions. Beginning at levels 1 and 2, the “automated system” controls some aspects of 
driving, even though the driver controls most driving and monitoring functions. At level 3, the human 
can relinquish some control, under particular conditions, to the automated system, which, at level 4, can 
take full control under certain conditions. At level 5, all driving tasks, under all conditions, can be per-
formed by the automated system. FAVP defines an “automated system” as a “combination of hardware 
and software…that performs a driving function, with or without a human actively monitoring the driving 
environment.”151 While all levels refer to this type of system, the term “highly-automated vehicle” corre-
sponds to level 3-5 vehicles “with automated systems that are responsible for monitoring the driving en-
vironment.”152 Per FAVP’s designation, Autopilot’s automated capabilities are conceived in this context 
as both the ability to perform a driving function (levels 1 and 2), and the responsibility to monitor driving 
conditions (levels 3-5), wherein the latter may also assume responsibility for controlling many or all driv-
ing functions. Beyond demarcating automated function, FAVP’s adoption of SAE levels legitimates and 
transmits ideological assumptions about “who does what, when,”153 including who (Autopilot or hu-
mans) must exercise control, what types and degrees of control are assumed, and when they can be 
freed or enabled to control driving functions. These levels of automated performance are therefore also 
layered with ideological assumptions about when, how, and under what circumstances human auton-
omy can flourish or diminish as aligned with technological control. Across these layers, ideology models 
how human autonomy should be understood and experienced.  
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My use of “models” gestures towards Alexander Galloway’s notion that “ideology gets modeled in 
software,”154 as opposed to analogous relationships positing ideology as the seat of power placed into 
software or software as a vessel that transports ideological will from one point to another. Chun moves 
in this direction when she cautions against flattening ideological operation into software performance, 
as to do so “elides the difference between software as code and software as executed program,” and 
therefore “suppresses the question of power, central to any serious study of ideology.”155 Here, she 
stresses the differentiation between software as bundles of inert text (i.e. computer code) and software 
as active performance(s) when this text executes. Software is, in this sense, a differentiation of what is 
possible and what must transpire, not unlike the possibility of software control and the necessity of hu-
man control among FAVP automated systems (SAE levels 1-2) and the increasing necessity of software 
control and human freedom from necessary control among ascending levels of HAVs (SAE levels 3-5). 
Following from this logic, ideology is modeled within FAVP stipulations as a permeating force across lay-
ers (Autopilot code and performance, degrees of Autopilot and human control, SAE levels) that differen-
tiates ideological notions of autonomy.  
On one hand, possibilities for human autonomy can enlarge alongside the increasing necessity of 
Autopilot control. On the other hand, these possibilities transpire only within the auspices of policymak-
ing and scientific expert consensus for when, how, and under what circumstances humans should be 
“free” to make determinations about vehicular control, situational awareness, and passive occupation of 
Autopilot-powered cars. Furthermore, any enhanced possibilities for human autonomy must be under-
stood not as an ever-increasing one-way ascension, but as a conditional circumstance afforded only dur-
ing particular circumstances subject to change and fluctuate. At SAE level 4, for instance, passengers 
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“need not take back control,” even though the automated system can only operate “in certain environ-
ments and under certain conditions.”156 Even at the highest levels of automation, humans are never free 
from the possibility of being snapped back into vigilance and operational control, as the conditional cir-
cumstances of automated control correspond to a provisional autonomy in which human autonomy is 
conditional at all levels, alternately potentialized and restricted by ideological notions of control en-
meshed among policymaking bodies, legal encoding, technological performance, and human-machine 
purview. In this respect, the provisioned autonomy imposes an ideological force that differentiates be-
tween “inert” and “active” performance, an attempt to model in human beings normative ideas about 
compliance to state and technological control. This dynamic, however, should not be misconstrued with 
a vulgar Marxist stripe, as the claim here is not a simplistic notion of control as emanating from the state 
and heaved onto unwitting masses. Instead, taking seriously Chun’s recognition of ideology as a power 
struggle, it’s important to consider the ideological battles waged among policymakers and political 
power brokers, particularly the ways notions of autonomy factored into policy machinations preceding 
FAVP’s formal release. The most fruitful area for unpacking this next facet is the contestation over the 
use of - and relationships between - “autonomy” and “control” and “driver” and “user” as appears in the 
early formations of SAE levels and corresponding language of political power struggles preceding FAVP.  
2.9 Political Power and the Modulation/Modularity of Autonomy 
The SAE levels of automation precede FAVP adoption. Just as these levels are highly significant to 
FAVP (and automated driving more generally), preceding policy machinations reveal political struggles 
over how to designate within these levels the status and activities of humans occupying automated vehi-
cles, the nature of human operation, technological control and autonomy, and the way these struggles 
shift conceptions and opportunities for the autonomy of Autopilot passengers. While the FAVP is the 
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first attempt to formalize federal recommendations for automated vehicle policy, regulation and design, 
two successive attempts to ignite the consensus-building process leading to FAVP wrestled with specific-
ities of FAVP levels and corresponding terminology. These documents – a 2013 Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT) Statement of Policy (henceforth: 2013 DOT Statement) and the 2014 Society of Automotive 
Engineers International (SAE)’s Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Sys-
tems for On-Road Motor Vehicles (henceforth: 2014 SAE Taxonomy) – initiated a process of contested 
terminology, foci, and functionality germane to both human operation of an automated vehicle and the 
vehicle’s technological capability. Among these contestations, differing designations and applications of 
“automated,” “autonomous,” “control,” “driver,” and “user” reveal conflicting ideas as to the focal point 
of policy frameworks (vehicles or drivers), when (and if) drivers should be considered “users,” distinc-
tions among degrees of automated technique, and control as technological functionality, human opera-
tion, and gauge of human autonomy.  
Here, my primary claim orients around the modulation and modularity of policy stipulations, tech-
nical and terminological designations for humans and automated technique, and driving roles and activi-
ties accorded to humans. Modulation is the ability to induce change by exerting control. Change, in this 
sense, is not necessarily a totalized transition from one state to another. In radio, for example, the prop-
erties of transmitted signals are modulated to enable information to be encoded and received. Even as 
some properties undergo change, carrier signals maintain their wholistic designation. In this way, modu-
lation is a process of change and retention, a characteristic it shares with modularity. Modularity is the 
ability to separate and recombine the components of a larger whole. This is also a process of change and 
retention, as the larger whole changes from a totalized unit to a series of discreet units that retain the 
ability to reform into the larger whole. Beyond their general usage, these concepts are also important to 
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digital affordances,157 technological and social control,158 and human autonomy among systems and pro-
cesses of networked peer-to-peer production.159 In conjunction with convergence theorists, my aim is to 
demonstrate the way human roles and autonomous potentials are modulated through policy struggles 
transpiring across 2013 DOT Statement and 2014 SAE Taxonomy and become modular components 
among a higher-order notion of automated and political control. Thus, I illuminate the ways autonomy is 
subject to continual change and retentions along lines of human and technological control, rather than 
being inert and at rest. Likewise, this situates FAVP amidst transitional political formations, aiding an un-
derstanding of FAVP and what it portends for autonomy as subject to continued change and recompos-
ing.  
Across the 2013 DOT Statement and 2014 SAE Taxonomy, differing levels of automation were of-
fered by respective institutions, as the DOT outlined levels 0 – 4 of automated driving its 2013 State-
ment, while SAE included in the 2014 Taxonomy the levels of automation later adopted by FAVP. Across 
these documents and their respective levels of automation, policymakers modulated the application of 
“autonomy” and “control” to describe both technological function and human operation, as well as the 
application of “driver” and “user” to describe the roles of human interactions with automated vehicles. 
The 2013 DOT Statement uses “autonomy” when asserting the need to determine the operational pa-
rameters for its level 2 and 3 range, as such parameters can “help determine the level of autonomous 
authority that the vehicle is capable of achieving.”160 SAE demurs against using this term in its levels of 
automation, as “autonomous” is (alongside “control”) what the SAE dubs a “depreciated term.” Depreci-
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ated terms are those that SAE recommends against using in policy language because they are “function-
ally imprecise” and “frequently misused.”161 The Statement is careful to note the reliability of this term 
when suitably applied by robotics and artificial intelligence researchers, but recommends against its ap-
plication to automated driving since popular discourses inaccurately apply “autonomous” to varying de-
grees of automation (including “vernacular usages” equating autonomy with automated driving); the 
term obfuscates the extent to which the vehicular operation may depend on entities external to the ve-
hicle (such as remote operation); and, self-governance, as an innate condition of autonomy, does not 
apply to automated driving systems, since such systems function by obeying algorithmic command and 
the “commands of users.”162  
“Control” is also a depreciated term in the 2014 SAE Taxonomy, despite DOT’s privilege of “control 
function” as the primary criteria for designating a vehicle “automated” (based on how automation con-
trols aspects of driving, rather than merely performing such aspects). Since its “numerous technical, le-
gal, and popular meanings” do more to confuse than to clarify, by SAE standards “control” is insufficient 
to describe the roles of automated technological function and human activity. Furthermore, negating 
the act of control (as in “the driver does not take control”) is especially problematic for SAE, as this us-
age could “unintentionally and erroneously suggest the loss of all human activity.”163 While FAVP ulti-
mately adopts SAE’s resistance to the use of “autonomy,” FAVP demonstrates a more complicated rela-
tionship with “control,” as the term does not apply to technological function in FAVP levels, but is used 
to indicate whether or not a human must “take back control” at level 3 or 4, as well as more casual AVP 
references to human “control actions” or “control transition” from the vehicle to the human operator.164  
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SAE pinpoints a dynamic of control among definitional criteria and its connotations as both a tech-
nological and political technique. In The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the 
Information Society (1989), James Beniger argues for a tightly-woven relationship between contempo-
rary technological and social control emerging out of a longitudinal process of industrial development 
and exploitation of information technologies dating back to the mid-19th century. He notes that “control 
encompasses the entire range from absolute control to the weakest and most probabilistic form…any 
purposive influence on behavior, however slight.”165 As informational processing and communicative 
reciprocity underpin this broad conception of control, “society’s ability to maintain control…will be di-
rectly proportional to the development of its information technologies.”166 For SAE, “control” is too 
broad to appear anywhere in approximation to human or technological activity, yet for Beniger control 
is too broad to ignore as it exerts itself everywhere in a society increasingly animating technologies and 
social paradigms with informational-processing capacities of digital automation. SAE, however, is exclu-
sively concerned with technological control, and the scope of Beniger’s definition and societal scale gets 
us closer to understanding how SAE and DOT modulate autonomy along lines of technological, social 
and political control. Where Beniger typifies techno-social control at its scale of exertion, Gilles 
Deleuze’s “societies of control” looks beyond scale to emphasize modulation as critical to contemporary 
techno-social control.  
Advancing from a Foucauldian concept of control administered by sovereign powers in enclosed 
disciplinary societies, Deleuze argues for control as a “modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will 
continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from 
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point to point,” a process of change indicative of “short-term and rapid rates of turnover, but also con-
tinuous and without limit.”167 Thus, SAE’s 2014 Taxonomy is not just a response to the 2013 DOT State-
ment, but a modulation of “control” and “autonomy” as terminologically important, a modulation of hu-
man autonomy in accordance with this importance, and a modulation of political power attempting to 
exert control over legal and social conceptions of how human autonomy can be potentialized in Autopi-
lot-powered cars.  
Across the depreciation of “autonomy” and “control” from 2013 DOT Statement to 2014 SAE Tax-
onomy, “autonomy” as a terminological designation is modulated from sparing usage to a null state. Be-
yond this explicit reference to technological autonomy, embedded notions of human autonomy are 
modulated in two key ways. First, the nullification of technological “autonomy” is predicated on human 
autonomy to determine (i.e. “command”) when and how automated and algorithmic processes should 
execute. Second, the depreciation of “control” hinges on this determination, as its plurality of meanings 
is conceived as a stopgap for humans to reliably undertake autonomous decision-making and reasoning 
capacities for driving, usage, and situational awareness. Furthermore, and with respect to Beniger and 
Deleuze, the societal importance of autonomy is modulated across individual and societal lines, as SAE 
implicates self-governance as a socially-recognized “innate” quality of autonomy among humans, while 
contextualizing this quality in the individual act of automated vehicle transport and operation. Thus, au-
tonomy is modulated from a technological condition to a human condition, modulated across differing 
levels of automation and their concomitant designations of “control,” and modulated across individual 
potential for self-determinative action and social understandings of self-determination as foundational 
to human autonomy.  
Pulling from this latter point, human autonomy is both modulated and situated as a modular com-
ponent.  Autonomy as a social conception predicated on self-determination is cleaved into individual 
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acts of autonomy wherein the aggregation of these individual acts recombines to both constitute and 
affirm a wider recognition of human autonomy. Allegorizing foundational conceits of autonomy with Lev 
Manovich’s foundational attribution of modularity as the “fractal structure” of digital media,168 the rela-
tionship between individual autonomous acts of automated vehicular interactivity and recombinant digi-
tal media forms both represent “discreet samples…assembled together into larger scale objects.”169 But 
where computer users assemble media forms into larger wholes that retain fractal elements, the assem-
blage and disaggregation of human autonomy by political power brokers calls into question how human 
autonomy can be retained when its potential – in the context of Autopilot and other automated vehicu-
lar interaction – is the purview of legislative bodies. Under certain conditions, however, human auton-
omy flourishes at points of compartmentalized interaction with digital technology.  
Yochi Benkler notes that among individuals participating in networked peer production, an individ-
ual “maximizes their autonomy” when a close correspondence occurs between a module independent 
of the larger digital whole and the ability of the human to work independently on this module.170 Under 
Benkler’s conception, human autonomy enlarges at the micro level. As modulated across the 2013 DOT 
Statement and 2014 SAE Taxonomy, human autonomy is tightly regimented as a condition subject to the 
shifting winds of policy brokerage wrestling with the application and qualification of technological con-
trol and shifts in the way such brokers exercise control over such applications and qualifications. Unlike 
Benkler’s conception, the maximization of human autonomy at the micro level is not a given, as the 
modular nature of human autonomy amidst SAE and DOT contestations does not attain the independ-
ence of Benkler’s socio-techno arrangement of networked peer production. A further shift between the 
2013 DOT Statement and 2014 Taxonomy reveals a modulation of human autonomy in accordance with 
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the aforementioned notion of Autopilot and other HAV passengers as “users,” a modulation of human 
autonomy amidst intertwined notions of control, driving, and usage.  
2.10 Human Autonomy: The Quandary of Modulating Cultural Activities 
In the 2013 DOT Statement, each level of automated driving designates roles and functions ex-
pected of the “driver.” The 2014 SAE Taxonomy, however, complicates the notion of a “driver.” With 
respect to the operations of driving tasks, SAE levels are grouped between driver-performed171 tasks 
(level 0 – 2) and the performance of sustained driving tasks by the automated driving system172 (ADS) 
(level 3 – 5). At Level 3, when the ADS becomes the primary performer of driving tasks, the (human) 
driver transitions to a “user.” At this level and subsequent levels, the user is “receptive to ADS-issued 
requests to intervene,” (level 3), not expected to respond to such requests (Levels 4 and 5).173  The no-
tion of a “driver” is one of four terms describing the driving tasks performed by a human user: driver, 
passenger, DDT fallback-ready user174, and dispatcher.175 The driver performs all or part of the driving 
tasks, the passenger is present in the vehicle (never remote to the vehicle) but does not have a role in 
vehicle operation, the DDT fallback-ready user is able and ready to operate and intervene when re-
quested by the ADS, and the dispatcher affirms the vehicle’s operational readiness and engages or dis-
engages the ADS.176 Since the 2014 SAE Taxonomy notes that user roles do not overlap and often occur 
in sequence, the transition from “driver” to “user” across the  2013 DOT Statement and 2014 SAE Taxon-
omy modulates human autonomy along lines of driving, usage, and control (or lack thereof) as the 
means for human autonomy.  
                                                             
171 “Performance” – alongside “operation” - is SAE preferred parlance for more precisely accounting for the actions 
undertaken by both human and the ADS. “Performance” and “operation” replace the Statement’s dependence on 
“control.” 
172 An ADS refers to the converged software and hardware capable of performing sustained driving tasks.  
173 Taxonomy, 17. 
174 DDT is Taxonomy acronym for “dynamic driving tasks,” defined in as the tasks necessary to “operate a vehicle in 
on-road traffic.”  
175 Ibid 14.  
176 Ibid 14-15.  
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When considering the transitional relationship between “drivers” and “users,” it’s important to first 
situate driving as an act socially connected with human autonomy. In a recent essay unpacking social 
and cultural contexts of automated driving, Fabian Kroger notes: “the promise of automotive autonomy 
has historically rested primarily on human drivers’ control of the gas pedal, steering wheel and brakes. 
Steering a car is the only area where the love of power and imagination still has free rein” one that of-
fers refuge from an “increasingly controlled and managed society.” 177 Autopilot and other highly-auto-
mated vehicles hold the potential to diminish the autonomy of human drivers increasingly relegated to 
passengers or “users” of a technological system wherein human interaction bears more resemblance to 
computational input than automotive control. In the modulation of “drivers” to “users,” human auton-
omy is afforded and restricted in accordance with social dispositions for driving as a cultural activity and 
the convergence of other cultural activities through the transformative to automotive space.  
The transition from “driver” to “user” is not only a move away from the cultural activity of driving 
and its autonomous potential, but a move towards the “user” as an agent exercising somewhat different 
possibilities for human autonomous potential. In this context, “user” is a term among convergence and 
digital media theorists that offer heightened degrees of self-determination as opposed to “audiences” 
and “consumers.” P. David Marshall describes the transition from an “audience-subject” to “user-sub-
ject” as a key development in the relationship between self-personalization offered by digital media sys-
tems and way such personalization is prefigured by industrial progenitors. Citing cultural convergence as 
a phenomenon upturning traditional demarcations and power dimensions among producers, audiences, 
and consumers (among other categorizations), Marshall describes the ability for consumers to personal-
ize digital media technologies as a technique that “hails the individual to see themselves producing their 
                                                             
177 Kroger, Fabian. “Automated Driving in Its Social, Historical, and Cultural Contexts.” In Eds. Maurer, Markus, J. 
Christian Gerdes, Barbara Lenz, and Hermann Winner Autonomous driving. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Ger-
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cultural activity.”178 Whereas historical models of consumption prefigured audiences as amalgamations 
of individuals subject to fixed consumptive parameters of media systems, objects and content produced 
by industry, the rupturing of this fixity through modifiable digital techniques means that audiences be-
come empowered to actively engage with media to such an extent that media usage more aptly de-
scribes consumptive patterns and activities.179 Likewise, Philip Napoli’s “audience autonomy” preserves 
the use of “audience” yet signals to the underlying logics of how users experience greater personal au-
tonomy through technological control, as “the contemporary media environment provides audiences 
with unprecedented levels of control over not only what media they consume, but also when, where, 
and how they consume it.”180 Conceptually, “users,” and its underlying logics interweave with the way 
users might issues commands to Autopilot in accordance with driving or navigational preferences, as 
well as the way Autopilot modulates reconfigured cultural and spatial practices in Tesla and other 
highly-automated vehicles.  
As conceived by Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge, software such as Autopilot “modulates how space 
comes into being,” wherein space is understood not as a fixed or contained demarcation of area but, 
instead, an “event or doing – a set of unfolding practices that lack a clear ontology.”181 Through this 
                                                             
178 Philip D Marshall, "New Media as Transformed Media Industry" in Media Industries: History, Theory, and 
Method, eds. Jennifer Holt and Alissa Perren (Wiley: 2009): 84.  
179 To be more precise, and guard against interpretations of technological determinism, it’s important to note 
strands of scholarship (particularly among cultural studies, media reception, and critical theory) that evidenced 
various degrees of audience activity prior to the digital turn. My claim is not that audiences were passive or docile 
prior to digital connectivity. Instead, my evocation of the transition from audiences to users understands audi-
ences as already increasingly active across contexts of consumption, creation, and interactivity prior to – and 
alongside – the uptake of digital technologies. For more on active audiences, see: Stuart Hall, "Encoding/Decod-
ing," in Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks 2, eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham, Douglas Kellner (Blackwell Publish-
ing: 2001): 163-173; David Morley, "Active Audience Theory: Pendulums and Pitfalls," Journal of communica-
tion 43, no. 4 (1993): 13-19; John Fiske, Television Culture, (Routledge, 2002).  
180 Philip M Napoli, Audience Evolution: New Technologies and the Transformation of Media Audiences, (Columbia 
University Press, 2011): 55.  
181 Kitchin, Rob, and Martin Dodge. Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life, (MIT Press, 2011): 16.  
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modulation – what these authors dub “code/space” -  Autopilot “creates new horizons for cultural activ-
ity,”182 such as opportunities for engaged media usage when humans are not performing driving tests. 
One of Autopilot’s features is a “personalized media player” that enables tactile interaction with 
“streaming radio, live stations, and podcasts,” available via touchscreens built into Autopilot-powered 
Tesla cars.183 When the 2014 SAT Taxonomy implores a redefinition of “drivers” to “users,” the latter is 
understood as a modulation between cultural acts of driving, cultural activities made manifest by soft-
ware, and their points of collision. Viewed this way, “drivers” entails a state of “driving” or “non-driv-
ing,” while “users” speaks to the autonomous potentials of humans to engage in an enlarged series of 
cultural practices, be it driving, media interactivity, or a combination thereof. Nonetheless, if driving en-
thusiasts experience autonomy only along lines of vehicular control, the transition from “drivers” to “us-
ers” and the concomitant loss of human vehicular control is a reminder that “the interplay between peo-
ple and software in diverse, complex, relational, embodied, and in context-specific ways,”184 in addition 
to the contestations over “driver” and “users” waged by DOT and SAE. And, since DOT deferred to “driv-
ers” in the FAVP, this subsequent modulation invokes political actors and frameworks in this interplay, 
as the imagined cultural significance of Autopilot, the car it powers, the spatial and cultural practices it 
brings to the fore, and the transmutable micro and macro conceptions of human autonomy coursing 
across these dynamics signifies policymaking machinations as a primary agent in the interplay among 
varying intensities of human autonomy.  
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2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the complications of human autonomy as imagined by policymakers 
constructing and anticipating legal recommendations for state-level policy makers and designers of au-
tomated vehicles in the FAVP and its antecedents. I begin with this chapter in order to drive towards a 
more nuanced conception of human autonomy amidst highly-automated vehicles possessed with the 
potential for technological autonomy. Elsewhere in this project, I stress a transition from automation to 
autonomy. Here, however, the prominent interplay of advanced automation and autonomous agency 
among technological systems and processes warrant an address of both autonomous and automated 
conditions, especially as Autopilot-powered Tesla cars and other automated vehicles display evidence of 
autonomous potential. Moreover, the popular imagination and early reception around highly-auto-
mated vehicles tends to deploy autonomy as a shorthand for these vehicles and cultural implications. 
Therefore, unique to this chapter is the necessity of urging a more nuanced conception of human auton-
omy that addresses questions outside the purview of autonomous agents and automated interaction as 
described in scientific literatures and circulated across popular arenas. In short, it was necessary to ad-
dress autonomy and automation, rework them both, and conceptualize a more precise understand of 
human autonomy. 
My approach analyzed the first formal federal policy to recommend consolidated practices for out-
lining regulatory scope, enacting state-level policies around highly-automated vehicles, and urging de-
sign specifications – the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (FAVP). My analysis primarily focused on the 
federal adoption of SAE levels of automation in this policy as they correspond to potential regulatory, 
policy, and design implications. More critically, however, in their attempt to encode legal and technolog-
ical designations, policymakers and scientific experts embedded shifting conceptions of human auton-
omy that merge out of notions of control as both a source and inhibitor of personal and social freedom. 
Through a methodology that situated FAVP as a discursive nodal point interconnected with preceding 
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attempts to anticipate and contest legal, technological, and related distinctions automation, control, and 
freedom that give rise to how policymakers envision and anticipate the cultural significance of auto-
mated vehicles and human transport in such vehicles. By leveraging digital media theory – particularly 
those concerned with convergence and software affordances – I contextualized and gave levity to how 
political notions of autonomy correspond to techno-socio conditions, especially around control.  
Through this approach, I began by arguing for Elon’s musk conception of full autonomy on the 
grounds that it is indicative of cultural applications and interpretations of autonomy in relation to Auto-
pilot and other automated vehicles. While this conception reworks cultural fears around autonomous 
technology, it is definitionally and theoretically insufficient to describe the complications of human au-
tonomy that can emerge from rigorous analysis. From this point, I build towards a more nuanced con-
ception of human autonomy, arguing for an ideology of human autonomy as a condition modeled in pol-
icy stipulations for technological and social control; human autonomy as a condition modulated in its 
intensities and opportunities by political power struggles; and modulated in accordance with implica-
tions for the intersection of driving and media usage as cultural activities transpiring during passage in 
automated vehicles.  
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3     IBM’S WATSON 
For viewers of the television show Jeopardy! on February 14, 2011, Valentine's Day was a contest 
for human hearts and robotic minds. On this day, IBM's Watson took part in the first of a three-day com-
petition with former Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter. In the annals of this show's 
competition, Jennings and Rutter are prime contenders for the Mount Rushmore of Jeopardy! successes. 
Jennings is the record holder for most consecutive wins and second highest-earning competitor in the 
game's history. Rutter is the overall highest-earning competitor, and until 2011 never lost a match due 
to pre-2003 rules that stipulated consecutive 5-day winners must retire undefeated. He maintained his 
undefeated streak while competing in Tournament of Champions matches against other five-day win-
ners in 2001, 2002, and 2005 and remained undefeated until Feb. 16, 2011, when Watson defeated both 
Rutter and Jennings to become the victor in the first-ever "man vs. machine" match in the show's his-
tory. 
Watson is IBM’s proprietary advanced computer technology that performs analytical interpreta-
tions “powered by the latest innovations in machine learning” to transform data into usable insights,185 
such as analyzing questions asked by Alex Trebek and generating appropriate responses.  Watson's Jeop-
ardy! win was widely publicized and in subsequent years became a cultural shorthand for understanding 
the increasing human-like intelligence of artificial intelligence (AI) as an oppositional force to human be-
ings, amplifying a "man vs. machine" dichotomy that played out in popular culture, journalistic report-
age, economic forecasting, think-tank white papers, and policymaking arenas. Interviews with IBM CEO 
Ginni Rometty often acknowledge the Jeopardy! match as a moment of vast cultural visibility and aware-
ness of Watson and, more generally, advanced AI. In these moments, Rometty is quick to decry the dys-
topianism of "man vs. machine" narratives that proliferated across pop culture in the wake of Watson's 
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Jeopardy! victory, depictions positing the increasingly autonomous capabilities of AI as the crest of a 
technological wave threatening humans’ intellectual uniqueness and therefore poised to undercut the 
biological, social, and economic vitality of human beings.  
On February 28, 2011 Watson participated in an untelevised Jeopardy! match against two members 
of Congress: Democratic Representative Rush Holt and Republican House Representative Bill Cassidy. 
This time, however, a human emerged victorious. Holt, a physicist and former five-time Jeopardy cham-
pion, won the match, beating both Watson and Cassidy (now a Senator). Unlike the man vs. machine 
narrative that tended to follow in the wake of Watson’s televised victory on February 14, 2011, the Feb-
ruary 28, 2011 match ended in conciliatory tones, not only between humans and machine, but between 
IBM and policymakers. Holt noted he was “proud to hold my own with Watson,” but prouder to “join 
IBM and other members to highlight the importance of science and math education and research and 
development.”186 Christopher Padilla, IBM’s vice president of government and regulatory affairs, also 
emphasized the match as symbolic of more profound material possibilities, echoing Holt’s call for public-
private collaborations aimed at leveraging Watson and other advanced technology to “help organiza-
tions make better decisions and improve how government helps its citizens.”187 
While the popular reception to the televised Feb. 14 Watson Jeopardy! victory fomented dystopian 
notions about advanced AI’s threat to human labor and performance, the Feb. 28 match speaks to a 
more focused attempt by IBM to situate Watson as not only helpful to organizations and their workers, 
but a technology poised to embolden the citizenry by enlarging opportunities for jobs and labor out-
comes beneficial to both individual workers and businesses. More importantly, this moment epitomized 
IBM’s increasing focus on policymakers and policy itself to generate outcomes aligned with neoliberal 
ideologies of supply-side job creation and investment, a strategy in which IBM sought to legally encode 
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stipulations favorable to IBM’s marketplace prowess. Steadily, from 2011 to late 2017, IBM increasingly 
placed Watson at the center of its corporate portfolio while simultaneously pursuing government poli-
cies and partnerships aimed at reconfiguring notions of skilled labor and how laborers attain such skills. 
This centering increasingly placed Watson at the nexus of IBM’s attempts to 1) woo policymakers with 
vested interests in spurring job creation through privatized innovation; 2) reorient Dystopain notions 
about advanced AI; 3) engender a new class of highly-specialized tech workers; and 4) support and in-
vest in pathways for training high-skilled workers as part of IBM’s budding forays into public-private ed-
ucation.  
In these ways, during the 2011-2017 timeframe, as IBM augmented Watson’s technological af-
fordances, these affordances were concomitantly positioned as augmentative to job opportunities, the 
dignity of workers performing such jobs, and the outcomes for workers, IBM, and third-party collabora-
tions alike. Even as Watson’s automated capabilities escalated towards increasing technological auton-
omy, IBM was careful to downplay dystopian notions of technological autonomy as neutralizing human 
autonomy and rework this dynamic into a more utopian conception in which Watson augments human 
autonomy alongside the AI’s increasing autonomy. By pursuing policy as a means to formalize mecha-
nisms for training workers with the skills to augment their autonomy through Watson, IBM sought to 
augment its own institutional autonomy and marketplace self-determination, especially as the company 
transitioned from a long-standing business model predicated on the manufacture and sale of hardware 
to a business model prioritizing Watson as software-as-a-service (Saas) for third-party businesses. While 
these tactics reworked a technological determinism and dystopianism surrounding Watson (and AI more 
generally), they also created a series of legal provisions enabling IBM to commodify educational and vo-
cational opportunities even as these provisions also allowed IBM to reap tax breaks and other economic 
benefits stemming from the recruitment and retention of what the company would begin referring to as 
“New Collar” workers.  
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As I will demonstrate, New Collar work emerges out of IBM’s strategic use of “augmentation” to 
describe the productive and intellectual capacities of humans enhanced by collaboration with Watson 
and “cognitive” as a rubric for reconceptualizing Watson and IBM’s contemporary marketplace prowess. 
On this latter front, IBM’s insistence on the augmentative capacities of Watson stems a preference for 
“cognitive” as opposed to “artificial” intelligence, a means of reversing AI-based dystopian implications 
for human vitality and stressing the ability of Watson to inflect tech workers with its automated cogni-
tion. Moreover, “cognitive” also exemplifies IBM’s attempt to assert its prowess in contemporary digital 
economies by stressing Watson as the signifier of the “cognitive era” of computing and IBM as the pro-
genitor and corporate titan of this era. Before delving into my analysis, however, it’s important to clarify 
the relationship between computational cognition and automation, as IBM’s use of cognition in approxi-
mation to its highly-automated technology dovetails with scientific engineering literatures on “cognitive 
automation” as the cooperative exchange of decision-making attributes between humans and intelligent 
automated machines. By accounting for scholarship on cognitive automation, I not only deepen an un-
derstanding of the ties between automation and cognition but, more importantly, stress the importance 
of autonomy as a critical attribute among IBM’s politico-economic motivations and ensuing implications 
for emerging tech workers.  
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3.1 Automated Cognition 
When explicitly scrutinized as a distinct phenomenon, cognitive automation is chiefly analyzed in 
the context of two paradigms: vehicular navigation,188 and assembly systems.189 Defined as the use of 
software “intended to automate cognitive activities, such as situation assessment, monitoring, and fault 
management”190 otherwise conducted by human beings, these literatures tend to focus on the ability of 
automated cognition to lend support to human operators for situational assessment, transfer of task ori-
entation, and execution of such tasks. Generally speaking, these streams of scholarship are concerned 
with automation and its cognitive capacities as a means of productive workflow and output. While, at 
times, researchers might gesture towards the implications for human laboring vitality, including the pos-
sibility of assessing “the operators own view of the assembly line in order to design the right cognitive 
support for them,”191 this research is not designed to conceptualize the employability or empowerment 
of the labor force in relation to the creep of automated cognition, nor are the designed to derive such 
ideas by understanding the economic informants of companies turning towards cognitive machines.  
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Research on artificial intelligence and cognition has swelled in parallel with the public awareness of 
Watson and IBM’s epochal branding of the “cognitive era” of computing. Computer scientists and engi-
neers consider relational currents between cognitive science and the information-processing capabilities 
of artificial intelligence,192 including the digital modeling of neural pathways,193 and information reason-
ing, comprehension, and expression.194 Beyond a recent trend analyzing the relatedness between AI and 
cognition, the “cognitive computer” was developed in the 1980s195 as a rubric for conceptualizing “this 
obscure field” and “how intelligence computers affect the world we live in.”196 These approaches are 
worthwhile for their contributions to the philosophy of mind and AI, the cognitive performance of AI, 
and foundational modes of unpacking the ways human cognition allegorizes and models AI design. Like-
wise, cognitive automation is useful for the way it thinks-throw the realities of awareness and task flow 
among human-machine collaboration.  
What’s missing, however, is a more precise analysis of the material circumstances informing the 
manifestation of such collaboration and, more pertinently, the implications for humans to maintain la-
boring and professional vitality amidst cultural narratives increasingly supposing the diminishment of 
human productivity, intellectual uniqueness, and social dignity at the hands of technologies accelerating 
towards autonomous states. As noted in the introduction, beyond fanciful pop culture imaginings, these 
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narratives crisscross arenas of civic politics, economics, business, and cottage industries supporting their 
enterprise through sober forecasts, trend analyses, white papers, and other formal reportage. Thus, my 
approach seeks to understand the way human autonomy is built into mechanisms for smoothing the cul-
tural inception of autonomous technologies into prominent public life. In the case of IBM, the centrality 
of Watson to the company’s corporate portfolio and the gestures made by IBM executives to woo politi-
cal power brokers evokes questions about the use of formal policy to underwrite economic circum-
stances beneficial to IBM’s marketplace latitude. IBM’s regard for policy as a means to attain financial 
remuneration for employee training and retention transpired in tandem with the company’s insistence 
on its ability to upskill and augment a new type of American worker: the technologically-savvy New Col-
lar worker. IBM’s offering of New Collar training and labor situated Watson as a driving force for human 
autonomy, a means of augmenting New Collar workers’ ability to pursue meaningful training, employ-
ment, and purposeful application of skills. In order to more precisely understand the complications of 
autonomy among IBM’s attempt to leverage policy arenas, fortify New Collar labor, and do so with an 
eye towards the autonomy of tech workers and IBM’s corporate autonomy, my approach analyzes a 
proposed legislative bill not unfamiliar to IBM’s corporate priorities: the New Collar Jobs Act of 2017.  
3.2 The New Collar Jobs Act: Politicizing Autonomy 
Introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on July 25, 2017, the New Collar Jobs Act of 2017 
(henceforth: New Collar Jobs Act) proposes to amend the federal tax code to allow employers to claim 
an “employee cybersecurity education tax credit” for costs incurred by an employer who contributes to 
an employee’s attainment of a collegiate degree or federally-recognized training certification. 197 At first 
glance, the applicability to Watson, IBM, and tech workers might seem opaque, yet both the use of 
“New Collar” in the bill’s title and the intersecting provisions for skills training and cybersecurity closely 
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align with IBM goals, strategies, and public discourse aimed at concomitantly uptraining emerging tech 
workers with the skills necessary to work with Watson (and other advanced computational technolo-
gies) and minimizing financial expenditures for such training. As IBM sought to transition from a manu-
facturer of personal computing hardware and software to a provider of diversified computer services 
primarily aimed at third-party ventures, this move towards a business-to-business (B2B) model saw IBM 
increasingly position Watson as a solutions-driven platform for healthcare, meteorology, media produc-
tion, tax preparation, and other diversified interests. In doing so, IBM also increasingly attempted to fos-
ter relationships with policymakers and other political power brokers, aligning policymakers’ inclination 
for private sector job creation, training, and employment with areas of mutual interests, such as Wat-
son’s increasing applicability for cybersecurity. The emergence of the New Collar Jobs Act is not only a 
significant alignment of IBM corporate priorities with the agendas of the Republican-controlled U.S. 
House, but a rich causeway for assessing IBM’s construction of New Collar work, its ideological align-
ment with political gatekeepers, diversified applications for Watson, and New Collar workers capable of 
using Watson to drive innovate outcomes in diversified sectors. More critically, assessing the New Collar 
Jobs Act is an orienting force for understanding the significance of autonomy to IBM’s construction of 
New Collar work, training and employability, as the company framed the upskilling and employment of 
New Collar workers as a source of productive and professional autonomy for these workers and lever-
aged embedded notions of autonomy to pursue policy outcomes enabling IBM to enlarge its corporate 
autonomy amidst shifting business models, marketplaces, and political climates. Thus, the New Collar 
Jobs Act is the most viable means of tracing the significant points of discourse enabling the manifesta-
tion of its proposed enactment and illuminating the significance of workers and corporate autonomy to 
the development and uses of Watson.  
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3.3 The New Collar Jobs Act: Assessing Autonomy 
The New Collar Jobs Act is therefore significant for several reasons. First, the Act is a means of as-
sessing the construction of New Collar as both conceptual category of labor and how this conceptualiza-
tion bears on political ideologies embedded into the Act. Second, the Act readies a means of correlating 
the Act’s provisions with the economic motivations of IBM, especially as the company continues to tran-
sition from manufacturer of hardware and software to a services-based company with Watson at the 
forefront of these services. The Act is also a fruitful locus for understanding autonomy as a condition as-
cribed to various conceptions, institutions, interactions and related paradigms, despite the absence of 
the term “autonomy” itself. While the autonomy of Watson as a technological affordance is the subject 
of much popular discourse, little has been done to address the autonomy of various actors shaping the 
circumstances surround the development of Watson, who works with Watson, how workers interact 
with Watson, the outputs of this work, and the stakes and motivations of IBM as they attempt to posi-
tion the company in an advantageous spot to economically capitalize on the cross-correspondence of 
these paradigms. In this sense, the technological determinism surrounding conceptions of AI and in-
creasingly autonomous technologies can be reworked into a more precise understanding of the autono-
mous conditions ebbing and flowing across legal, economic, institutional, and social vectors, a precision 
primed by careful analysis of the New Collar Jobs Act, one that treats the Act as a significant “nodal 
point” within a broader discursive network and pays heed to scholarship foregrounding the importance 
of assessing policy and policymaking discourse.  
3.4 Methodology: The Nodal Point of Policy Discourse 
My approach intends more than an exclusive read of a single policy text and instead situates this 
policy text as a “nodal point” weaving together discourses external to policy verbiage yet no less critical 
in fomenting ideologies, values, and beliefs built into the New Collar Jobs Act’s legal, economic, institu-
tional, and social intentions. A nodal point, as described by Laclau and Moueffe, is a privileged site 
90 
 
among a broader network of discursive formations.198 By treating the Act as a nodal point, notions of 
worker and corporate autonomy can be readily identified in IBM discourse aimed both directly and indi-
rectly at policymakers and therefore infusing the circumstances of the Act’s development and the lan-
guage of the text itself. Nodal points crystallize the plurality of meanings and conceptions evacuated 
from a single policy text and circulating amongst its influencers. In this way, using a nodal point method-
ology for policy analysis corresponds to the ability to conceptualize autonomy as condition beyond its 
prominent association with technologies such as Watson and, more precisely, illuminate the plurality of 
autonomy penetrating discourse around Watson’s development, use, and economic underwriting. In 
other words, the nodal point methodology is the viable method to excavate – through the New Collar 
Jobs Act – complications of autonomy that supersede broader discourses and dispositions around au-
tonomous technologies. Similarly, this approach aligns with media and technology studies scholarship 
leveraging the nodal point methods to excavate plural associations embedded in policy discourse 
around critical technological issues.  
Media scholar Becky Lentz treats a series of policy texts as nodal points in her attempt to explore 
the shifting definitions and interpretations of “neutrality” among internet neutrality debates dating back 
to 1986.199 By situating the New Collar Jobs Act as a nodal point significant amidst IBM’s attempts to 
sway policymakers through attempts to instill interpretations of New Collar and correlate those inter-
pretations with legal provisions, my approach approximates Lentz’s attempt to understand the net neu-
trality debate. Just as Lentz ‘s attempt to understand “net neutrality” revealed a plurality of associations 
with “information service,” “enhanced service,” “telecommunications service,” “single integrated ser-
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vice” as particulate informants to larger conceptions of net neutrality (such as what kind of service is al-
legedly “neutral”),200 my approach similarly strives to understand notions of autonomy informing the 
construction of New Collar as a terminological conceit and how this construction likewise informed the 
legal provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act. If policy is "dominated by those with the most extensive fi-
nancial, ideological and political resources who are best able to mobilize their interests against their ri-
vals,"201 the adoption of New Collar by Congressional actors less than a year after the term was initially 
propagated by IBM suggests the company possesses a mastery of ideological and political sway that 
must be understood by tracing IBM’s machinations across its institutional texts and discourses.  
Furthermore, my approach is indebted to strands of media studies literatures increasingly looking 
to policy and policymaking as critical vectors for assessing intertwined technological, economic, legal, 
and cultural conditions. Since the early 2000s, policy has increasingly moved to the forefront of inter-
twined questions involving the cultural significance, historical import, and material realities shaping the 
development and inception of media and technological systems. This includes key works that advocate 
for policy as an important arena of critical media analysis;202 interlock policy, industrial practice, and cul-
tural output;203 interrogate political ideologies of policies favorable to media (de)regulation, conglomer-
ation, and commodification;204 and situate policy amidst globalized and transnational media develop-
ment and distribution.205 Among these literatures, scholars also undertake focused analyses of a single 
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policy, including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act;206 the Radio Act of 1927;207 the Telecommunica-
tion Act of 1996;208 and the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.209  
Either directly or indirectly, these projects are indebted to the work of Thomas Streeter, whose 
landmark work Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of Commercial Broadcasting in the United States 
(1996) enfolded critical theory, Foucauldian discourse analysis, and political economy into a methodo-
logical practice capable of assessing the role of policy as both a source and constitutive component of 
commercial and political power.210 Using this method, he argued for commercial broadcasting to be un-
derstood not as a technology or cultural form (as Raymond Williams otherwise observed about broad-
cast television211), but as a “legal inscription on technology”212 influencing the operation of technology 
beyond its material affordances. In a similar vein, I seek to illuminate the ways legal machinations such 
as the New Collar Jobs Act not only inscribe notions of autonomy on technology and its non-material af-
fordances, but inflects who gets to experience autonomy through work with Watson, how the skills for 
such work are engendered, and what motivates corporate and legal sectors to align their efforts towards 
economically underwriting high-tech worker autonomy.  
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My analysis of the New Collar Jobs Act is likewise indebted to Streeter’s brand of discourse analysis, 
political economy, critical application of (digital media) theory, and concern for commercial and political 
power influencing IBM, policymakers, and overlapping political and economic ideologies. IN addition to 
Streeter’s work on policy, my approach reflects Des Freedmans’s concern with “ideological resources 
brought to the media policy process and the contrasting sets of ideas that are either normalized or mar-
ginalized in the clashes that take place,"213 especially since scholarly analyses of a singular policy necessi-
tates critical inquiry of circumstances shaping the development of the policy, including terminological 
assumptions, contestations, and conceptions fomenting prior to the inception of legal encoding. When 
Hector Postigo interrogates the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), his considerable insights are 
buoyed by looking upstream to legislative histories and pre-enactment markers that “illustrate the is-
sues that confronted policymakers, content owners, and some consumer representatives”214 well before 
the official enactment of these issues in the DMCA. Likewise, Louise Benjamin’s analysis of the 1927’s 
Radio Act pinpoints the policymaking process leading to its enactment as the result of shared desires to 
“meet societal needs for national reform and steady economic expansion” among federal government 
actors (Herbert Hoover, Department of Commerce) and private corporations (G.E., RCA, AT &T).215 My 
analysis gestures towards this work as I look upstream from the New Collar Jobs Act towards IBM’s con-
struction of New Collar as a term free and clear of dystopian associations with Watson and advanced AI 
in general.  As I will demonstrate, IBM’s construction of New Collar and the instantiation of legal provi-
sions corresponding to New Collar work indicate an ideological contrast between IBM and popular con-
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ceptions of Watson’s relation to labor, as well as an ideological correlation between IBM’s economic in-
vestments and the specific provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act. This contrast, and the implications writ 
large, are the complications of autonomy unearthed through my approach.  
3.5 Methodology: Mapping “New Collar” and the New Collar Jobs Act 
Unpacking these dynamics entails a twofold analytical process. First, I map the conception of “New 
Collar” as a terminological construct indicative of a categorization of workers and technologically-based 
work processes performed by such workers. By understanding the New Collar Jobs Act as a nodal point 
linking together a broader set of discourses leveraged by IBM in public-facing corporate documentation, 
the New Collar Jobs Act signifies the process whereby the construction of legal definitions orients to 
economic, political, and institutional ideologies preceding the instantiation of such definitions in legal 
code. In this way, IBM’s imaginaries of what New Collar work entails, who performs this work, and how 
vocational training instills New Collar competencies suffuse the Act, even absent a formal definition for 
how this policy and its legislative authors stipulate “New Collar.” Furthermore, by increasingly placing 
Watson at the forefront of its business model alongside the construction of New Collar, IBM situated 
Watson as a primary means for New Collar job creation and the ability for New Collar workers to aug-
ment their autonomy. As we shall see, this notion of “augment” is key to the relationship among Wat-
son, New Collar work, and autonomy, given IBM’s strategic use of “augment” to reorient dystopian con-
notations associated with Watson and other advanced AI and instead position Watson as an augmenta-
tive force for human ingenuity, institutional collaboration, and economic vitality. Mapping “New Collar” 
is thus necessary to disentangle the myriad informants of “New Collar” in the New Collar Jobs Act and 
more strenuously pinpoint the motivations of IBM executives curating economically-advantageous con-
ceptions of New Collar work. As I will demonstrate, IBM stresses Watson as an augmentative to the 
skills, employability, and productive vitality of New Collar workers, asserting the enhanced autonomy 
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these workers will gain as a result of plying their trade through Watson, rather than (as popular narra-
tives would have it) succumbing to the autonomous prowess of Watson’s alleged “job-stealing” poten-
tial.    
The second aspect of my twofold analytical approach to the New Collar Jobs Act concerns the Act’s 
legal codification of stipulations that allow employers (such as IBM) to claim a tax credit on institutional 
expenditures used to train employees with competencies in 19 specialty areas of cybersecurity. While 
IBM’s discourse stresses the newfound forms of autonomy New Collar workers will experience through 
Watson, this bill spotlights the economic incentives motivating IBM’s propagation of New Collar work-
ers, especially as IBM increasingly uses public-private partnerships to make inroads into the monetiza-
tion of vocational training transpiring through public schools. By investing in these schools, IBM can di-
rectly influence the uptake of vocational skillsets necessary to work with Watson, leverage educational 
institutions to instill IBM’s institutional ethos among primary school students, and enlarge the pool of 
New Collar workers ready to evolve the company’s products and services. The New Collar Jobs Act is 
therefore a means for IBM to increase its institutional autonomy by leveraging their conception of hu-
man-oriented New Collar autonomy towards policy arenas ideologically-inclined towards supply-side job 
creation and tax incentives. In this way, the New Collar Jobs Act shines a light on IBM’s intensification of 
“cognitive capitalism” logics wherein IBM increasingly captures and monetizes intelligence across educa-
tional, legal, and marketplace venues. As I will demonstrate, the uplift of IBM’s institutional autonomy in 
a cognitive capitalist marketplace occurs through modalities of production and accumulation that limit 
and restrict the ability for New Collar workers to maintain heightened autonomy beyond the auspices of 
educational, legal, and corporate institutions modeled on IBM’s corporate conception of autonomy.  
In the following section, I map IBM’s conception of New Collar as both category of workers and the 
sophisticated technological competencies this category of work entails. Through this mapping, I also ac-
count for the increasing privilege IBM accords to Watson among its corporate portfolio and marketplace 
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ventures. By mapping the construction of New Collar, I demonstrate the ways IBM reworks dystopian 
notions of artificial intelligence, charts distinct pathways for New Collar training, positions Watson as an 
augmentative force for the autonomy of New Collar work, and derives “cognitive” products and services 
infused with the augmented autonomy of both humans and Watson.  
3.6 Mapping New Collar 
The term “New Collar” is mostly absent from the text of the New Collar Jobs Act, appearing only in 
the bill’s title.  Where the Act itself leaves “New Collar” undefined, IBM’s THINKPolicy blog and popular 
press provided opportunities for IBM to typify New Collar work and align this typology with specific pol-
icy objectives of the Trump administration, as well as entrenched neoliberal ethos of supply-side invest-
ment and austerity as engines of job creation favored by fiscally-conservative Republicans.216 Under-
standing policy as a nodal point for discursive strategies influencing policymaking actors, institutions, 
processes, and outcomes, the definitional absence of “New Collar” in the text of the New Collar Jobs Act 
implores a rigorous accounting of how New Collar was constructed by IBM and internalized by legislative 
power brokers. Moreover, it is an opportunity to unearth this construction and internalization, notably 
since the titular usage of “New Collar” alongside the absence of further context is symptomatic of IBM’s 
successful inscription of “New Collar” onto political ideologies, legislative outcomes, emergent work cat-
egories, and pathways for worker training and employability. In this way, mapping a typology of “New 
Collar” by working backwards from the New Collar Jobs Act aligns with media studies scholarship intent 
on understanding the role of policy and its textuality as infused with institutional, intellectual, and ideo-
logical struggles incubated among power brokers well before these brokers put ink to legislative parch-
ment.  
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IBM’s initial reference217 to New Collar work appeared in a letter to President-elect Donald Trump 
posted on IBM’s THINKPolicy blog on Novermber 15, 2016, just one week after the 2016 presidential 
election. Penned by IBM CEO Ginny Rometty, the letter seeks to align Trump’s policy priorities with 
IBM’s unique capabilities to address these priorities, covering topics ranging from infrastructure to gov-
ernment fiscal inefficiency to employer-sponsored healthcare. The letter’s first priority area is New Col-
lar jobs, a class of worker Rometty endeavored to both create and hire. For Rometty, emerging roles in 
cybersecurity, data science, and “cognitive” business necessitate competencies more readily available 
through vocational skills training than four-year college degrees.218  With deference to Trump campaign 
discourse invoking the importance of vocational training, Rometty touts IBM’s “new educational model” 
as an approach that aligns traditional public education and vocational training to maximize the efficiency 
and professional viability of learning outcomes.219 Despite being unnamed in the letter to Trump, this 
approach is IBM’s Pathways In Technology Early College High Schools (P-TECH), an educational model in 
which IBM invests (through public-private partnerships) in six-year public schools that hybridize grade 9-
12 STEM-based education with two years of vocational training aimed at putting STEM skills into prac-
tice. P-TECH students graduate with an associate degree in science, engineering, computers, or other 
STEM-related area that provides skills and aptitudes to pursue further education or “step easily into 
high-growth, ‘new collar’ jobs.”220 Less than one year later, on July 25, 2017, Congress introduced the 
New Collar Jobs Act of 2017. By amending the tax code to “establish an employee cybersecurity educa-
tion tax credit” available to employers who cover costs for employees earning degrees or certifications 
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in competencies related to cybersecutity.221 Despite the absence of the term “new collar” in the full text, 
the Act attempts to legally-codify economic remunerations beneficial to IBM as both provider and recipi-
ent of New Collar training.  
In the wake of IBM CEO Ginny Rometty’s Nov. 15, 2016 letter to Trump, Rometty and other IBM ex-
ecutives outlined their concept of New Collar work alongside the company’s unique ability to train New 
Collar workers. In doing so, IBM’s discourse sought to reframe dystopian impressions of Watson and 
other advanced AI, impressions fomented by Watson’s seeming autonomy from human operation dur-
ing its 2011 televised Jeopardy! win. Even though IBM is quick to promote Watson’s victory and the sub-
sequent enhancement of its technological capabilities, the company is careful to situate the enhance-
ment of Watson as, first and foremost, augmentative to the autonomy of humans. While many popular 
depictions and assessments of artificial intelligence posit AI and other increasingly autonomous technol-
ogies as a threat to human autonomy, IBM’s careful deconstruction of dystopian horizons enabled the 
company to construct a profile of Watson as an engine of human ingenuity, capability, and employabil-
ity. By reconfiguring past impressions of its AI in relation to human autonomy in the contemporaneous 
moment, IBM leveraged these reconfigured ideas about technological and human autonomy towards 
future policy outcomes, attaining a measure of success with the introduction of the New Collar Jobs Act 
in July 2017. When IBM began foregrounding “New Collar” in late 2016, the deployment of this term 
marshalled and accentuated many of the discursive tactics used by IBM during the 2011-2017 timeframe 
(what IBM refers to as the emergence of the “cognitive era”) to both counterpose dystopian associa-
tions with Watson and increasingly place Watson at the center of IBM’s corporate strategies. Even when 
Watson and New Collar seem to appear at a remove in IBM corporate messaging, IBM’s positioning of 
Watson as an augmentative force for human autonomy inflects upon New Collar, as from its inception 
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the typology of New Collar evacuates dystopian associations and furthermore invokes new (quasi-uto-
pian) horizons for education, training, and employability. 
3.7 Mapping New Collar: Augmenting Autonomy 
In tandem with downplaying dystopian themes associated with Watson, IBM plays up Watson’s 
unique ability to augment the autonomy of New Collar workers and outcomes of New Collar work. IBM’s 
primary method of situating Watson as a driver of human autonomy stresses the inadequacy of the 
term “artificial intelligence.” For IBM, dystopian and mythic associations with “artificial intelligence” ob-
fuscate efficient and expanded possibilities for technological work and work outcomes. As a way to dis-
tance IBM and Watson from such associations, IBM corporate executives and researchers employ two 
primary terminological constructs that reinforce the autonomy of New Collar workers and institutions 
leveraging New Collar work: “augmentative” and “cognitive.”  
In the case of the former, “augmentative” – and its variations “augment,” “augmented,” and “aug-
mentation – refer to the “intelligent” capacities of “artificial intelligence.” IBM blogs, reports, white pa-
pers, promotional materials and trade press interviews reiterate a common approach: leverage the acro-
nym “AI” to downplay “artificial intelligence” and stress “augmented intelligence” wherein “augmented” 
refers to human workers, work processes, and outcomes. Where “artificial intelligence” connotates fab-
ricated neural processes confined to silicon-based technologies, “augmented intelligence” evokes hu-
man intelligence as the primary force driving sophisticated technological systems and outcomes per-
formed through these systems. Augmented intelligence enables IBM to stress human-oriented auton-
omy and the flowering of sophisticated mastery of computational skills performed by human beings. 
In addition to “augmented,” the term “cognitive” refers to a series of technological phenomena 
both specific to IBM and born from IBM institutional innovation. Watson is a “cognitive” system, em-
blematic of the potential of “cognitive” computing, herald of the “cognitive” era of computing, and the 
driving force behind “cognitive” outcomes. Alongside augmentation as a force innately empowering of 
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human intelligence, “cognitive” enables IBM to emphasize intellect as a shared – or, rather, “distrib-
uted” – condition among humans and Watson, thereby recasting notions of AI as “job-stealers” and in-
stead positing Watson as a co-constituted force augmentative of New Collar autonomy. This notion of 
“distributed” harkens towards a common strand of posthumanist theory: “distributed cognition” as an 
emergent condition among humans and non-humans. In the case of Watson, posthumanist theory illu-
minates the relationship among IBM’s reworking of dystopian motifs into a sophisticated discursive re-
lay for generating newfound vistas of human intellect and performances transpiring through Watson. To 
be clear, my claim here is not that New Collar workers are posthuman workers per se; rather, IBM’s at-
tempt to downplay the dominance of Watson and AI is best understood through the lens of posthuman-
ist theory, specifically the process of re-centering humans by centering Watson as the core asset of IBM 
and the primary means for attaining renewed possibilities for human autonomy. Posthumanist theory 
brings clarity to the construction of “New Collar” as a class of workers and work performances empow-
ered by the sophisticated intelligence of Watson and its augmentative capacities, infusing the term with 
connotations that concomitantly enable IBM to leverage policy arenas to align its technology and inno-
vative prowess with policy outcomes.  
A noteworthy example of IBM’s deployment of “augmented intelligence” and “cognitive” is IBM’s 
white paper “Computing, Cognition, and the Future of Knowing.” Authored by Dr. John E. Kelly III (Senior 
VP for IBM Research and Solutions Portfolio) and subtitled “How Humans and Machines are Forging a 
New Age of Understanding,” the white paper conceptualizes “artificial intelligence” as “co-opted by Hol-
lywood, mischaracterized by the media, portrayed as everything from savior to scourge of humanity,” 
while also decrying “sentience or autonomy on the part of machines.”222 Opposed to “artificial intelli-
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gence” and a purely machinic autonomy, Kelly advocates for a Watson as a cognitive system “augment-
ing the human ability to understand – and act upon – the complex systems of our society.”223 With this 
invocation of “cognitive system,” it’s necessary to briefly outline distinctions between “cognitive compu-
ting” and “cognitive system” as utilized by IBM.  
“Cognitive computing” refers to a series of advanced computational capabilities designed to learn 
how to perform specific tasks based on interactions with humans.224 Rather than being programmed to 
deliver particular outcomes, cognitive computing is an assemblage of techniques enabling computers to 
learn and reason from datafied inputs to generate well-defined outputs. Techniques such as machine 
learning, computer vision, and pattern recognition reflect human intellectual processes for comprehend-
ing sensorial input and learning to logically process and structure outputs, hence the applicability of 
“cognitive.” A “cognitive system,” on the other hand, is a particular instantiation of any range of such 
techniques. When exemplifying Watson as a “cognitive system,” IBM notes Watson’s ability to “tease 
apart the human language to identify inferences between text passages with human-like accuracy,”225 at 
a speed and scale unattainable through human intellect alone. In other words, cognitive computing is a 
series of generalized techniques (i.e. speech recognition), while a cognitive system is a particular instan-
tiation of techniques for more directed purposes (i.e. Watson is a cognitive system with distinct meth-
ods for leveraging speech recognition to answer Jeopardy! questions).  
3.8 Mapping New Collar: Augmented Human Autonomy and Posthuman Cognition 
The ability for Watson to augment human ability is made possible through a “distributed cognition” 
of intellectual tasks and performances. In posthumanist theory, distributed cognition is a foundational 
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tenet descriptive of cognition as a transferrable condition among both humans and non-humans. Dis-
tributed cognition implores an understanding of cognitive capability and performance as an exteriority 
to human bodies and human biological matter, conceived instead as “carried out by a system in which a 
human interacts with objects, artefacts, tools and other humans."226 Cognition, in this viewpoint, is not a 
matter of a biological human cognition colliding with a separate technological cognition; instead, when 
humans process information through Watson and other cognitive systems, cognition carries out infor-
mational tasks “across the boundaries of biological and nonbiological matter.”227 If viewed through the 
prism of a posthuman orthodoxy, we might understand this “union of the human with the intelligence 
machine”228 as an egalitarian union positing man-machine equality through a “radical decentering of the 
transitional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human.”229 In posthumanism, after all, the “post” pre-
fix entails this very decentering, a point of view that stresses humans should be understood not as the 
supreme entities of ontological being but as co-constituted actors in a complex network of life forms 
and epistemological processes with “no essential differences or absolute demarcations”230 between hu-
mans and highly-intelligent computer systems, Watson or otherwise. Thus, the question of human au-
tonomy is significant to foundational conceits of posthumanism. In attempting to move beyond the hu-
man as “coherent and autonomous,” the distributed cognition in posthumanism tends to imply a distrib-
uted autonomy among intellectual tasks performed through the co-constitution of human and techno-
logical work: 
"‘cognition’ is actually being carried out by the system as a whole, not just the human being: 
for example, a pilot can only fly a plane in conjunction with the instruments, panels and 
readouts in the cockpit, all of which are sensing, monitoring, calculating, reacting to, storing 
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and displaying all the information necessary to keep the plane in the air. The cognition neces-
sary to fly the plane happens in both flesh and blood and silicon and wire"231 
In other words, the pilot is only autonomous insofar as the machinic technologies and techniques 
open a range of possibilities enabling the human pilot to consider and determine courses of action. Hu-
man autonomy is therefore, much like cognition, not parked in the corporeal human but coursing across 
human and technological capabilities, interactions, and performances. But where posthumanism under-
stands the autonomous human as a fictitious paradigm,232and distributed cognition traditionally implies 
a relative egalitarianism between humans and machines, IBM reorients this distribution by repositioning 
Watson as a means of re-centering human autonomy.  
Whereas posthumanism begins with the premise that historical humanism radically overdeter-
mined humans as privileged beings, IBM takes as its starting point the premise that AI and other techno-
logical intelligence is grossly overprivileged in the contemporary moment. Downplaying AI-related dys-
topianism and the term “artificial intelligence” is not only a means of situating IBM and Watson at a re-
move from social stigmas surrounding AI, but a way for IBM to position the company and its technology 
as the salutary corrective for an overdetermined centering of autonomous technologies among cultural 
imaginaries. In many cases, especially among discourses aimed at policymakers, IBM leverages “cogni-
tive” alongside “augmented intelligence” as a tactic that stresses the sophistication of Watson while 
stressing this sophistication enables newfound human possibility. In IBM’s response to a Request for In-
formation (RFI) from the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy on AI “tools, technologies, and 
training,”233 IBM begins by describing the proliferation of Watson among various industries (i.e. 
healthcare, security, the Internet of Things) alongside the increasing complexity and scale of Watson’s 
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capabilities in the wake of Watson’s Jeopardy! win.234 As context for IBM’s individual responses to the 
questions in the RFI, IBM invokes the advantages of “augmented intelligence” and “cognitive compu-
ting” as the company’s preferred approach to augmented intelligence. Augmented intelligence can “en-
hance and scale human expertise,” as opposed to the attempt to mimicry of human intelligence sug-
gested by “artificial intelligence.”235 Similarly, cognitive computing is a means to use augmented intelli-
gence to “solve a wide range of practical problems, boost productivity, and foster new discoveries 
across many industries,” a range of possibilities for enhanced human intelligence and intelligent deci-
sion-making made possible through the “form of IBM Watson.”236 Before the coinage of “New Collar” 
and the emergence of the New Collar Jobs Act, IBM’s address to policy officials sought to stress the au-
tonomous potentials of Watson as a condition readied and at hand for human beings rather than a force 
ascending beyond human laboring capabilities. As IBM attempted to make clear, policymakers should 
understand Watson as the point of ascendency for human intelligence and the ability to exercise auton-
omy in employability, productivity, and industrial innovation. In this sense, discourse aimed at policy-
makers inflected less on Watson and more so on what Watson makes possible for the alignment of cor-
porate and federal government priorities for job creation and staffing of critical technological jobs. Just 
as Streeter noted the use of “blue skies” rhetoric in cable television policy discourse to foster industri-
ally-advantageous conception of cable television as a populist form of engagement, IBM’s rhetorical use 
of “augmentation” shifts notions of technology as autonomous to Watson as the grounds for human au-
tonomy in arenas at the forefront of political priorities.237 In doing so, IBM also shifted the way augmen-
tation and cognition situate among presiding notions and aims of posthuman theory.  
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By augmenting human intelligence (“human expertise”) and leveraging cognitive computing to fur-
ther augment outcomes (productivity, discoveries), human work performed with Watson is a distributed 
cognition that first distributes cognition in the vein of posthumanism, only to subsequently redistribute 
cognitive prowess and fortitude back to the human, ultimately repositioning the human as the center of 
ontological enterprise. In this way, IBM reconfigures a posthumanist perspective that views humans as 
the entities configured to be “seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines;”238 instead, IBM config-
ures Watson for articulation with humans and, more critically, enables humans to articulate skillsets and 
performances indicative of human ingenuity. Where this posthmanist perspective sees a limit to the 
configuration of machine-bound humans,239 IBM’s reconfiguration of distributed cognition supposes no 
limits in the augmentation of human intelligence. Nonetheless, just as IBM configures Watson to aug-
ment human intelligence, IBM’s discursive articulations around “augment” must strategically elide other 
aspects of posthumanism and transhumanism that conceive of augmentation as a means of replacing or 
transcending human biology and life more generally, connoting dystopian fears about the overtaking or 
replacement of human biology and human life.  
3.9 Mapping New Collar: Augmentation and Re-Centering Human Autonomy 
Beyond a general use of “augment” (synonymous with “improving” or “enhancing”), “augmenta-
tion” is bound up in posthuman and transhuman speculations about emergent humanoid beings poised 
to supersede contemporary human beings. Philosopher Nick Bostrom notes the tendency of transhu-
manists to “view human nature as a work in progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to 
remold in desirable ways.”240 These desirable ways include “radical extension of human health-span, 
eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, and augmentation of human intellectual, 
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physical, and emotional capacities.”241 Augmentation, in this sense, intends more than an uplift of attrib-
utes possessed by a human; it is an uplift of human attributes engendering a more advanced lifeform. In 
this vein, transhumanism overlaps with Kurzweils’ utopian ideas of a technological singularity, such as 
the use of nanobots to “augment and ultimately replace our organs,”242 as a means of “transcending” 
the natural limits and finitude of human biology.  Likewise, strands of posthumanist thought tend to im-
agine the transcended human emerging in the wake of seemingly unthinkable technologies. Speculative 
posthumanism envisions a future world of unimagined and/or unrealized technological sophistication 
where the potential for some posthumans to emerge as evolutionary epochal descendants of human 
beings can be realized within a "posthuman possibility space."243 Within this space, the “disconnection 
thesis” suggests technological alteration could enable an entity (biological humans, animals, technical 
objects) to ultimately exist outside of human society and its governing paradigms.244 Through disconnec-
tion, and the exteriority to human society, these posthumans become “functionally autonomous.”245 
Augmentation, for IBM, is preferable than “artificial” intelligence for what it enables the company 
to posit about the autonomy of New Collar workers, yet it is also a term that risks connotating apocalyp-
tic visions of contemporary human inferiority and reorienting back towards dystopian conceptions of 
autonomy as the purview of robotic and other non-human lifeforms. Thus, IBM’s use of augmentation 
harkens towards Lev Manovich’s notion of augmentation as an idea and “cultural practice”246 extending 
beyond technological capacities for uplift and transcendence. Just as Manovich conceives of augmented 
humans traveling through material realms as a cultural practice co-augmenting space, bodies, and their 
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situated actions,247IBM similarly suggests a co-enlivening of humans, situated work process, and innova-
tive industrial outcomes. When contextualizing the “augmented intelligence” of Watson, IBM stresses 
augmentation as tied to material opportunities for capitalizing on technological, marketplace, and insti-
tutional innovation in the present moment. In the wake of Rometty speaking at the World Economic Fo-
rum in January 2017, IBM’s Collaboration Solutions blog capitalized on her insistence that AI will not 
steal jobs and instead “work cohesively with most professions”248 by outlining commercial applications 
for augmented intelligence and cognitive techniques. Under the blunt, exclamatory headline “Aug-
mented Intelligence, NOT Artificial Intelligence,” IBM’s answer to their self-imposed question “why does 
IBM choose to use ‘augmented intelligence’ or ‘cognitive’ over ‘artificial intelligence’?” offers “aug-
mented intelligence with Watson” as a means to be “more productive with less work” across industries 
presently in need of innovative solutions, such as airline travel, healthcare, and insurance.249 In IBM’s 
2016 annual report, the company outlines the fruits of augmented human productivity, situating Wat-
son as the chief augmenter of human productivity and the generation of “cognitive” products and ser-
vices derived from this augmentation.  
3.10 Mapping New Collar: Augmented Autonomy and Cognitive Outcomes 
IBM’s 2016 annual report begins by stressing work undertaken in the present day as transpiring 
with IBM and Watson. The title page’s sole text “You, with IBM” leads into a subsequent salvo declaring 
the company “reinvented IBM for this moment – to fuel your dreams with Watson” and build “a world 
we all want to live in. The world you’re building, with IBM.”250 Even as IBM conjures images of a socially-
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agreeable future world, this world is alive in the present day, in “this moment,” a guard against transhu-
manist and posthumanist disconnections from contemporary humanism reinforced using present tense 
verbiage to stress you are presently building this world (rather than you “will” or “can’). When Rometty’s 
letter to investors subsequently describes the purpose of AI to augment human intelligence, she does so 
amidst pull-quotes and headings respectively intoning Watson as the “AI platform for business” and the 
world “we” want to live in as “a world with Watson.”251 Rather than augmentation as a force moving 
away from contemporary humanism and human society, IBM’s augmentation positions Watson as a pre-
sent-day opportunity for humans and institutions to work “with” Watson and IBM and engender a 
“hopeful” and “more prosperous and progressive” future by focusing on commercial opportunities alive 
in the present moment.252  
As evidence of these opportunities, IBM’s 2016 annual report offers 50 short case studies of profes-
sionals across numerous industries working with Watson and other IBM technologies to generate “cog-
nitive” products and services. Among these cognitive outcomes, IBM cites Watson working with music 
producers and film editors to creative a “cognitive song” and “cognitive film trailer” for the film Morgan 
(2016); working with chefs to create “cognitive cooking;”253 working with fashion designers to create a 
“cognitive dress;” and working with copywriters to develop “cognitive ads.”254 Thus, for IBM, working 
with Watson entails an augmented human intelligence empowered to deliver unparalleled possibilities 
for market-based solutions, products, and services. If, per the disconnection thesis, posthuman life 
forms becomes functionally autonomous by eclipsing societal paradigms, IBM’s strategic use of augmen-
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tations proffers contemporaneous paradigms of capitalist marketplaces, workers, products, and institu-
tions as opportunities to enliven the autonomy of New Collar workers by heightening and variegating 
work processes, collaborations, and outcomes. But, per IBM’s discourse, if autonomy is heightened by 
IBM and its intellectual property (Watson), and if this heightening invariably leads to commodities 
poised to enrich IBM’s economic and marketplace positioning, the questions then becomes one of the 
relationship between IBM’s strategy of promoting the autonomous capabilities of New Collar workers 
and how this strategy serves IBM’s institutional autonomy, as well as the tension between New Collar 
autonomy and IBM institutional autonomy.  
The next section – “Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act” - therefore draws these questions more 
sharply into focus by contextualizing the provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act in relation to IBM’s at-
tempts to heighten its ability to self-determine in a turbulent economic marketplace alongside the com-
pany’s transition from a producer of hardware and software to a services-based business-to-business 
(B2B) company. This section also continues to map the construction of “New Collar.” Whereas this sec-
tion focuses on the attempts by IBM to imbue the term “New Collar” with connotations diametrically 
opposed to dystopian and mythic conceptions of AI and notions of diminished human autonomy accom-
panying these conceptions, the next section correlates provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act with con-
ceptions of New Collar work aligned with political ideas about how human autonomy is potentialized 
and realized. This is especially critical for understanding motivations for IBM to construct ideas about 
New Collar work and align this construction with the company’s financial and intellectual contributions 
to public-private schools, IBM’s use of these schools to train New Collar workers, and employ New Collar 
workers in service of governmental and private business opportunities to capitalize on IBM’s renewed 
corporate strategy. In this way, alongside downplaying dystopia and augmenting human autonomy, IBM 
seeks to increase its institutional autonomy by leveraging policy opportunities for competitive ad-
vantages in an intensifying cognitive capitalism. Ultimately, as will become clear, IBM’s alignment of its 
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institutional autonomy with the logics of cognitive capitalism complicates the nature of human auton-
omy afforded to New Collar workers.  
Before proceeding to the next section, a brief summary of this section is in order. This section out-
lined the ways IBM worked to construct the concept of “New Collar” by first, downplaying dystopian as-
sociations with Watson and other advanced AI and, second, urging the use of “augmented intelligence” 
as a more adequate use of “AI” that stresses the ability of Watson to augment the intelligence and au-
tonomy of human beings. This strategy transpires through a reworking of distributed cognition whereby 
IBM attempts to re-center human beings by positioning Watson as the driver of human augmentation, 
an augmentation that is neither posthumanist nor transhumanist and instead stresses the potential for 
humans to flourish in the present moment. Watson, as a cognitive system built from cognitive compu-
ting, epitomizes this reworked distributed cognition, offering cognition as an intellectual force at hand 
for human mastery, as opposed to more egalitarian notions of distributed cognition specific to posthu-
manist theory. Ultimately, cognitive products and services enabled through Watson evidence, for IBM, 
the fruits of human autonomy made possible by downplaying dystopia and augmenting autonomy.   
3.11 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act 
Whereas the previous section outlined importance of worker autonomy to the conceptual con-
struction of New Collar and its relevance to presiding policymakers, this section outlines the particular 
provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act with IBM’s strategic attempts to leverage this type of worker au-
tonomy for aligned corporate and political interests, thereby enabling IBM to enact greater autonomy as 
a company in a rapidly-shifting and turbulent marketplace.  The stated goals of the New Collar Jobs Act 
are to “increase cybersecurity education and job growth,” as well as the unspecified designation “other 
purposes.”255 To achieve these goals, the Act proposes benefits for both New Collar workers and their 
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employers. For New Collar workers, the Act amends the 1965 Higher Education Act to enable debt can-
cellation for any employee who uses federal loans to pat for cybersecurity-related education and train-
ing, contingent upon “3 years (36 months) of consecutive non-default payment, continual employment 
in a cybersecurity job during this period wherein the job is located in an economically distressed area or 
requires the work to perform at least 60% of their duties in an economically distressed area.”256 
For employers of New Collar workers, the Act amends the federal tax code to allow employers to 
claim a tax credit on "qualified employee cybersecurity education expenses," defined as costs incurred 
for contributing to the education of an employee who ultimately receives a “certificate or degree at the 
undergraduate or graduate level or industry-recognized certification.”257 “Industry-recognized certifica-
tion” includes certification related to “specialty areas” and “work roles” listed in the National Initiative 
for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)’s Cybersecurity Workforce Framework. A specialty area is a type of 
“concentrated work, or function, within cybersecurity and related work,” formalized as 32 distinct spe-
cialty areas designated in the Framework.258 A work role is a specific grouping of cybersecurity and re-
lated work, including knowledge, skills, and ability (KSA) necessary to perform such work.259 Thus, per 
the language of the New Collar Jobs Act and the Cybersecurity Framework, the criteria for an “industry-
recognized certification” includes certifications broadly understood as bearing some relation to one of 
the specialty areas, a work role, or any of its constitutive knowledges, skills, and abilities.260 Additionally, 
businesses that claim the cybersecurity education credit can receive an increased evaluation score (5%) 
when competing for government contracts in excess of $5 million.261 
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The alignment of these employer-based provisions with interrelated IBM ventures in the areas of 
education and cybersecurity, alongside the concomitant interrelation of Watson with these ventures, 
offer insights into IBM’s attempts to navigate transformations to its business model and technological 
marketplaces with agility and supremacy. It is an attempt, in other words, to enliven its institutional au-
tonomy. Whereas the preceding section detailed IBM’s construction of “New Collar” as a paradigm in-
dicative of augmented autonomy for human workers (transpiring through Watson and the evacuation of 
dystopian motifs and myths associated with AI such as Watson), this section details IBM’s attempts to 
increase its autonomy by positioning the company as unilaterally capable of training and hiring New Col-
lar workers for job roles and skills critical to contemporary marketplaces and issues of pressing national 
concern (i.e. cybersecurity). My mapping of the New Collar Jobs Act correlates the Act’s provisions with 
IBM’s investments in targeted areas of vocational training and cybersecurity, as well as IBM’s designa-
tion of a contemporary era of cognitive computing, an era that is both the result of IBM’s ingenuity with 
Watson and an era emblematic of IBM’s ability to heighten its self-determination among technological, 
economic, and cultural forces.    
3.12 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: IBM and the Cognitive Era 
But even as Rometty attempts to avoid the rhetorical signifiers suggestive of hype cycle protolyzing, 
her typology of the cognitive era – and Watson as the progenitor of this era – leans into what Evgeny 
Morozov refers to as epochalism, an intellectually fallacy supposing an “exceptional era of unprece-
dented opportunity due to the emergence and widespread availability of sophisticated technological 
systems.”262 Espousers of epochalist rhetoric, however, are driven by more than opportunities for lucra-
tive marketplace ventures. As Morozov notes, epochalists believe their own epochalism,263 a sincerity 
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that informs Rometty’s evangelism for Watson, IBM, and the company’s significance as a driving force 
behind and within the emerging cognitive era. While IBM externalizes the notion of the cognitive era as 
one of emerging technological and business opportunities, the cognitive era is also something of a belief 
system guiding the fervency and machinations through which IBM advocates for its ventures, technol-
ogy, and institutional prowess.  
The New Collar Jobs Act is a significant moment in IBM’s attempts to realize the fruits of its institu-
tional prowess in the cognitive era, one that corresponds to the company’s attempts to maximize its in-
stitutional autonomy. Thus, this section draws on IBM’s use of “cognitive” as outlined in the preceding 
section to correlate the provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act with IBM’s attempt to capitalize on the 
logics of an intensified “cognitive capitalism.” Cognitive capitalism is a contemporary iteration of capital-
ist production predicated on knowledge as a process and outcome of production, leveraging the minds 
of workers as the “machine of production, generating profit for owners who have purchased, with a 
wage, its thinking power.”264 Value is produced from “processes of creativity, communication, expres-
sion, artistry, innovation and ‘fun,’”265 generating outputs with economic value and imbued with social 
values that accord esteem to these processes and workers capable of their undertaking. In this way, cog-
nitive capitalism also describes a “broad organizational principle of contemporary society.”266 As we will 
see, IBM’s political and institutional maneuvering not only epitomizes the logics of cognitive capitalism; 
IBM intensifies these logics by engendering circumstances that allowed the company to economically 
capitalize on the training and creation of New Collar workers, particularly those capable of leveraging 
Watson to address cybersecurity concerns.  
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From 2011 to 2017, alongside the centrality of Watson in the IBM corporate portfolio, IBM increas-
ingly invested in vocational training for emerging New Collar workers, advocated for public-private edu-
cational models to train New Collar workers, and stressed New Collar training and work as uniquely ca-
pable of alleviating cybersecurity dilemmas. While the provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act are not spe-
cific to IBM as an institution, they closely align with IBM ventures around vocational training and cyber-
security and, more importantly, position the company to receive tax credits for economic investments in 
ventures poised to accelerate through the year 2020.  
Ultimately, I will return to the question of New Collar worker autonomy and cognitive outcomes 
addressed in the preceding section. First, however, it is necessary to understand how IBM’s investments 
in vocational training of New Collar workers for competencies related to cybersecurity correlate with the 
provisions of the New Collar Jobs act and, through this correlation, evidence success of IBM’s maneuver-
ability in the cognitive era, thereby clearing the way for IBM to operate with heightened degrees of au-
tonomy. In what follows, I not only draw out IBM’s strategies for aligning the company’s ventures with 
political mindsets in cognitive capitalism, but also complete the conceptual mapping of “New Collar,” as 
these provisions also closely correlate with IBM rhetoric that downplays traditional dichotomies of labor 
and collegiate education as insufficient for marketplace success in the cognitive era. Thus, these provi-
sions are very telling about IBM’s institutional autonomy, the conceptualization of New Collar, and the 
economic and social values driving economic and political ideologies, as well as the instantiation of such 
ideologies in legal code. Beyond legal encoding, IBM’s forays into education stress skills and competen-
cies with computer code as necessary for New Collar workers to compete in IBM’s cognitive era. 
3.13 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: IBM, P-Tech, and Vocational Training 
In September 2011, approximately half a year after Watson’s Jeopardy! appearance, IBM collabo-
rated with the New York City Department of Education, the City University of New York, and New York 
City College of Technology to open Pathways in Technology Early College High School (P-TECH), a New 
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York City public high school. While P-TECH initially referred to this particular New York City school, P-
TECH now refers to a public-private partnership model for integrated high school and college education, 
a model that prioritizes creating direct pathways for jobs that require advanced computational skills. Af-
ter six years of training, P-TECH students earn (free of charge) an associate degree in computers or cog-
nate STEM fields reflective of “skills and knowledge they need to continue their studies or step easily 
into high-growth, ‘new collar’ jobs.”267 As of 2017, more than 80 P-TECH schools operate around the 
world, including 50 across six U.S. States.268 According to the P-TECH website (developed by IBM and col-
laborators from the New York state education and university systems), the majority of P-TECH funding 
comes from local school districts, alongside federal funding earmarked for Career & Technical Education 
(CTE) schools through the Carl D. Perkins Act and college course costs covered by a range of potential 
funding options (such as philanthropic donation or college tuition waivers).269  
As IBM notes on the “Key Issues” page of its THINKPolicy blog, the Carl D. Perkins Act is a policy pri-
ority for IBM, one that overlaps with other priorities for cybersecurity and corporate tax reform, each of 
which envelops rhetoric around P-TECH, New Collar jobs, and/or supply-side job creation. The Carl D. 
Perkins Act provides federal funding to states and other grantees for the purposes of enhancing career 
and technical education (CTE) programs and skillsets gained through CTE programs. By supporting the 
Carl D. Perkins Act, IBM’s seeks to maintain incentives for its efforts to improve the “educational pipe-
line for future skills through Perkins CTE and P-TECH…career-focused schools,” and orient this pipeline 
towards New Collar job training focused on “current skills that do not necessarily require a bachelor’s 
degree, but instead prioritize capabilities over credentials.”270 IBM’s “Key Issues” for policy also include 
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reforming the corporate tax code to “promote investment, job creation, and keep American companies 
competitive,” alongside “non-regulatory, voluntary” approaches to cybersecurity, such as IBM’s declara-
tion that its “cognitive security products will also create New Collar jobs that demand skills, knowledge, 
and creative thinking to outsmart cyber criminals.”271 
IBM’s policy priorities significantly correlate with provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act for voca-
tional training and skills, job creation and staffing, and computational competencies underpinning cyber-
security. The “Key Issues” page also shines a light on the role of tax reform and credits simultaneously 
incentivizing IBM’s contributions to P-TECH schools and IBM’s monetization of such investments. Tax 
credits for media and technology companies tend to arise from political ideologies about corporate in-
vestment as the source of job creation, technological innovation, and spurs for wider economic sustaina-
bility. As Vicki Mayer notes in her analysis of the 2002 Louisiana Motion Picture Inventive Act, tax credit 
policies aimed at availing media companies of public coffers were rationalized on the grounds that sup-
ply-side economic strategies would create a “self-sustaining satellite of the Hollywood film economy” 
eventually capable of offsetting losses to municipal funds.272 Likewise, political ideologies and machina-
tions often envision the role of policy as a facilitator of private-sector enterprise. Hector Postigo notes 
the Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) was tasked with not only developing information and 
telecommunication policy, but with objectives that included tax incentives, protections for intellectual 
property, and allowing businesses to guide infrastructure innovation.273 Much like tax benefits accorded 
to Hollywood, media, and infrastructure companies, IBM’s investment in P-TECH and New Collar training 
situates the company in a privileged position to gain an economic windfall via tax credits, creating a de 
facto monetization of P-TECH and New Collar training.  
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3.14 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: IBM and New Collar Training Incentives 
Even though IBM claims it does not directly donate money to P-TECH schools, and also describes its 
support of P-TECH as part of its “philanthropic portfolio,”274 estimates from 2015 indicate IBM spends 
over $1 million on curriculum development, training programs, internships, and employee involve-
ment.275 In early 2018, IBM donated $25,000 to establish the “Stanley Litow P-TECH Scholarship,” a fund 
named after IBM vice president emeritus of the IBM International Foundation and co-founder of P-
TECH.276 The scholarship is administered by the SUNY Impact Foundation, meaning IBM did not give 
money to P-TECH schools directly, yet nonetheless made funding available through the SUNY intermedi-
ary.277 Thus, beyond IBM’s hand in curriculum development and donation of employee time, IBM’s in-
vestment in P-TECH is also monetary, even if this investment does not travel along a direct pipeline from 
IBM to a single school or school system. These types of investments are poised to increase, as in late 
2016, less than one month after Rometty’s letter to Trump, the IBM CEO indicated the company plans to 
invest $1 billion by 2020 to train and develop U.S. employees.278 While Rometty did not specify P-TECH 
as a recipient or beneficiary of these funds, the subsequent repetition of the “$1 billion investment” 
talking point often appears in approximation to IBM’s promotion of P-TECH schools and the company’s 
focus on hiring New Collar workers, such as a THINK blog post that touts – under the heading “New Col-
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lar jobs” - IBM’s pioneering of P-TECH schools, followed immediately by $1 billion training and develop-
ing talking point, and followed immediately again by a pronouncement reinforcing IBM’s commitment to 
New Collar hiring and training.279  
Where the mind of the worker is the machine of production in cognitive capitalism, IBM’s invest-
ments in New Collar training redoubles the modalities of this production, creating circumstances 
whereby the mind of the workers is both the machine of production and what is produced. In their anal-
ysis of EA Sports as a company indicative of cognitive capitalist logics, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 
note EA’s increasing presence on college campuses as symptomatic of the company’s attempts to both 
align its corporate interests with on-campus recruitment efforts and transform its corporate facilities 
into spaces exuding a collegiate atmosphere at a distance remove from factory-style work.280 Whereas 
three out of every four of EA's new recruits were college graduates, and EA sought a stronger footprint 
on college campuses,281 IBM’s stake in training of New Collar workers supersedes mere recruitment 
from third-party institutions and provides the company with a direct hand in curriculum development, 
interpersonal trainee interaction, and a mode of producing New Collar workers who can then produce 
innovative and ameliorating outputs, notably when these trainees transition directly from P-TECH to 
IBM employment.  
Per the provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act, IBM can conceivably claim a tax credit on these in-
vestments (or “amounts paid or incurred” as stipulated in the Act’s language) when P-TECH trainees 
and/or graduates are employed by IBM.  Under such circumstances, IBM’s institutional autonomy flour-
ishes on the backs of the company’s ability to intensify the logics of cognitive capitalism by not only capi-
talizing on the minds and outcomes of New Collar workers, but by monetizing the conditions of their 
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training and employment. If cognitive capitalist emerges from a “knowledge-based economy framed and 
subsumed by the laws of capitalist accumulation,”282 and its continued development can only be 
achieved through “institutional arrangements governing its activities, relationships, and property 
rights,”283 IBM’s prowess in correlating institutional arrangements across public sectors (school districts, 
university systems), policymaking bodies (U.S. congress), and knowledge-based activities and profes-
sional relationships transpiring through IBM property (New Collar workers trained to enhance and lever-
age Watson) evidences a cognitive capitalist accumulation preferential to – and driven at least partly by 
- IBM’s institutional maneuvering. When IBM touts the success of P-TECH to create New Collar workers, 
particularly those who transitioned from P-TECH trainees to IBM employees, the company both makes a 
case for continued policy support of its ventures and evidences success of support already granted.  
3.15 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: IBM and New Collar Employment 
Shortly before the introduction of the New Collar Jobs Act, a June 2017 IBM THINKPolicy blog post 
profiled five P-TECH graduates from the first full cycle of trainees to complete the P-TECH program. De-
scribed as “skilled, confident, and ready for the New Collar Jobs of the 21st Century,” each graduate 
shared two common trains: they completed grades 9-14 of the “six-year” program in less than six years 
and each now works for IBM as a New Collar employee.284 A Citizen IBM blog post from earlier in the 
years similarly stresses the success of P-TECH’s ability to as graduate, train and, in many cases, employ 
recent graduates with IBM as New Collar workers. In addition to touting the success of these graduates, 
the post leverages this success to make the case for continued policy support of P-TECH schools, noting 
P-TECH’s achievements “inspired unprecedented bipartisan Congressional support” for the Perkins Act’s 
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CTE funding and gesturing towards IBM’s anticipation of the Act’s continued authorization.285 The post 
also anticipates questions about public investments in these schools, implicitly accounting for the bene-
fit to taxpayers and the public at large, while implicitly making the case for further policy initiatives (such 
as the New Collar Jobs Act) incentivizing IBM’s investment in P-TECH and New Collar training: 
What will America get for this money? We’ll get state-determined 21st century CTE pro-
grams that meet today’s (and tomorrow’s) demands for rigor, relevance and accountability. 
We’ll stop training our young people for jobs that either don’t exist or pay low wages. And 
we’ll pioneer the collaborations among educators, business and government that are es-
sential to maintaining a strong economy with a strong middle class. With new collar job 
growth outpacing that of low-paying service-industry jobs – and 99 percent of new, post-
recession jobs going to workers with at least some college education – programs like P-
TECH will open the door to opportunity for anyone from any background who has the drive 
to succeed.”286 
References to outdated training modalities for non-existent or low-paying jobs alongside the public-
private model driving P-TECH’s ability to close the “’skills gap’ between 21st century labor market de-
mands and a generation’s ability to meet those demands”287 pulls together discursive threads corre-
sponding to IBM’s attempts to galvanize policy initiatives for P-TECH and related models. In doing so, 
IBM stresses the inadequacy of traditional collegiate education, New Collar as a job class superseding its 
predecessors in the ability to address this “skills gap,” and IBM’s ability to capitalize on New Collar skills 
for cybersecurity outcomes. 
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The utility of media and technology polices often tend to turn on questions of whether or not such 
policies will create jobs, whether or not such policies function as job-creation engines, and whether or 
not such creation is sustainable. As Susan Crawford notes in her historical account of the NBC-Comcast 
merger, one of the primary questions asked by the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee when considering 
the proposed Comcast-NBC merger was “will it create or destroy jobs?”288 Likewise, the enactment of 
the 2002 Louisiana Motion Picture Incentive Act marshaled notions that any film policy is (or should be) 
a de facto jobs policy.289 As these works indicate, the ability to drive favorable policy outcomes for me-
dia and technology companies is highly dependent on the ability to convincingly situate industrial prac-
tices as engines of ongoing job creation and a vicarious means of accelerating economic growth through 
consumer spending and progressive taxation. To assert the autonomy of humans to more reliability de-
termine employability and productivity is to speak a policy language that hears this type of autonomy as 
conditions highly favorable to the presiding economic worldview of policymakers.  IBM’s urging of poli-
cies aimed at financially undergirding P-TECH and other CTE programs as a means of training and em-
ploying New Collar workers anticipates these questions. More critically, however, stressing an existing 
“skills gap” between the number of sufficiently-trained New Collar workers and the number of unstaffed 
jobs in areas critical to business and national interests adds a sense of urgency to IBM’s discourse. 
Through this urgency, IBM ‘s evocation of a “skills gap” both poses the problem and offers P-Tech as the 
solution, one traditional educational models and labor categories are ill-prepared to address, particu-
larly in the area of cybersecurity.  
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3.16 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: IBM and Cybersecurity  
In Feb. 2017, an IBM press release announced the availability of Watson for Cyber Security as part 
of the company’s Cognitive SOC (security operations center) platform. Cited as the first augmented intel-
ligence technology powering SOCs, Watson augments a security analyst’s ability to “fill gaps in intelli-
gence and act with speed and accuracy,” based on Watson’s year-long intake of security documents to 
learn the language of cybersecurity.290 Where this press release addresses a gap between a security ana-
lyst’s ability to quickly decipher and respond to vast complicated streams of data, a May 2017 IBM white 
paper aims at “addressing the cybersecurity skills gap with a new collar approach.”291 The paper begins 
with a “state of the skills gap,” including research indicating nearly 2 million positions will be unfulfilled 
by 2022 due to a paucity of qualified professions, additional research indicating 75% of cybersecurity 
professionals believe the government underinvests in cybersecurity professionalization, and the inability 
of universities and community colleges to evolve curriculum, shift to meet job-market demands, and 
employ sufficient numbers of qualified teachers and professors.292  
To alleviate these quandaries, IBM recommends public and private organizations consider P-TECH 
and similar vocational-oriented educational models to train New Collar workers. IBM further recom-
mends businesses prioritize hiring New Collar workers, since “a new collar approach focuses on skills – 
not degrees earned,” and the skills to perform complex cybersecurity tasks demand specific training but 
“do not necessarily require a university degree.”293 Ultimately, the white paper typifies New Collar roles 
as many of the roles listed in the NICE Framework, such as integration engineer, threat monitoring ana-
lyst, and security device analyst.294In this white paper, IBM not only rigorously aligns its advocation for P-
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TECH and New Collar workers with cybersecurity roles, but also employs a tactic used elsewhere to 
champion the technological prowess and social utility of New Collar workers: downplaying both four-
year college degrees and associated labor categories.  
3.17 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: Downplaying Degrees and Labor Dichotomies 
Alongside investing in – and advocating for – PTECH, IBM decries the focus on four-year university 
and collegiate degrees as both antiquated and inadequate, since degree-based programs tend to focus 
on the degree as the sole outcome at the cost of fostering skillsets applicable for business and social so-
lutions. Often occurring in tandem with downplaying degree-based education, IBM also downplays the 
use of “white collar” and “blue collar” in deference to the contemporaneous preferability of “New Col-
lar.” Similar to the way IBM plays up Watson as an augmentative force for human autonomy by down-
playing dystopian and mythic connotations with AI, downplaying degree-based education and traditional 
dichotomies of labor enables the company to posit the P-TECH model as a salve for the inadequacy of 
degree-based education to close the skills gap. The sub-heading for IBM’s New Collar landing page de-
scribes New Collar as “about skills, not degrees,” IBM’s shorthand for promoting P-TECH and its skills-
oriented vocationalism as more adept at resolving the skills gap and filling critical jobs roles.295 Likewise, 
shortly after Rometty’s Nov. 2016 letter to President-elect Donald Trump, the IBM CEO penned a col-
umn for Time magazine advocating for the creation of New Collar jobs, touting the P-TECH model, and 
ending with what would become a persistent talking point for IBM: “the future of job creation is no 
longer white collar vs. blue collar. It’s new collar.”296  
This talking point appears again in Rometty’s Dec. 13, 2016 USA Today op-ed, reiterating a slight 
variation on this talking point while also stressing that New Collar jobs do not necessarily require a four-
                                                             
295 “What is New Collar,” IBM, https://www-03.ibm.com/employment/us/new_collar.shtml.  
296 Ginny Rometty, “How To Create ‘New’ Collar Jobs,” Time, Dec. 1, 2016, http://time.com/collection-
post/4587758/how-to-create-new-collar-jobs/.  
124 
 
year college degree and one-third IBM employees do not possess such a degree, since “what matters 
most is these employees…have relevant skills, often obtained through vocational training.”297 An IBM 
THINKPolicy blog post by IBM’s Vice President of Human Resources collapses these “collar” and “skills” 
talking points into a more pithy takeaway, indicating many IBM employees’ roles are not “white collar or 
blue collar, they’re New Collar jobs – where skills matter more than degrees.”298 Although completion of 
P-TECH programs lead to both a high school and associate degree, for IBM these degrees signify particu-
lar skills for particular jobs in fulfillment of particular tasks in the contemporary moment, as opposed to 
the traditional association of white collar with generalized intellectual skills for office work and blue col-
lar with generalized skills for manual labor. In this way, the conceptualization of “New Collar” borrows 
from both aspects of blue and white collar, as New Collar work demands an intellectual rigor suggestive 
of white collar work combined with a hands-on, manual taskmastery associated with blue collar work. 
But for all that New Collar borrows from white collar and blue collar, it elides much more, as New Collar 
work entails a division of labor and outputs of this labor that intensify IBM’s mode of cognitive capital-
ism with respect to both New Collar work and the workers themselves. If New Collar workers augment 
their autonomy through Watson and IBM’s corporate machinations, this autonomy is one that can only 
transpire at the behest of IBM. By situating autonomy as potentialized only through the company’s 
modes for training and upskilling, the augmentative capacities of its proprietary technology, and out-
comes favorable to IBM third-party B2B clients, New Collar autonomy is an autonomy valued as the sole 
province of IBM, a worker autonomy extractable and fungible for an IBM corporate autonomy seeking 
economic latitude in cognitive capitalism.  
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3.18 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: Reinventing Worker Collars 
IBM’s opportunities to capitalize on the cognitive capacities of its workers include not only training, 
employment, and the alignment of New Collar work with policy and marketplace opportunities (i.e. The 
New Collar Jobs Act and cybersecurity), but the esteem and dignity New Collar workers accord to the 
outcomes they produce through their advanced skillsets. By both borrowing from and superseding traits 
associated with blue collar and white collar, as well as their associations with vocational upskilling and 
collegiate intellect, IBM advances New Collar work as a cognitive labor both invigorating and subsuming 
the energies put into this work. In this way, the relationship between IBM’s inducement of augmented 
worker autonomy and IBM’s institutional autonomy collides and repels along a cognitive division of la-
bor divesting from New Collar workers the autonomous energies fostered by IBM.  
Labor in cognitive capitalism transcends industrial labor’s dependence on blue collar manual labor 
undertaking routinized work functions.299 New Collar labor also transcends white collar labor, as New 
Collar skills defy the generalized knowledge accrued from four-year college degrees as applied to gener-
alized sets of intellectual tasks administered as “office work.” In its attempts to capitalize on the benefits 
of training and employing New Collar workers, IBM’s profiles of New Collar workers depict New Collar 
work as an avenue for satisfaction, esteem, and opportunity unaccommodated by white and blue collar 
work. In this way, IBM’s profiling of New Collar employees epitomizes a “cognitive labor,” work per-
formed not only with advanced intellectual capacities, but as advanced intellectuality, one that often 
portends an “enrichment of experience” stemming from the application of such intellect. 300 Profiles of 
New Collar workers on THINKPolicy posit the enrichment of experience New Collar workers feel when 
given opportunities by IBM to apply their craft and grow their professional opportunities. This enrich-
ment of experience plays out through a “reinvention” motif in which New Collar workers reinvented 
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themselves as skills-oriented professionals, often after becoming disenchanted with the unviability of 
four-year degrees as a gateway to a viable career.   
Rey Lozano, an IBM New Collar worker who left college after two semesters because “coursework 
wasn’t helping him build skills that would translate to a career,” and became fed up with minimum-
wage fast food jobs, reinvented himself by joining IBM in 2014. He quickly climbed the corporate ranks 
to move from a member of a technician team to eventually leading a team as a senior technician.301 
Looking back on that period, he cites as unimaginable the experience and knowledge he now possesses, 
as well as the professional and lifestyle opportunities IBM affords: “Now I can live comfortably and have 
opportunities to grow my career…all because I found the opportunities to try something new, and took 
a chance.” New Collar worker Cecilia Schartiger struggled to transform her four-year degree in early 
childhood education into a full-time teaching position, and therefore decided to alter her trajectory to-
wards cybersecurity, ultimately landing a cybersecurity job with IBM in 2016. Her commitment to “rest-
less reinvention” (inspired by a Ginny Rometty maxim about the importance of reinvention) enabled her 
to understand a degree does not “define or limit a person to one career,” and by committing herself to 
reinvention was able to “embark on a new career in technology – a field with some of the fastest grow-
ing opportunities in the country.”302 This reinvention motif, its transcendence of narrowly-defined de-
gree-based opportunities, and the ability of IBM to enable this reinvention and open the door for unre-
alizes vistas of professional opportunities, also plays out in profiles of a creative writer turned IBM New 
Collar developer,303 and IBM’s “first New Collar worker,” who continually reinvented himself (beginning 
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with his first IBM jobs in 1978) by progressively advancing his skillsets and therefore engendering better 
opportunities within IBM.304  
On one hand, this reinvention motifs offers evidence of IBM’s inventiveness as a catalyst of job 
training, creation and fulfillment – a fulfillment in which IBM is able to fill unstaffed roles with emerging 
New Collar workers and offer fulfilling careers. The reliance of this fulfillment on one company’s modali-
ties for training and employment also, on the other hand, offers caution as to the larger stakes around 
IBM’s intensification of cognitive capitalism. While cognitive labor can, under some circumstances, in-
duce a sense of enrichment and fulfillment, cognitive labor also risks reinventing these qualities as a 
crass “economic necessity” that transforms enriching experiences into a “joyless fiction.”305 This signifi-
cance of this risk, however, is greater than any one New Collar worker’s joylessness, as the cognitive 
outcomes of New Collar workers evidence the structural intensification of IBM’s cognitive capitalism, its 
institutional autonomy, and the tension among these autonomous conditions.  
3.19 Mapping the New Collar Jobs Act: IBM Institutional Autonomy and New Collar Autonomy 
The mention of “cognitive outcomes” returns us to the questions posed at the end of the preceding 
section regarding what these outcomes portend for the augmented autonomy of New Collar workers 
and IBM’s institutional autonomy, especially in light of this section’s correlation of the New Collar Jobs 
Act’s provisions with IBM’s monetization of New Collar training, hiring, and outputs. On one hand, cogni-
tive outcomes such as a cognitive trailer or cognitive song offers evidence of the creative and market 
viability of New Collar workers and their skillsets. On the other hand, alongside the flourishing of New 
Collar autonomy, the esteem and energies New Collar workers invest in work performed through Wat-
son and other IBM technologies and cognitive outcomes entails a situation in which IBM has captured all 
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forms of New Collar intelligence, from training to employment to work performance to cognitive out-
comes. When understanding how these outcomes function as commodities in cognitive capitalism, it 
becomes clear how the procedures emboldening IBM’s institutional autonomy enables New Collar 
worker autonomy to flourish and, ultimately, become restricted to the institutional and marketplace 
purviews of IBM.   
The objective of cognitive labor is the "production of new knowledges that can feed innovation up-
stream" wherein knowledge is not only produced and marshaled towards innovation, but all forms of 
intelligence are captured.306 Understood as commodities in cognitive capitalism, cognitive outcomes im-
part a sense of both economic and social value, particularly the qualities of New Collar workers “trans-
posed and enshrined into the body of a commodity,”307 qualities such as the esteem New Collar workers 
accord to vocational training, skillsets, and IBM, as well as the intelligence driving these skillsets and the 
skillsets themselves. In this way, the social value of cognitive commodities “reflects not only the social 
relationships that exist among those who worked in production…but also the exceptional and numerous 
cognitive qualities that are embedded in it through us.”308 If the dual character of commodities in cogni-
tive capitalism entails a differentiated economic value based on the social reputations and esteems as-
sociated with these commodities,309 value is doubly differentiated when IBM avails itself of economic 
values from training to output and the social values “embedded in commodities as they travel through 
their production processes.”310  
IBM’s intensification of cognitive capitalism entails the capture of all intelligence as both economic 
and social value when New Collar workers undertake production processes enabled by IBMs monetiza-
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tion of training and the cognitive outcomes of this training. Where New Collar work is predicated on cog-
nitive capitalism’s “economies of learning” wherein laboring energies necessitate an unceasing anticipa-
tion and accommodation to rapidly-shifting demands of the market,311 IBM’s capitalization on this antici-
pates and captures learning and its intellectual outputs across a nexus of institutional and laboring para-
digms. In other words, IBM’s economic investment in New Collar workers is a means of engendering so-
cial values around education and training, skills and performance, professionalization and careerism, 
outcomes and commodities that are again captured by IBM for their economic value. The scale of IBM’s 
institutional autonomy, then, far surpasses the autonomy afforded to New Collar workers, especially 
since this autonomy is at hand for IBM’s productive value.  
New Collar workers, in this sense, embody the “social corporeality of cognitive labor”312 in which 
“high tech workers invest their specific competences, their creative, innovative and communicative en-
ergies in the labor process,” the “best part of their intellectual capacities” unceasingly at hand for IBM 
across institutions, paradigms, and milestones in training, production, and outcomes. These intellectual 
capacities and social values remain the possession of IBM in the form of intellectual protections around 
technologies and outcomes performed through these technologies (i.e. using Watson to generate a cog-
nitive trailer), and are thus inexhaustible even as the corporeality of New Collar workers is subject to 
physical and mental exhaustion.  
3.20 Conclusion 
The discrepancy between economic and social values afforded to IBM and economic and social values 
alternately afforded to and extracted back from New Collar workers correlates with this chapter’s detail-
ing of autonomy as a condition among both New Collar workers and IBM. To the extent that New Collar 
                                                             
311 Moulier-Boutang, Cognitive Capitalism, 69. 
312 Berardi, The Soul At Work, 105.  
130 
 
workers are able to augment their autonomy, this augmented autonomy transpires only through the pa-
rameters set forth by IBM, parameters that ensure this autonomy and its associated social values are 
transformed into economic value for IBM. The New Collar Jobs Act corresponds to this logic, as the pro-
visions enable remuneration for both employer and employee, since the ability for New Collar workers 
to claim loan forgiveness is tied to duration of employment. Thus, as with the autonomy of IBM in rela-
tion to New Collar workers, the provisions of the New Collar Jobs Act entails a twofold benefit to em-
ployers such as IBM: employers are the beneficiaries of tax credits for training New Collar workers and 
also benefit from the stipulation incentivizing workers to remain employed to a company for 3 years if 
they want to become eligible for federal loan forgiveness. It is, in other words, a policy that benefits em-
ployers first, even when employees are the intended direct beneficiary. To the extent that New Collar 
workers can heighten their autonomy, it is a heightening prefigured, enabled, and monetized by IBM 
and corresponding political mindsets, a cognitive era in which autonomy is not the sole province of an 
autonomous technology such as Watson but, rather, exchanged in uneven proportionality among corpo-
rate power, its interrelationship with public institutions, and the reinvention of working classes. 
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4     AMAZON’S ALEXA 
Elon Musk insists Space X will one day take us all to Mars. For Jeff Bezos, on the other hand, MARS 
is the earth-bound province of an elite few. MARS is Amazon CEO Bezos’ highly-exclusive showcase of 
cutting-edge Machine Learning, Home Automation, Robotics, and Space Exploration (MARS). Held annu-
ally (since 2016) at the Parker Hotel in Palm Springs, California, MARS is an invitation-only affair, often 
reserved for celebrities and tech luminaries such as Intel CEO Brian Krzanich, Dean Kamen (inventor of 
the Segway), and Adam Savage (star of the television show Mythbusters).313 Despite its short lifespan, 
MARS has gained significant attention for ostentatious accoutrements and grandiose feats of technolog-
ical spectacle, particularly those involving Bezos. At MARS 2016, Bezos donned a robotic suit resembling 
digitized jumpsuits from the film Tron (1982),314 only to attempt at MARS 2017 to outdo himself by man-
ning a robotic exoskeleton not unlike the colossal humanoid mechas in the film Pacific Rim (2013).315 In-
dependent of Bezos, robots at MARS also undertake quotidian feats, as each MARS event has included 
automated food and drink service by Amazon’s Kiva robots, the same robots that perform automated 
storage and retrieval in Amazon warehouses. Likewise, at the inaugural 2016 MARS event, MIT demoed 
its Non-Anthropomorphic Bipedal Robotic System (NABiRoS). Despite the apparent non-anthropo-
morphic intention of NABiRoS’ creators, pictures emerging from MARS 2016 show a NABiRoS robot 
adorned in an Amazon shipping box with a human smiley face drawn on one side.316 The box stands in 
for a human head, while the long eyelashes of the drawn face connote as feminized, gendering an other-
wise non-anthropomorphic device. While, for Bezos, MARS is an opportunity to embody larger-than-life 
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robotic contraptions, Bezos’ company increasingly uses other promotional spaces, collaborations, and 
techniques to market its gendered Alexa technology alongside the company’s hopes that Alexa will em-
body, for Amazon and its customers, the go-to consumer device for powering home automation.  
4.1 What is Alexa? 
Alexa is an automated personal voice assistant that interacts with humans through vocal com-
mands and queries. Alexa is part of a broader class of virtual assistants that perform tasks or services for 
human users. The breadth of virtual assistants, their capabilities, and their uses accommodates a multi-
tude of related and overlapping designations, including (but not limited to) “digital assistants,” “intelli-
gent assistants,” and “voice assistants.” Moreover, since voice is the primary means of interaction, des-
ignations of “voice-user interface” and “natural-language user interface” also apply to Alexa’s modes of 
human-computer interfacing. As a software agent, Alexa is not exclusive to any particular hardware de-
vice, but is most commonly associated with Amazon’s Echo smart speakers. While Alexa is not exclusive 
to the Echo, Alexa is the exclusive mode of interaction for Echo users. In this sense, Alexa is the primary 
appeal for Echo consumption, which may help explain Amazon’s rapid ascent in the voice-controlled 
home speaker market. The Echo became publicly available in June 2015 and by May 2017 trade press 
reported Echo’s dominance over rival Google Home, as Echo accounted for 70% market penetration 
among individuals who use a voice-enabled speaker at least once per month (compared to less than 24% 
for Google Home).317 That same month, a widely-cited forecasting report indicated the number of digital 
assistants will grow to 7.5 billion by 2021, outnumbering the world population of humans.318 By the fol-
lowing year, 2022, 70 million households are projected to have at least one voice-powered speaker, with 
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the total number of installed speakers eclipsing 175 million.319 As voice increasingly becomes a primary 
mode of interaction between humans and computers, Alexa is poised to continue occupying a central 
place in these interactions. In tandem with the escalating availability and usage of voice assistants, the 
industrial gendering of Alexa and other voice assistants ensures interactions with these assistants entail 
interacting with “her” more so than with “it.” 
4.2 Alexa, Voice Assistants, and Gender 
Beginning with the 2011 release of Apple’s Siri voice assistant and continuing through the respec-
tive releases of Microsoft’s Cortana and Alexa in 2014, the names and vocal intonations of these assis-
tants connote as feminized and imply a personified woman. Beyond mere anecdotal accounts, recent 
popular discourse demonstrates a penchant for addressing the gendered nature of voice assistants. A 
2016 Atlantic headline asks “Why Do So Many Digital Assistants Have Feminine Names?” to which the 
answer is a combination of social norms that associate administrative tasks with women and the likeli-
hood that users find a woman’s voice more trustworthy than a man’s voice.320 Similarly, other popular 
press notes the latter interpretation while stressing the former as the most worthy grounds for critique, 
offering blunt assessments of the corporate secretary as the “real-world analogue for virtual assis-
tants”321 and headlines that declare “It’s So Stupid That Digital Assistants Are Women.”322 
Media and technology studies scholarship has also recently taken up the question of gender and 
contemporary voice assistants, with a particular focus on Siri. Citing Siri’s servile, “unthreatening female 
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presence,” Hilary Bergen notes that “digital women like Siri have certain features…that are designed to 
placate their user through associations with the nurturing feminine.”323 Likewise, as noted by Claude 
Draude, Siri’s anthropomorphic qualities “present a zone for the contestations of what passes as human 
and what does not” and, within this zone, “puts gender on the agenda in a very obvious way.”324 For 
Thao Phan, Siri’s materiality is of central concern, since automated performance “invokes an anxiety 
around the displacement of bodies,” and Siri marks a “return of the human body into the domain of the 
digital” through a material inscription of gender that is “an inherent part of the successful functioning of 
the interface itself” rather than an application of gendered traits onto a supposedly neutral surface.325 
While Siri’s materially-embodied gender might, for some users, alleviate automation-induced anxieties 
about the erasure of human bodies, Siri’s gendered embodiment collides with “the politics of a material-
ity” that corresponds to material circumstances facing human women in lived existence.326 While these 
gendered traits and associations also apply to Alexa, the material development and conscious gendering 
of Alexa by Amazon offers a window into the interplay of production, gender, and material politics.  
4.3 Alexa and the Industrial Logics of Gender 
Until his retirement in in mid-2017, Mike George - Amazon vice president for Alexa, Echo, and the 
Appstore – referred to Alexa by the feminine pronoun “she,” commonly embedding this gendered con-
ception into promotional intonations around Alexa’s escalating functionality: “she’ll be smarter, able to 
answer more questions, probably a little more conversational.”327 Heather Zorn, director of the Alexa 
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engagement team, consciously views and develops Alexa as “‘she’ not ‘it,’” and strives to “keep her gen-
der in mind when considering how customers might interact with her.”328 Zorn’s team is responsible for 
devising Alexa’s conversational interactions, functioning as something akin to a television writer’s room 
in which anticipated questions and potential responses are pitched, debated, revised, and ultimately af-
firmed. One aspect the team affirmed is Alexa’s own affirmation of feminism when queried on the sub-
ject, in addition to affirming support for diversity and social progressiveness.329 Representations of 
women, diversity, and social progressiveness are important for Zorn and vicariously important for Alexa, 
indicating a politics of gender built into Alexa. Despite this cultural politic and the political charge around 
gender issues during the 2016 presidential election (including the viability of the first female U.S. presi-
dent), developing Alexa responses around civil presidential politics necessitated a relatively apolitical 
stance:  
“We had a lot of internal debates about this, with a lot of potential paths such as picking a can-
didate, talking about AIs not having the right to vote, or picking a joke candidate…we decided to 
do a mixture of truth and humor, with Alexa saying there weren’t any voting booths in the 
Cloud. We wanted to avoid accidentally reinforcing the idea of her as subservient by pointing 
out she didn’t have the right to vote — but that she’d vote for her favorite robot BB-8 since she 
‘likes the way he rolls.’”330 
In other words, Amazon builds a cultural feminist politics into Alexa while simultaneously demur-
ring against how this feminist disposition might materialize into civic political action. A user receives a 
straightforward affirmation of Alexa’s feminism, while receiving only a quirky dodge when attempting to 
ground Alexa’s feminism in participatory politics. For Amazon, however, developing Alexa’s personality 
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and cultural politics is not merely a technological exercise and, instead, speaks to the importance of 
Zorn’s practice as a means of marketing who Alexa is, what Alexa does, and, most importantly for the 
purposes of this chapter, where Alexa is most viable as a consumer product.  
Since Alexa’s public availability in 2015, Amazon has increasingly marketed Alexa as a domestic 
technology capable of powering not only the Echo home speaker system, but an array of other in-home 
devices that afford both connectivity among individual devices and the aggregation of these devices into 
a wholistic home automation system. Where complications around gendered politics are explicitly built 
into attempts to market Alexa as the driving force of the budding home automation market, this chapter 
aims to identity the complications of autonomy among intermingled conceptions of technology, gender 
and domesticity embedded in Amazon’s drives to capitalize on the economic potential of home automa-
tion. As I will again reinforce, my central claim is that Amazon’s marketing of Alexa illuminates a complex 
series of contrasts in which Alexa’s autonomy is alternately conceived as heightened or diminished with 
respect to distinctions of technology (hardware and software), labor performance (productivity and ser-
vility), and social domains (public and private spheres). While it might be tidier to situate autonomy to 
one particular aegis or another, the material circumstances foisting Alexa into the world and material 
implications they portend for human women are, in fact, quite complex and necessitate a scholarly un-
dertaking that unpacks this complexity. This is especially important since wholistic notions of home au-
tomation among particular streams of scholarship do little to illuminate the complications of gender 
with respect to marketing digital and voice-assistant technologies for public and/or private usage. By in-
voking embedded notions of autonomy, my analysis pinpoints a nuanced correspondence between the 
industrial gendering of home automation and the complexities of cultural ideas about women, emerging 
technology, and domesticity.  
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4.4 Home Automation and Technological Distinctions 
Among computer science, engineering, and human-computer interaction literatures, discerning 
among technological facets of home automation is a central occupation. One of the primary streams of 
these literatures identified and distinguishes overlapping terminology, particularly among “home auto-
mation,” “smart homes,” “intelligent homes,” and “connected homes.” In the 2006 collection Inside the 
Smart Home, multiple essays attempt to bracket off terminological applications and corresponding tech-
nological distinctions.331 Barlow and Venables note that designations of “‘smart home,’ ‘intelligent 
homes’ and ‘home automation’ are often used interchangeably” to refer to the potential automation of 
domestic tasks wherein automation encompasses “simple fixed applications with predefined and pre-es-
tablished operations, through…programmable applications and devices to…fully flexible and automated ap-
plications and networks of devices that share information and provide it to consumers.”332 Aldrich attempts a 
more precise rendering of home automation levels, proposing “five hierarchical classes of smart home”: 
homes that contain intelligent objects; homes that contain intelligence, communicative objects; con-
nected homes (internal and external networking, accessible from within and beyond the home); learning 
homes (adaptable and flexible to learned patterns of in-home use); attentive homes (anticipates and ac-
commodates the needs of occupants).333  
Elsewhere, home automation and its related distinctions are analyzed in the context of consumer 
demand and adoption. Home automation, as the ability to manage and control “disparate systems,” is 
described a stepping stone to the totalized systematic control of a smart home, with four barriers stand-
ing between wider automated home adoption and upscaling towards smart home connectivity: “high 
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cost of ownership, inflexibility, poor manageability, and difficulty achieving security.”334 From a user 
adoption standpoint, Mennicken et al cite the cultural fear of autonomous technology as a significant 
barrier to the full potential of home automation, advocating for a vision of “human-home collaboration” 
to overcome these challenges.335 While these sectors of scholarship admirably address the complexities 
of home automation through lenses of technological distinction, consumer viability, and user interac-
tion, the emphasis on home automation as a technological and consumer paradigm leaves unanswered 
questions about other important distinctions, especially distinctions among intersecting lines of gender, 
domestic usage and integration, and industrial production. Even as media studies and digital media the-
ory increasingly addresses the connectivity between media industries and empowered citizens in the 
automated home336 or the transduction of home space through the increasing proliferation of software-
powered objects,337 questions remain as to the gendered dynamics of home automation that crosscut 
human-machine lines, especially as gendered technologies such as Alexa proliferate among domestic 
dwellings. While authors Kember and Zylinska gesture towards the recurrence of “regressive gender ide-
ologies” among visions of technologically-animated “future homes,” and further spotlight autonomy as a 
countervailing force against such ideologies,338 my method ultimately seeks to illuminate the way auton-
omy is already prefigured into Alexa’s technological design, marketing, and integration with other smart 
objects within the home, an autonomy that corresponds to the gendering of Alexa and implications for 
women in (and in relation to) the Alexa-driven automated home. I will return to Kember and Zylinska’s 
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ideas about autonomy and intelligent homes later in my analysis. First, it is necessary to unpack the vari-
ous threads among media studies and technology studies that address relationships among technology, 
gender, and domesticity, and thereby crystallize the specific nature of my intervention as it both pulls 
from and contributes to recurring questions among emergent media and technological paradigms.   
4.5 Technology, Gender, and Domesticity 
A critical touchstone for inquiries into the relationship between gender and technology is Donna 
Haraway’s “cyborg manifesto,” a call for a non-normative, porous concept of feminism and gendered 
identity conceptualized through the lens of the cyborg as an assemblage of biological and machine com-
ponents resistive of normative identity and patriarchal power constructs.339 Haraway’s cyborgian con-
cept has been widely cited and complicated among media studies and technology studies,340 in addition 
to its influence (direct and indirect) on feminist approaches to emerging media and technology. Stand-
outs in this field include the considerable work of Judy Wajcman341 and Cynthia Cockburn.342 Wajcman’s 
landmark work Feminism Confronts Technology (1991) is a social shaping approach to scrutinizing rela-
tionship of technology and gender. Her chapter on domestic technology leverages social shaping to push 
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back against technological determinisms that cast innovation as the primary agents of change between 
an “informal household economy and the formal economy,” urging instead considerations of the way 
“gendered meanings are encoded in the design process.”343 Likewise, writing in 1992 on domestic tech-
nologies and gender, Cockburn’s claim that the “social relations of technology are gendered relations”344 
attempts to evoke a proposition that (according to Cockburn) had not yet become widely accepted at 
the time, stressing the incomplete nature of technological analyses that sidestep gender, notably with 
regard to the home sphere. Wendy Faulkner pulls from these concerns when advocating for “feminist 
technology studies” as a “nuanced and politically helpful framework for analyzing the relationship be-
tween technology and gender.”345 She deepens an understanding of the way gendered relations are 
built into technological design by outlining seven ways technology is gendered: designers are “predomi-
nantly men”; “gender division of labor around technology”; the material and symbolic gendering of arti-
facts; “hegemonic masculinity” is the primary cultural association with technology; knowledge and prac-
tice is gendered; work styles are gendered; and technology as key in the construction and maintenance 
of male identity.346 
With the emergence of the digital turn, feminist and gender approaches to technology increasingly 
turned towards informational and computational technologies, often with considerations of – and impli-
cations for – the domestic sphere. As computational “new” media increasingly became a predominant 
area of inquiry, historiographical approaches attempted to situate “old” media within intertwined social 
contexts for domestic integration and gender roles. In her milestone work When Old Technologies Were 
New: Thinking About Electric Communication in the Late Nineteenth Century (1990), Carolyn Marvin’s 
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assesses the ways telephony and other electronic communication devices integrated into the home and 
both upturned and reinforced social expectations for women within and exterior to the domestic 
sphere.347 More recently, Lisa Gitelman demonstrates the way forms of recorded sound were defined by 
middle-class women who facilitated the integration, accessibility, and intelligibility of recorded sound in 
domestic homes.348 Similarly, William Boddy stresses early 20th century social conceptions of gender and 
domestic roles as influencing the widespread uptake of radios in the home and gendered associations 
with its development, evolution, and usage.349 In tandem with these historical approaches, cyberfemi-
nism emerged in the 1990s as a framework addressing the complications of gender and political power 
in virtual spaces and processes, interrogating both new problems and the reification of lived gender dy-
namics posed by computational logics.350 Within analyses of new media, scholars have addressed the 
role of automation among digital and virtual life.   
4.6 Automation and Gender 
Judith Halberstam351 describes gender as an “automated construct” owing to the alignment of gen-
der and computer intelligence as “learned, imitative behavior that can be processed so well that it 
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comes to look natural.”352 While a particularly vibrant stream of technology studies considered the rela-
tionship between automation and women’s office work in the 1980s,353 feminist considerations of auto-
mated technologies and performance populate strands of scholarship addressing digitality and the do-
mestic sphere. Channeling Halberstam’s constructivism, AJ Berg describes the automated smart home as 
a “gendered socio-technical construct” built by men who fail to understand or imagine how smart home 
design impedes upon and intensifies the social expectations of women’s work in the home.354 In this 
vein, recent scholarship allegorizes the relationship between automated robots and women in the do-
mestic sphere. Where Alison Adam accounts for the gender biases inscribed in real-world artificial intel-
ligence,355 Julie Wosk focuses on cultural representations of feminized machines, including robots and 
“artificial eves,”356 as does Despina Kakoudaki’s cultural analysis of artificial women that “dominate the 
technological and representational landscape at the turn of the [21st] century,”357 as well as Heather 
Hicks’ turn-of-the-century analysis of Joanna Russ’ novel The Female Man (1975) as a read against inter-
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linked notions of cyborgian female labor and automation’s alleged potential to render formal labor ob-
solete.358 Around this time, Sadie Plant also linked automation to the “feminization of the workforce,” 
arguing for social anxieties around automation as more prominent among men fearful of losing their 
masculinity and laboring dominance to the increasing sweep of “feminized” automation.359 More re-
cently, media studies scholarship quickly seized upon the films Her (2013) and Ex Machina (2015) as 
fruitful texts for analyzing gendered aspects of human-machine romance360 and robotic embodiment,361 
including the way female robots stand in for “automated anxiety.”362 Leopoldina Fortunati, on the other 
hand, describes a more amenable disposition towards domestic automation, as the “robotization of the 
domestic sphere” is enabled by automated “proto-robotization” of broader social and technological 
phenomena that include computer-mediated communication between humans; online information pro-
cessing (i.e. algorithmic generation); social behaviors; robotization of the human body; and robotization 
of everyday machines.363  
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Along similar lines, Kylie Jarrett’s “digital housewife” draws from a Marxist conception of automa-
tion as the expropriation and alienation of human labor transferred to machines and, through this lens, 
charts a correspondence between women’s unpaid domestic labor and the social production of eco-
nomic value by online consumers.364 In 2015, the same year as Jarrett’s monograph on the digital house-
wife and the inaugural issue of the journal Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience, the feminist col-
lective Laboria Cuboniks published the manifesto “Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation,” urging a 
“feminist futurity” predicated on a vision of “augmented homes…communal media and technical facili-
ties” as a transformative conception of domestic life concomitantly transformative of women’s political 
power.365 Helen Hester’s recent monograph Xenofeminism (2018) describes this brand of feminism as a  
“technomaterialist, anti-naturalist, and gender abolitionist” feminism in which domestic automation can 
serve as a “point of leverage in efforts to transform oppressive socio-biological conditions.”366 In arguing 
for autonomy as the most viable lens for understanding the complications of home automation, the gen-
dering of Alexa, and its implications for lived domesticity, my pivot towards autonomy draws from many 
of these preceding works, in addition to television studies and the work of Lynn Spigel, whose research 
informs both my topical and methodological inquiry.  
4.7 Television Studies and Lynn Spigel: Towards a Methodological Approach 
Concerns for contexts of reception, spectatorship, and usage have led many television scholars to 
explore interrelations among gender, identity, television (and related technologies), and the home, as 
well as the role of industry towards influencing and refining these interrelations. The work of the late 
David Morley, for example, grants considerable insights into the nature of television within the domestic 
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sphere, particularly with regard to the use and interpretation by different types of domestic families,367 
a “gendered framework” of family viewing,368 gendered associations among local and global contexts,369 
and the mediation of the home itself through increasing digital connectivity.370 Likewise, Roger Silver-
stone’s work on television and information technologies in the home includes considerations of gender, 
technological design, and domestic usage.371 Increasingly, scholars foreground (post)feminist theory as a 
necessary critical approach to television texts, sites of reception, and production.372 While Lynn Spigel 
researches prolifically in the area of her television studies, her larger body of work cuts across media 
technologies, texts, and domestic paradigms to consider the way industrial and cultural imaginaries miti-
gate the dynamics of gender in technologically-enlivened households. Notably, Make Room For Televi-
sion (1992) and Welcome to the Dreamhouse (2001) respectively historicize the vast proliferation of tel-
evision sets into American homes and mediated socio-techno visions of real and imagined suburban 
households during the postwar era. In 2012, Spigel received a Guggenheim fellowship for her work on 
smart homes and the digitization of everyday domestic life, work that thus far includes essays on smart 
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home design and production.373 My interest in Spigel’s work speaks not only to the considerable insights 
gleamed from her specific analyses of smart homes and technology, domesticity, and gender more gen-
erally, but, more importantly for the purposes of this essay, her method for generating claims about the 
cultural inception and significance of these paradigms. I’m particularly interested in her analyses of ad-
vertising, promotional, and marketing materials (among other texts) as inroads into industrial imagi-
naries that shape the development and uses of domestic-bound technologies.  
Across her considerable outputs, Spigel examines a wide range of industrial texts and artifacts, in-
cluding advertisements, consumer guides, popular magazine articles, promotional materials, and pop 
culture texts (film, television). Her approach understands these types of texts as forming an “intertextual 
network…through which people encounter statements about and images of the social world.”374 My ap-
proach builds off this conception to stress the role of marketing undergirding industrial statements and 
images about the social world, a role that infuses industrial texts aimed directly at consumers - advertis-
ing, consumer guides, popular articles, and pop culture – as well as texts and venues aimed at marketing 
products and services to other businesses and third-party collaborators. Where Spigel reads industrial 
texts to unearth domestic-related dispositions and inclinations common among industry and everyday 
social dwellers in a preceding historical period, my approach is more explicit to the contemporaneous 
culture and economic drives of Amazon as it endeavors to seize a prominent place within the nascent 
home automation market by marketing Alexa as a consumer product enabling smart connectivity for 
consumers and industrial connectivity among third-party software and appliance producers. Analyzing 
Amazon’s marketing of Alexa moves beyond home automation as mere technological and consumeristic 
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paradigms and instead evokes embedded notions of autonomy that correspond to gendered implica-
tions for life within – and in relation to – the Alexa-driven automated home. By transcending automa-
tion, my analysis conceptualizes a human-machine autonomy that stresses the implications for human 
autonomy and, more precisely, further illuminates the ways industrial automation paradigms differenti-
ate human autonomous potential with respect to gender.  
4.8 Alexa: Marketing Autonomy in Home Automation 
I argue that Amazon’s marketing of Alexa reveals alternating intensities of autonomy wherein Alexa 
is conceived as highly and minimally autonomous within the automated home (and in relation to home 
automation devices) with respect to contrasting dispositions towards software and hardware, productiv-
ity and servility, and public and private spheres. Amazon’s marketing allegorizes implications for human 
women, as the female gendering of Alexa corresponds to cultural conceptions both dogging and ena-
bling women across the historical and contemporary emergence of domestic technologies. To be clear, I 
do not wish to suggest that Amazon intends to diminish the autonomy of human women or otherwise 
explicitly market its wares in conjunction with patriarchal norms. Instead, Amazon’s gendering of Alexa 
and the company’s desire to fortify Alexa as the home automation device par excellence emerges from 
cultural and economic logics that have lingered in structural arrangements for domestic life, work, and 
marketplace aptitude over long periods of time. In this way, the marketing of Alexa not only illuminates 
many of these complexities but also shines a light on how the contemporaneous circumstances of 
Alexa’s cultural and marketplace rollout collides and repels with preceding technology developed with 
an eye towards domestic integration and usage.  
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I focus on marketing because of its centrality to corporate modes of production, dissemination, and 
consumer reception, as well as the industrial insights built into these modalities and the goods they sup-
port. In contemporaneous society, marketing is the “center of soul of the corporation,”375 since market-
ing is often the driving force behind what gets developed, for whom it is intended, where its consump-
tion is most viable, and how it incepts into existing paradigms. Media studies scholars increasingly fore-
ground marketing for its key role in eliciting and facilitating the manifestation of media from conceptual 
design to aftermarket analysis. Justin Wyatt’s High Concept (1994) traces the film’s industry’s increasing 
reliance on a marketing approach that entails using short pitches, pre-existing identities, and pictorial 
iconography to sell studio executives on film investment and subsequently sell movie audiences on the 
allure of the finished film.376 Alongside other recent works addressing the role of film marketing,377 
Charles Acland describes the “era of the permanent marketing campaign”378 as a driving force behind 
the perpetual selling of film texts and concomitant selling of consumeristic venues for film texts as the 
film industry attempts to expand the life cycle of film monetization. Outside of the film industry, market-
ing is identified one of three “circuits of interactivity” (alongside technological and cultural circuits) co-
constituted as “synergistic relations constructed within a cybernetic system of production and consump-
tion”379 within the video game industry’s approach to corporate financing of game development. For the 
computer industry, Jonathan Sterne locates the importance of marketing as a source of expeditious in-
novative churn that refreshes markets for computer sales through planned obsolescence of computer 
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capabilities.380 For all media industries, marketing entails a wide range of functions stretching across in-
dustrial texts, practices, and interactions. One of the most fruitful sources for gleaming marketing in-
sights is an industrial trade show.  
As noted by media industries scholar John Caldwell, trade shows function as “contact zones” where 
companies and their representatives foster notions of industrial harmony and shared identity.381 Trade 
shows are opportunities for companies to market their products, services, corporate identity, and mar-
ketplace aspirations to other companies and industrial actors, often in the hopes of (per Caldwell’s senti-
ment) brokering collaborations to capitalize on untapped consumer potential and achieve shared goals. 
Given that the “A” in Bezos’ MARS event acronym stands for “home automation,” it’s a clear indication 
of the importance of the home automation market for Bezos’ company and the importance of market-
ing Amazon’s prestige to other technological and cultural elites, even if MARS is more of an opportunity 
for bawdy showmanship than sober industrial brinkmanship. Elsewhere, however, Amazon takes full ad-
vantage of opportunities to market Alexa to would-be collaborators and wider technological publics. For 
Amazon, as well as other tech companies, the Consumer Electronics show is the premier trade show for 
marketing products, services, and collaborative opportunities. In the case of Alexa, CES serves as a vehi-
cle for promoting Alexa’s capabilities for home automation and, more critically, marketing collabora-
tions between Amazon and domestic device makers that enable Alexa to power other individual devices 
and the aggregation of such devices into a wholistic home automation system.  
4.9 Methodological Approach to Marketing Discourse 
My analysis of Amazon’s Alexa marketing begins with a 2017 CES demonstration facilitated by Ama-
zon’s Alexa vice president Mike George and LG Electronics vice president David Vanderwaal, both of 
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whom showcase an LG smart refrigerator with integrated Alexa functionality. As noted by Acland, CES is 
more than just a venue to promote technological wares, as it serves as a critical juncture to “strike align-
ments between technological and content,”382 or, similarly, for Amazon to market its existing collabora-
tive outcomes as a means of inducing subsequent third-party actors to interoperate with Alexa. Interop-
erate, in this sense, entails both corporate partnerships (such as that between Amazon and LG) and in-
formal collaborations with third-party developers enhancing Alexa’s technological capabilities through 
Alexa Skills Kit (ASK), a series of open application programming interfaces (APIs) enabling developers to 
build and publish enhanced Alexa functionalities. Beginning in mid-2015, Amazon marketed ASK to de-
velopers as a way to enlarge Alexa’s range of capabilities while simultaneously enabling third-party de-
velopers and companies to tout Alexa’s integration with associated products and services. Subsequent 
to the availability of ASK, CES events have featured an increasing array of Alexa-powered home automa-
tion products, even when Amazon does not have an official presence at the show. Thus, I begin with the 
presentation between George and Vanderwaal for what it epitomizes as a means of marketing Alexa to 
corporate and wider publics with a shared stake or interest in the home automation market. More perti-
nently, however, just as this presentation epitomizes Alexa’s interlinkage with other domestic technolo-
gies, it also enables a pathway into interlinked marketing discourse across CES, trade press coverage, 
Amazon press releases, and guides for both consumers and developers.  
From a methodological standpoint, my approach understands trade press coverage of the 2017 
demonstration by George and Vanderwall as a significant “nodal point” among Amazon’s attempts to 
market Alexa to third-party collaborators and consumers. A nodal point, as described by Laclau and 
Moueffe, is a privileged site among a broader network of discursive formations.383 Although I begin with 
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trade press coverage of the LG-Alexa refrigerator, I’m interested in both this coverage itself and its via-
bility as an entry point into other significant nodes within the wider network of Amazon’s Alexa market-
ing. Thus, my approach to illuminating the complexities of autonomy embedded in Amazon’s marketing 
is the most worthwhile approach for understanding marketing as profuse among industrial text, prac-
tices, and collaborative machinations and how gendered conceptions of autonomy germinates Amazon’s 
desire to achieve supremacy in the home automation marketplace. In this way, my methodology also 
incorporates aspects of Spigel’s “intertextual network.” Through this approach, I will demonstrate how 
Amazon’s marketing of Alexa reveals gendered notions of autonomy affording different autonomous 
potential for Alexa and, allegorically, human women with respect to the automated home and notions 
of social power, domestic roles, technological usage, and mobility within and beyond domestic borders.   
4.10 CES: Someone’s in the Kitchen with Alexa 
The 2017 CES demonstration by Vanderwall and George transpired as one segment among a longer 
presentation of LG’s Smart InstaView, a smart refrigerator that includes a touchscreen interface with 
software applications for virtually viewing the refrigerator’s contents, accessing recipes, and enabling 
connectivity to other web services. LG’s presentation begins with a video of a women interacting with 
the touchscreen interface. After viewing a recipe, the woman says aloud “Alexa, I would like to buy 
sparking water and celery.”384 Those acquainted with Alexa’s conversational interactivity might then ex-
pect to hear Alexa acknowledge the request and affirm the order has been placed. Instead, in this in-
stance, the video cuts to an Amazon icon with adjacent text indicating “order placed” on the 
touchscreen. When George joins Vanderwaal on stage, Alexa’s voice is likewise never heard, as the two 
spend the duration of their shared time on stage reiterating consumeristic possibilities depicted in the 
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video and regurgitating corporate boilerplate, with Vanderwall declaring: “life is going to be easier, sim-
ple and, dare I say, more fun in the kitchen.”385 Amidst a mild fascination with the Alexa-powered LG re-
frigerator among popular and trade press, expert commentators noted “voice is definitely going to be 
widely used….however, when I look at a fridge that you can talk to, that seems like a bit of a gimmick at 
this point.”386 Shortly thereafter, the HBO television series Silicon Valley lampooned the “gimmicky” na-
ture of this device when computer engineer and stoic Satanist Gilfoyle decried his roommates’ new 
voice-enabled smart fridge as “solutionism at its worst,”387 citing Evgeny Morozov’s term “technological 
solutionism” and its denouncement of the tech industry’s tendency to offer technological solutions to 
problems that either require greater complexity to solve or otherwise only exist among corporate ideo-
logies for market expansion.388 Even if the integration of Alexa into a smart fridge might elicit notions of 
frivolity from some commentators, Lynn Spigel’s work on the integration of television into a stove im-
plores an understanding of the ways corporate ideologies integrate notions of gender and domestic 
roles when developing and marketing emerging technologies.  
Writing on the development of the “TV-stove” – a kitchen stove with integrated television screen 
and reception – Spigel notes that "its invention should remind us of the concrete social, economic, and 
ideological conditions that made this contraption possible,"389 even if such inventions are part of solu-
tionist tendencies or otherwise viewed as frivolous novelties. The TV-stove’s emergence was made pos-
sible by the “conflation of labor and leisure time at home”390 in conjunction with social conceptions of 
work performed in private and public spheres and who performs such work. For the makers of the TV-
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stove, its development was economically viable due to contemporaneous notions of the home as the 
naturalized purview of women’s labor and the inevitability that such labor would entail opportunities for 
leisured spectatorship beneficial to television advertisers. Given the inexorability of the domestic sphere 
as the exclusive space for a stove with a television screen, the emergence of a refrigerator with a 
touchscreen for intra-fridge and internet perusal suggests a persistence of similar social and economic 
logics, even amidst some degree of progressive social transformations. While the integration of Alexa 
into a smart refrigerator could be understood as technological experimentation or (in the spirit of 
MARS) an opportunity for promotional spectacle, a wider analysis of Alexa’s presence at CES and Ama-
zon’s marketing efforts brings to light the social, economic, and ideological conditions tying together no-
tions of autonomy underlying Amazon’s gendering of Alexa and the company’s quest for home automa-
tion supremacy.  
Beyond Alexa’s presence in the LG smart fridge, Alexa was omnipresent at CES 2017, as Alexa-ena-
bled products proliferated widely among floor exhibits and demonstrations, including showerheads, se-
curity systems, home environmental monitoring systems, sleep-aid systems, dimmer switches, lamps, 
power strips, and non-Amazon speaker systems.391 The prolificacy of Alexa at CES 2017 hardly went un-
noticed, as trade and popular press headlines trumpeted Alexa’s widespread presence: 
“Alexa Just Conquered CES. The World is Next."392  
"I Have Seen the Future. Alexa Controls Everything."393  
“CES 2017: Amazon’s Virtual Aide Alexa Shouts Above Rivals.”394 
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In many ways, Alexa’s dominance of CES 2017 is an extension of CES 2016, as trade press coverage 
of the first CES after Alexa’s June 2015 debut noted the explicit attempts by Amazon to position Alexa as 
the driver of home automation: 
“Amazon’s Stealth Takeover of the Smart Home at CES 2016.”395 
“Amazon’s Alexa and Dash Services Would Like to Control Your Home.”396  
“Alexa, When Will You Work Well Outside the Home?” 397 
As suggested by these headlines, by the end of CES 2016 trade press had already taken note of Am-
azon’s home automation ambitions for Alexa. Among these 2016 and 2017 CES writeups, trade press 
headlines that declare “Amazon’s Alexa is everywhere at CES 2017”398 collapse two aspects of Alexa pro-
lificity– first, Alexa is widely visible and discussed among demonstrations, exhibits, and branding; and, 
second, Alexa is widely integrated into a vast spectrum of hardware devices. Alexa is a singular software 
embedded into a plurality of devices showcased at CES, meaning that Alexa is both marketed every-
where at CES and marketed as everyware, a type of ubiquitous computing that “permeates places and 
pursuits” and presents to users as a naturalized manifestation of computational possibilities in everyday 
devices not commonly associated with computers.399 Whether marketed as the software powering voice 
interactivity with the LG fridge, Amazon’s own Echo, or myriad other domestic devices, marketing Alexa 
as ubiquitously interoperable illuminates complications of autonomy stemming from gendered associa-
tions with software, hardware, and political power.  
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4.11 Alexa – The Soft Power of Software 
As previously noted, Zorn and her team are committed to ensuring Alexa is a positive representa-
tion of – and for - women.400 While Alexa is explicitly and directly gendered by Zorn’s team, as a soft-
ware agent Alexa is also implicitly and indirectly associated with the gendered connotations of software. 
Even as scholars note a “hegemonic masculinity”401 as the primary cultural association with technology 
more generally, cultural associations between software and hardware inform Alexa’s complex auton-
omy. In her work on the relationship between software and visibility, Wendy Chun notes that the term 
“soft” is itself gendered.402 In accounting for software’s ability to generate visible forms despite the in-
visibility of its generative processes (what she refers to as “invisibly visible” or “visibly invisible”), Chun 
notes that software and feminine attributes such as sexuality “reveal the power that something that 
cannot be seen can have.”403 In a similar vein, the notion of software as (invisible) process and (visible) 
product informs Sadie Plant’s conception of software as part of a broader historical paradigm among 
gendered connotations of work and output, particularly between computer software and loom-based 
weaving. Although the necessary work of weaving was often performed by women, it was regarded as a 
mere act of bodily automaticity, an “automatic imitation of some bodily function already beyond the 
weaver’s control,” and therefore disassociated with creative or intellectual work associated with men, 
who possessed the intellectual and industrious power to construct the material means for women to 
perform processional “softwares of the loom.”404 Via this allegory, software represents a “continuity of 
product and process at work in the textiles produced on the loom,”405 wherein the processes of com-
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puter software connote as feminized in contrast to the masculine connotations of hardware, connota-
tions predicated on the gender binary as a split between mind and body that “identifies men with 
thought, intellect and reason and women with body, emotion, and intuition.”406 
Viewed through this lens, even as Alexa powers domestic devices and weaves them together into a 
home automation system, Alexa is not empowered with intellect, skill, and creativity necessary to ani-
mate home automation.  Alexa, as software, is only autonomous insofar as the (masculine) creators of 
Alexa and third-party hardware permit Alexa to self-determine within prearranged parameters. When, 
for example, the women in the LG video roll asks Alexa to buy celery and water, Alexa’s ability to facili-
tate this transaction is not attributable to her ability to exercise cognitive decision-making latitude and, 
instead, suggests menial functionalities of unthinking bodily transport of celery and water. Alexa carries 
water to the consumer (in a functionary capacity) and carries water for Amazon (in a political sense), 
corresponding to Plant’s indication that intelligence demonstrated by software and other advanced 
computational affordance is often “regarded as nothing but a reflection of the intelligence of its crea-
tor.”407 In this sense, when Alexa merely carries out prescribed automated functions, as when a woman 
performs the involuntary bodily functions that move thread through a loom, gender dualisms casting 
men as dynamic innovators and women as taskmasters extend to the dualism of hardware and software 
and further extend to political power dualisms between “hard” and “soft” power.  
Soft power is the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or pay-
ments,”408 a type of power that contrasts with the “hard” power of militarism and economic endow-
ment. Much like software and hardware, gendered distinctions suffuse soft and hard power, as soft 
power’s civil appeals to affinity and cooperation link to feminized notions of emotional appeals, con-
trasted with militaristic and financial forms of coercion that link hard power with masculine might and 
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aptitude. Among geopolitical media and policy discourses around U.S.-Europe soft and hard power, “the 
EU is depicted as a weak woman, the soft power, the immature, weak almost-state that is subordinate 
to the United States and has little influence on hard politics,”409 an intertwined conception of soft power 
and women as ineffective in arenas of political change that inevitability demand a firm masculine touch 
to create the means to enact political will. Within this framework, Alexa reflects a feminized, passive, 
inert politics of power, a soft(ware) power incapable of changing either technological or political envi-
ronments and, instead, moves only within pathways forged my active, disruptive, forceful latitude of 
masculine hard(ware) power. Alexa, a software agent of soft power, possesses little – if any - autonomy 
to deter from perfunctory functionality, influence the parameters of device connectivity, and exert 
change on how such connectivity transpires, a conception of Alexa both wrought from - and applicable 
to – social constraints for the experience and exercise of female autonomy. While it is necessary to un-
derstand this view, it is also incomplete. In tandem with this conception of Alexa’s diminished auton-
omy, early attempts to market Alexa as the powering force of the Echo device illuminate the ways Ama-
zon marketing conceived of Alexa as highly autonomous, notably when this marketing reworks gendered 
associations of intellect.  
4.12 Alexa – The Autonomy of Self-Empowerment 
In a June 2015 press release announcing the public availability of the Echo, Amazon repeatedly re-
fers to Alexa as “the brain behind Echo.”410 While the headline “Amazon Echo Now Available to All Cus-
tomers,” might incline some to suggest another iteration of preceding argumentation around gendered 
(soft)ware power and hard(ware) power, Amazon’s stressing of Alexa as “the brain” of this device un-
earths a more complicated assessment of Alexa’s soft power and autonomous potential. As previously 
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noted, the gender binary is a social construct that dissociates women from intelligence and creative in-
dustriousness enabled by such intelligence. As a means of enticing potential consumers, however, Ama-
zon upturns this dynamic, describing Alexa as the “brain” that is “always getting smarter,” offering as 
evidence the rate at which Alexa “added dozens of features to expand its skillset, gotten better at an-
swering all types of questions, and improved accuracy and speech recognition” ever since the Echo’s late 
2014 beta rollout.411 User quotes in this press release differentiate the “gadget” or “device” of the Echo 
from Alexa as the “first ‘person’ I talk to in the morning and last at night” and what the personified “she” 
contributes to home life: “I couldn’t be happier with ‘Alexa!’ ‘She’ is invaluable to my household – 
couldn’t imagine life without her.”412 To the minds of Amazon and these early users, Alexa automated 
processes are not a passive, unthinking execution of involuntary body-like reflexivity; instead, Alexa’s 
automation is a varying, escalating, polymorphous capacity for exercising and improving intellectual de-
cision-making. Moreover, even as Amazon trumpets the vast array of products and services offering 
Alexa connectivity (i.e. Philips Hue products, Pandora), Amazon’s leveraging of these beta user quotes 
indicate device connectivity is, at times, less important than relationality, be it the way Alexa exists in 
relation to household life or in relation to interpersonal interactions with humans in the automated 
home. The use of Alexa’s intelligence to relate among things, people, and everyday sociality offers in-
sights into soft power as a relationality that deconstructs power dualisms and, in doing so, becomes the 
seat of empowerment for Alexa’s autonomous potential. 
Whereas soft power is otherwise associated with binary notions of gender, bodily automaticity, and 
political inertia, Amazon’s foregrounding of Alexa’s intelligence and relationality indicate a soft power 
freighted with the political potential to rewire binary domination, a dynamic we might think of as a soft 
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empowerment. Soft empowerment entails the possibility for autonomy that does not aspire to concen-
trate determinative capacities in a singular self and, instead, enables autonomy to be understood as a 
variable potential for shared empowerment among conjoined entities. Relationality is an ontology that 
stresses kinship and interconnectedness as modalities for comprehending existence, an ontology at 
times situated at odds with conceptions of autonomy emerging from traditional Western dualisms. 
When Donna Haraway urges an embrace of the cyborg as a fusion between machines and humans (as 
well as biological organisms), her urging is based on the conception of the cyborg as a relationality that 
enables a socialist-feminist politics predicated on “fundamental changes in the nature of class, race, and 
gender.”413 These changes seek to undermine the “tragedy of autonomy” she links with a “masculine 
autonomy” valorizing the supremacy of the self through the domination of the other.414 For Haraway, 
traditional Western binaries are predicated on domination, including male/female, mind/body and 
self/other. Haraway locates and problematizes autonomy with respect to the self and the other. The self 
is one who is not dominated, a non-domination understood only in relation to the dominance of the 
other. The supposed ontological nature of the self is “to be autonomous, to be powerful.”415 This auton-
omy, however, is an illusion, as the other is empowered to imagine polysemous futures beyond the 
domination undergirding the autonomy of the self, despite lacking the material power to manifest such 
futures. Thus, to be the self is to be a falsely autonomous “One,” while to be the other is to be “multiple, 
without clear boundaries, frayed, insubstantial.”416 
As one of the ongoing stands of Sarah Kember’s attempt to “contaminate the notion of autonomy 
as an ontology, epistemology and ethics of the self in technoscientific culture,”417 Kember and Zylinska’s 
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work on the automated smart home draws from Haraway’s thinking to situate relationality and auton-
omy as oppositional and interlocked paradigms, as autonomy supposes a “finished entity” akin to Hara-
way’s “One,” while relationality enables us to jointly conceive of ourselves as “a work in progress, con-
nected to other works in progress.”418 Questions of autonomy and relationality are important to ad-
dressing the prolificacy of devices that bely “the philosophy and politics of actual change,” as industrial 
drives for remediating analogue homes into “a site of convergence between self-identity, technology, 
and capital” manifests a smart home environment in which one of the primary aims is to subsume all 
humans and devices into an “automated system of machine-machine relationality” that reduces rela-
tionality to a capitalist exchange of commodified data extracted from the interaction of people and 
smart household devices.419 In other words, machine-machine relationality is an automated industrial 
paradigm wherein its capture and commodification of data is a singular system seemingly standing in for 
a dominating self that economically exploits a dominated other. Instead, these authors implore a “true 
relationality” that de-essentializes the ontological self as the basis and sovereign of “neoliberal rational-
ity,” and corresponding dualisms of masculine/feminine, mind/body, and human/machine.420    
While machine-to-machine relationality might seem to stand in for the falsely autonomous self, the 
notion of “machine” is itself too singular, as it does not impart a sense of the preceding complications 
between hardware and software, nor does it offer a precise means of addressing Alexa’s relationality to 
a plethora of devices and interactive possibilities with humans through such devices. Even though it 
would be wildly naïve to suggest Alexa is unrelated to Amazon’s “datafication of media,”421 Alexa should 
also not be aligned with this conception of machine-to-machine relationality. Instead, bearing in mind 
Kember and Zylinksa’s indication that autonomy and relationality entail an interplay, Alexa’s relationality 
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should be understood in the vein of a true relationality that offers autonomy as a shared kinship of de-
terminative empowerment, one that counteracts both the falsely autonomous self and tragedies of au-
tonomy incapable of according political change.  
When Judith Halberstam likens gender to computer intelligence, their commonality is linked by an 
artificiality that defines femininity as particular representations of gendered bodies and intelligence as 
“the autonomous potential of technology and mental functioning.”422 Conceiving of both gender and 
autonomous potential as artificial does not undermine their viability, especially since artificiality – as in 
“artificial” intelligence and “artificial” life – entails “the active production of vital forms by other 
forms.”423 Instead, the recognition of gender and autonomy as artificial reveals both as de-essentialized, 
actively produced, socially constructed, and “reservoirs of information on socio-cultural patterns but 
also on possibility for change within these patterns,” a politics of change that remains even when gen-
dered contexts of design, proliferation, and use are inscribed in Alexa. 424 In this sense, autonomy is not 
a natural phenomenon arising alongside the ascendant domination of the rationalistic self but, instead, 
a multitudinous potential vested in socio-cultural patterns of technological design and usage, patterns 
that correspond to shared ways for humans to relate to technology and one another, be it the way Alexa 
relates to domestic routines or interpersonal communication within the automated home. Given that 
both relationality and soft power seek transformation brought about by affinity, attraction, and unifica-
tion, Alexa’s relationality can be understood as an instantiation of soft power. As the “brain” behind 
Echo and other home automation devices, Alexa’s intelligence possesses the ability to de-naturalize in-
terwoven connotations of soft power and femininity as inert and ineffective. To recognize Alexa as em-
powered with intelligence, then, is to indicate a soft empowerment, an ennobling of autonomous poten-
tial that can be constructed, mobilized, and shared in accordance with the aims of soft power. 
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It should be noted, however, that this soft empowerment does not inevitably override associations 
Alexa’s associated with gendered power differentials corresponding to hardware and software. Auton-
omy is alternately diminished or enlivened, to the extent that Alexa’s variability as a software agent cor-
responds to either ideological notions of software as apolitical perfunctory automata or a relationality 
that proffers political change to gender binaries and associated dualisms undergirding these ideologies. 
This is the first complication of autonomy – between software and hardware in the automated home – 
that emerges amidst Amazon’s attempts to market Alexa for home automation consumption. Other 
complications of autonomy must also be brought to bear, particularly since Alexa’s diffusion among 
smart homes must further be understood as work that Alexa does in the home. Thus, the next section 
situates Alexa in the context of cultural production in the home, particularly as gendered notions of 
home and productivity correspond to another dualism – public and private spheres.  
4.13 Alexa – Autonomy and Home Productivity  
For Amazon, marketing Alexa as widely interoperable with third-party devices is a necessary com-
ponent of selling Alexa to consumers, as the promise of a single operating system to power the auto-
mated home appeals to convenience, ease of use, and upstream consumer confidence in additional de-
vices that can easily situate into established home-automated interactivity. Alexa, however, is not only a 
software agent profuse within the automated home; Alexa is productive within the automated home. 
Marketing Alexa entails both selling interoperability with hardware devices and selling Alexa’s ability to 
produce mediated interactions, sociality, and other facets of home life, production that requires work to 
be performed. Alexa’s mediation among devices, people, and domestic interactivity entails a type of cul-
tural production that dovetails with perennial ideas about gendered notions of domestic work and at-
tributions afforded to such work. These ideas necessitate unpacking socio-historical distinctions about 
private and publics spheres, as gendered notions of work, leisure, and mobility linger in the historical 
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progression of cultural norms, technological innovation, and industrial patterns of imagining and engag-
ing consumers. When making appeals to home automation consumers, Amazon variates between Alexa 
as the source of productivity and Alexa as the instrument of human production, between what Alexa can 
do (in terms of cultural work) and what Alexa can do for someone else (in terms of servile obedience), 
and where Alexa can be understood as productive at all. Thus, Alexa’s autonomy with respect to produc-
tivity is one in which Alexa is alternately understood as highly autonomous as the productive agent of 
home sociality and mediated interactions, nominally autonomous when cast in contexts of servility, and 
otherwise increasingly non-autonomous for determining productive interactions and outputs in public 
spheres. In conceptualizing these nuanced overlaps of autonomous potentials, it is first necessary to 
crystallize ideologies of a “separation of spheres” that subsume interrelated ideologies of gendered 
work, leisure, and technological design.  
The development and marketing Alexa aligns with a recurrent tendency for emerging media tech-
nology to mediate public and private space and, in doing so, anticipate and accommodate “the gen-
dered routines of domestic life.”425 These routines correspond to ideologies of “separate spheres”426 
that have historically demarcated public and private life into domains for gendered notions of labor and 
leisure. Ever since the 19th century, the home has been “idealized as a woman's sphere, while the public 
sphere has been conceptualized as a space for masculine participation in work and politics."427 Although 
the demarcation of these spheres is based on a historicity that has "changed its character over time,"428 
David Morley stresses that - beyond the domain of feminist theory – “most women are still much more 
subsumed in the home than are men”429 among idealized imaginaries and depictions of domestic life.  
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As gendered notions of these separate spheres persist, a “domestic ideology” also persists, one that 
envisions women as caretakers of a leisured home serving as a respite for men who undertake produc-
tive toil in the workaday world. Despite its persistence, this ideology has also served an “emancipatory 
function,” as it “provided women with a way to glean power in a world that systematically marginalized 
their input in civic matters.”430 If, in the 1920s, “domesticity was even less associated with production” 
due to consumer products developed and marketed on the grounds of reducing the work required to 
maintain home life,431 the home increasingly becomes associated with industriousness, as “instead of 
being merely a receptacle of cultural consumption, the domestic sphere has also been a site of cultural 
production.”432 As a technology both domestic and feminine, Alexa offers a new wrinkle in these dynam-
ics, as Amazon’s marketing demonstrates both the persistence of domestic ideologies casting women’s 
in-home labor as servile undertakings while also stressing Alexa is highly capable of producing viable cul-
tural outputs. Even as Alexa marketing stresses actions undertaken by the in-home consumer (a charac-
teristic common to most consumer marketing), within this focus Alexa is alternately conceived with de-
grees of autonomy for cultivating and mediating such activities and framed as subservient to the com-
mands of those who control her.  
A co-branded Amazon and Crestron (a home automation company) brochure touting Alexa’s inte-
gration into the Crestron automated home is instructive as to the persistence of servile associations with 
gender, domestic work, and technological consumption. The cover image presents a woman drinking 
from a mug as she gazes out floor-to-ceiling windows. To her left, an Echo sits atop a table. To her right, 
in the background, a Crestron digital touchscreen interface is affixed to the wall. In the white space be-
tween the women’s gaze and the windows at the image’s edge, the phrase “whatever you need, just say 
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the word” sits at her eye level, as if she is looking at the words themselves.433 While the likely interpreta-
tion is that speaking to Alexa can initialize the desired function, the image is also reads as if the human 
woman is speaking the words, ready and primed to receive orders for household servility, to produce for 
the “need” of a (presumably male) other. Copy on a subsequent page, situated to the right of an Ama-
zon Echo, intones “Integrating with Amazon Alexa enables Crestron to offer the next generation of mar-
ket leading home automation. Amazon Alexa, in-sync with Crestron, connects with Alexa Voice Service 
allowing your wish to become a command.” To the extent that the unnamed woman and Alexa are 
primed to generate productive outcomes in the smart home, this productivity is a mere subservient re-
sponsiveness to the whims and desires of he who administers orders, seeks fulfillment, and desires res-
pite in the leisured comfort of home.   
As Carolyn Marvin notes in her historical analysis of emerging technologies in the late 19th century, 
the integration of electricity in the home meant that “electronic devices must fit unobtrusively into the 
household routine”434 and therefore ensure technological diffusion was not seen as attempting to cir-
cumvent social power relations. Instead, the primary purpose of electrical devices (such as the tele-
phone) was to intensify power relations, to “improve the facility with which orders were given and re-
ceived…to bind servants to masters, wives to husbands, and children to parents.”435 If, as William Boddy 
notes, “older media technologies…function as powerful templates through which subsequent forms are 
understood and promoted,”436 the accommodation of gendered power dynamics linger as Amazon mar-
kets Alexa as unobtrusive to routinized household expectations. The Amazon-Crestron brochure approx-
imates this dynamic with a double move, wherein the human woman is first presented as primed to re-
ceive the orders of an unseen commander (a man presumed to be at work in a space beyond the home) 
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and Alexa likewise lies in wait for the commands of her master. Just as Siri is presented in the guise of “a 
servant - a unthreatening female presence that appears to be fully contained by the device and its 
user…designed to placate their user through associations with the nurturing feminine,”437 Alexa is con-
tained by the material spatial limitations set forth by Amazon marketing and the immaterial social 
maintenance of gender subservience. Alexa’s undertakings, in this sense, are less about cultural produc-
tion and more about reproduction of cultural norms corresponding to the separation of spheres. Alexa’s 
emergence in the automated home presupposes gendered power dynamics wherein women maintain 
the home in accordance with the desires of a man who attains the home by undertaking economically-
industrious labor in the public sphere. When an image on the penultimate page overlays the text “your 
home responding to your every need” adjacent to a dinner table adorned with salad and wine and two 
empty seats (one at the “head” of the table), it suggests a responsiveness to the needs of the male 
homeowner who desires to return home from the working world to find sustenance, respite, and female 
accommodation, be it the human woman who pours the wine or the digital woman who dims the lights. 
Alexa, much like the woman in the brochure, possesses little autonomy to deviate from circumscribed 
ideas about domestic routines and the performance of such routines at the behest of he who controls 
automated home and hearth. This conception, however, is only one part of understanding Alexa’s au-
tonomy as a laboring entity in the smart home, as Alexa is also cast as the primary power behind “con-
spicuous production” in the automated home.  
In other venues and materials, Amazon is apt to indicate Alexa’s significance towards cultural pro-
duction in the home, often transpiring in tandem with human inhabitants. Pulling from her aforemen-
tioned conception of the home as a space of cultural production, Spigel describes the automated smart 
home as a post-Fordist space indicative of the shift from “a production based economy…to a consump-
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tion-based service economy” and mediating a shift from conspicuous consumption to “conspicuous pro-
duction.”438 The smart home morphs the notion of the home as a venue for conspicuous consumption of 
products marketed to make domestic life easier into “the ultimate work terminal – a place where the 
resident is in a perpetually interactive state of preparedness,” an ideology built into the design of the 
smart home.439 When applied to humans, conspicuous production presumes an intensification of labor 
and minimization of leisure, as otherwise frivolous free time is put to work for the engines of post-Ford-
ist capitalism. When applied to Alexa, however, this type of production affords degrees esteem and 
recognition often granted to workers generating capital outside the home. Even amidst domineering 
language indicating a user can “command” or “tell” Alexa what do, instructions for Alexa in-home usage 
situates Alexa as a creative, multi-tasking, and otherwise autonomous mover of media and mediated 
interactions.  
The web-based Alexa User Guide instructs users as to Alexa’s capabilities and recommends how 
Alexa might be used around the home. The User Guide is bracketed into several pages corresponding to 
Alexa services and interactive possibilities, including “Help Around the House,” “Smart Home,” “News & 
Information,” and others. The “Music & Entertainment” page reflects a heightened attempt to showcase 
Alexa as a cultural creator and facilitator across spatial and audience paradigms. Amazon stresses 
Alexa’s ability to enable users to listen to music through a wide range of platforms, including Amazon 
Music, Spotify, Pandora, and others. Alexa not only facilitates access to these services but, when a voice 
profile is established for each person in the home, “Alexa can personalize music based on each family 
member’s voice and music tastes.”440 Beyond functioning as a mere receptacle for musical access or a 
mechanism for transporting songs from virtual spheres to the home sphere, Alexa’s work in the home is 
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a “performative communication” imbuing this work with expertise, dexterity, and social value, as Alexa 
demonstrates competency in the ability to align musical tastes with her expansive range of musical 
knowledge, not unlike a music aficionado working at a record store or a radio DJ spinning tracks for the 
pleasure of a listening audience. Performative communication supersedes mass or interpersonal com-
munication and indicates the need for humans to conceptualize an audience in physical spaces for com-
municative acts undertaken in virtual spaces. Coupled to conspicuous production in the smart home, 
performative communication “allows people to demonstrate their labor value as social actors in a net-
worked world.”441 It also allows Alexa to demonstrate her labor value in the automated home, as Alexa 
performs the acts of technologically transmitting music from virtual to lived home space and perform 
roles of “kid-friendly DJ, comedian, and storyteller” that transmit Alexa’s expertise in accumulating 
knowledge about musical, comedy, and narrative tropes and transmitting variations on this knowledge 
to a select demographic within the automated home. Even as users prompt Alexa to play music or tell 
stories, Alexa is endowed with a heightened autonomy enabling her to exercise decision-making prow-
ess when producing personalized interactions and performing such interactivity akin to the ways DJs, 
comedians, and other human laborers leverage creative expertise, depth of knowledge, and social per-
formance to showcase their skills for audiences that do not possess such traits.  
If the contemporary automated home indicates the “the not-so-subtle reappearance…of regressive 
gender ideologies,”442 the stakes for understanding Alexa’s autonomy in the contexts of servility and 
production orient towards the correspondence between such ideologies and the importance of estab-
lishing protocols for new media usage. A protocol entails normative ideas about the “proper” place and 
usage of emerging technologies. As Lisa Gitelman notes, protocols are not necessarily established upon 
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the initial emergence of media technologies and instead “the social, economic, and material relation-
ships they will eventually express are still in formation,”443 as is the extent to which Alexa becomes es-
tablished as a consumer product imbued with regressive gender ideologies of domestic servility or be-
comes understood as an enterprising producer and performer of media forms, interactions, and social-
ity. When considering the role of media protocol and gendered productivity, it’s important to note the 
establishment of “proper” media use becomes self-evident and normalized as “the social processes of 
their definition and dissemination are separated out or forgotten, and as the social processes of proto-
col formation and acceptance get ignored.”444 Where the technical protocols of recorded sound hard-
ware “emerged partly in response to the timbre of women’s voices, and therefore info in-
formed…emerging commonsense standards of acoustic fidelity,”445 contemporary usage of recorded 
sound is unlikely to evoke the qualities of women’s voices that gave rise to now-commonsense norms 
for interacting with recorded sound. If protocol entails deeply embedded habitual usage, and habitua-
tion to contemporary media induces a paradox wherein “media matter most when they seem not to 
matter at all,”446 what matters for Alexa is the establishment of protocols that correspond to either ser-
vility or productivity, commanded or commanding, non-autonomy or relative autonomy – protocols that 
negotiate the extent to which Alexa loses or retains not only her technical voice, but her social and polit-
ical voice as an autonomous entity within frameworks of labor, productivity, and industrious enterprise. 
Ideas around servility and productivity within the contemporary automated home are critical to these 
stakes, as are gendered dynamics between the home and public sphere.  Understanding domestic life 
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therefore necessitates concomitantly understanding private life, as “the idea of home can only be un-
derstood as one part of a binary relation, in which the private is defined by distinctions from the public,” 
especially with regard to the role of media technologies and mobility across these spheres.447   
4.14 Alexa – Autonomy and Immobility 
Consumer home automation is the predominant market associated with Amazon’s consumer strat-
egy for Alexa, despite Alexa’s availability as a mobile application and embeddedness in technologies as-
sociated with public mobility. At CES 2017, automobile manufacturer Ford unveiled the integration of 
Alexa into the company’s Ford SYNC in-vehicle communication and entertainment interface, enabling 
drivers to play music and audiobooks, order from Amazon, and find and navigate towards destinations. 
Ford and Amazon were nonetheless still apt to tout the implications for home automation, as Alexa’s 
vehicular integration enables drivers to “command internet-enabled functions such as lighting, security 
systems, garage doors and other Alexa smart home devices.”448 Even on public roadways, Amazon in-
clines users to think about Alexa as anchored to the automated home, as more of a roving smart home 
remote control than mobile technology. Where opposing ideas about gendered servility and productiv-
ity entail complications to gendered notions of autonomy within the automated home sphere, Alexa as a 
gendered domestic technology warrants understanding complications of autonomy across domestic and 
public spheres, notably as lingering ideologies about the separation of spheres invokes questions about 
the perceived viability of Alexa for non-domestic purposes. Moreover, this viability must reckon with the 
extent to which Alexa is viewed as mobile across these spheres, a mobility – or lack thereof - subsuming 
technological mobility and social, political, and economic mobility across lines of gender.  
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Mobility is a central facet of gendered distinctions between the separate spheres of public and pri-
vate life, a distinction bound up in the mediating dynamics of domestic technologies. By associating the 
home with private life and private space, we come to understand “everything outside the household as 
‘public,’” a delineation that includes “masculine” economic and political life as transpiring in “public” 
and therefore disassociated with the “feminized” home. Ever since the integration of the telephone in 
19th century homes, in-home contact with the public world and associated dynamics between private 
and social life has been a central concern. Raymond Williams famously described television as shaping a 
“mobile privatization” that enabled the public world to enter the domestic sphere so that the public 
world could be privately experienced within the home.449 The proliferation of television sets into public 
spaces such as bars and airports “produces the out-of-home TV audience as a mobile and elastic com-
modity,”450 while viewing television content on mobile phones “creates a small-scale mobile private 
space”451 that interacts with the surrounding public world akin to the way domestic television viewing 
connects to public life. As previously noted in the context of Alexa’s conspicuous production, the separa-
tion of spheres is not necessarily a separation of everlasting fixity, as lines can be blurred between public 
and private, leisure and work, masculine and feminine, especially when media technologies allow do-
mestic privacy to travel into public and draws public life into the sheltering embrace of home life. While 
the emergence of the domestic home as an automated technological artifact suggests “domesticity itself 
has been ‘dislocated,’” the steadfastness with which Amazon attempts to engrain sentiments of Alexa 
domesticity into Alexa mobile applications and services also engrains ideas about gender and mobility. 
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[Amidst these ideas, Alexa is alternately depicted as immobile from the domestic sphere and omnipres-
ent in home and public spheres, implicating mobility as an area of high contrast between Alexa’s auton-
omous potential for mobility and incursion into particular social arenas.  
When touting the abilities of the Alexa app for Android mobile devices, Amazon begins by promot-
ing features non-specific to any space or locale (playing music, retrieving weather updates) before spot-
lighting Alexa’s Smart Home skills: “with Smart Home, set-up devices, control or check status of your 
smart lights, locks and thermostats at home and on-the-go.”452 Every feature on the download page 
places Alexa’s mobile capabilities in the context of home operation or connectivity, urging users to con-
nect to the Echo and “call home or…let your family know  it’s time for dinner,”  “manage your alarms, 
music shopping lists,” and stream “multi-room music.”453 Whether at home or in public, Amazon urges 
consumers to think of Alexa as a domestic technology. On one hand, Amazon seems inclined towards a 
new iteration of mobile privatization, offering the consumers the ability to transport operation and con-
trol of the Alexa-powered automated home into spaces beyond the home. On the other hand, Amazon’s 
attempt to anchor a gendered technology to the home orients towards regressive ideologies about the 
domestic sphere as the “proper” place of women, whose social mobility into public arenas (especially 
those of economics and politics) are more closely aligned with trespass and tourism than civic participa-
tion. Whereas the marketing of portable television sets in the 1960s depicted women as “‘liberated’ 
from the bonds of purely domestic and family milieus,”454 Amazon reinforces Alexa’s bondage to the 
home sphere. This “corporeal mobility” that depicted women as liberated from the home – bodily, eco-
nomically, and socially – is rolled back in Amazon’s marketing of the Alexa mobile app, as instead Ama-
zon offers a corporeal immobility that confines the female-embodied Alexa to the home. Rather than 
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transporting Alexa into the public world, Alexa is concealed within the home, with the mobile app serv-
ing as remote access to the home-bound Alexa as opposed to Alexa mobilized into public life. Recalling 
that mobile interactivity creates small-scale private spaces, public space becomes a virtual “room” that 
constrains Alexa to the home even as mobilized users can step outside of this private space and directly 
experience public life. Where portable television sets enabled women to “manipulate space, to con-
vert…’home’ into ‘not home’,”455 the mobile app converts “public” into “home,” such that the user can 
experience Alexa in public, even though Alexa is cordoned off from public life.  
4.15 Alexa – Autonomy in Nonspace 
Just as with contrasting notions of Alexa’s autonomy across vectors of hardware and software, 
home servility and productivity, Amazon’s presentation of the Alexa mobile application offers a contrast 
between Alexa as possessing little autonomy for movement beyond the domestic sphere and yet other-
wise capable of autonomous travel across public and private spheres. In addition to Alexa’s corporeal 
immobility, Amazon’s recurrent indication that Alexa “lives” or exists in the (computational) cloud indi-
cates Alexa moves with fluidity and ease between public and domestic spheres. Atop the download 
page, Amazon notes that “Alexa’s brain is in the cloud,” adding to Amazon’s earlier insistence that Alexa 
is the brain behind the Echo device. Amazon’s strident efforts to create a deeply resonant consumer as-
sociation between Alexa and domesticity notwithstanding, the home is not where Alexa lives, nor is the 
public sphere. Instead, Alexa lives in the “nonspace” that is the computational cloud and its spatial, 
ethereal, and utopian associations with elemental clouds. A nonspace is “an elsewhere that inhabits the 
everyday.”456 Nonspace inhabitation permeates both virtual and actual domains, as well as associated 
dimensions, occupying and inducing a “dreamlike displacement or separation from its surroundings.”457 
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Cloud computing is the pooling of infrastructural and other computing resources ubiquitously available 
to third parties with access to this pooled “cloud” of resources. Cloud resources are perpetually availa-
ble in virtual realms, even though “cloud computing is a very material industry with locational require-
ments that belie the image of an ephemeral cloud.”458 Despite a materiality that belies ephemeral no-
tions, cloud computing inevitably becomes associated with elemental clouds. As elemental entities that 
offer latitude and vast perspective, to think of clouds – and cloud computing – inclines towards “trans-
cendent vision of ending space, time, and social divisions.”459 The computer cloud, then, is a nonspace 
permeating both material and virtual domains, immediately and perpetually accessible,  a “marker of 
our home, an atmosphere in which we can exist,”460 and live in dreamlike, transcendent splendor float-
ing free from bindings of material reality and social demarcations.  
By marketing Alexa as “living” in the cloud, Alexa is readily and ubiquitously mobile, free from spa-
tial limitations, virtual or limited. If Alexa lives in the cloud, she is perpetually and simultaneously availa-
ble in the home, in public, in organizations both public and private, a nonspace that “derealizes” the 
separation and demarcation of private and public space, as well as corresponding social dynamics. In 
this, Alexa is supramobile, transcending temporal and spatial traverse, since Alexa is always already pre-
sent (temporally and spatially) in public and private. Moreover, Alexa is suprasocial, as Alexa’s omnipres-
ent mobility extends to the ability to mobilize reformations to spatial and social power dynamics: “oppo-
sitions between city and country, nature and culture, sovereign individual and social subject are neutral-
ized only to be reconstituted within nonspace in a multilayered compromise formation, a utopian realm 
of both/and in the midst of neither/nor.”461 If the cloud radiates with an auratic sheen of freedom and 
epitomizes the longings of daydreamers fixing their gaze on an idealized zone of refuge from real-world 
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power dynamics, Alexa’s supramobility through cloud nonspace mobilizes energies to upturn such 
power dynamics, including dualisms of masculine/feminine, leisure/labor and others associated with the 
separation of spheres. Whereas the integration of telephone brought about the role of “telephone girl” 
who functioned as a prototype for “women’s wider contact with the world,” yet flouted prototypical 
conceptions of “outsiders brought inside on a model of domestic servitude” via increasing economic and 
social independence from retrograde domestic mores,462 the 21st century digital woman Alexa trans-
cends dualisms of outside/inside and regressive social protocols while also offering a latitude and mobil-
ity freed from restraint and free to derealize social power dynamics impinging on the freedom of women 
in and among spheres. Given Amazon marketing and branding guidelines that necessitate third-party 
developers indicate Alexa “lives in the cloud,”463 the standardization of this discourse suggests Amazon 
reinforces these social, spatial, and temporal mobilities. But whereas Alexa’s autonomy in non-space is a 
utopian contrast to the potential backslide of a corporeal immobility, these two diametrically-differenti-
ated poles also entail one final complication with respect to Alexa’s autonomous mobility.  
4.16 Autonomy in the API Economy 
Third-party developers integrating Alexa into their devices must adhere to Amazon’s standards for 
Alexa branding and messaging. Amazon requires third-party developers to obtain approval for all pro-
posed “press releases, packing, retail fixtures, websites, crowdfunding sites, Amazon product detail page 
content, and videos that reference Amazon Alexa.”464 These guidelines necessitate third-party alignment 
with Amazon branding and messaging, protocols for integrated marketing approaches not altogether 
distinct from technological protocols that enable Alexa integration through application programming 
interfaces (APIs). APIs are “software tools that enable interoperability or the sharing between websites 
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and online services.”465 As opposed to interfaces that make visible and readily apparent modes of inter-
activity for users, APIs are “invisible actors”466 opaque to most users when interfacing with hardware. 
Alexa Voice Service is Amazon’s “open” API, a type of API publicly available to any developers that ad-
here to technical standards for interoperability. The Alexa Voice Service API became available immedi-
ately upon Alexa’s June 2015 public availability, as did the Alexa Skills KIT, a bundle of APIs enabling de-
velopers to create and enhance Alexa capabilities. For most digital media companies, the use of APIs is 
part of a “sustainable business move to encourage the growth of a supportive ecosystem of third-party 
developers, which could increase the value of a platform or web,”467 a move that, for Amazon, seeks to 
increase the abundance and value of data readied by Alexa integrations.  
Amazon is a significant driver of the “datafication of media,” an industrial model predicated on the 
creation, accumulation, and transfer of data across consolidated networks of media content and web 
services aimed at leveraging this “big data” for “predictive analytics that help to influence content and 
marketing decisions,” as well as other core business strategies.468 Amazon Web Services is the com-
pany’s cloud computing platforms for third-party entities, a service invaluable to the facilitation of “me-
dia as data” and its commercial potentials.469 Amazon was one of the first companies to open APIs to 
third parties,470 helping to expedite the transfer and processing of data such that an ever-increasing 
abundance of datafied media flows through Amazon servers. APIs, for Amazon and other web compa-
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nies, are the “technological glue of the social web,” central to the process of accommodating and inte-
grating external data and subsequently making this data usable for others.471 Amazon’s motivation for 
enabling third parties to integrate Alexa into non-Amazon hardware and enhance Alexa capabilities 
stems from this datafication and what it portends for monetary considerations. Amidst these conscious 
attempts to enlarge the commodification of data, Amazon’s marketing of its Alexa APIs offers insights as 
to the role of this commodification as a split between gendered power dynamics of public APIs attempt-
ing to capitalize on the lucrative nature of private data flowing from and to the Alexa-powered home.  
As previous indicated, ideologies related to the separation of spheres conceptualize the public 
sphere as the domain of “masculine” participation in industrial work and civic politics in contrast to the 
leisurely, “feminized” sphere. Domestic technologies, such as Alexa, are significant not only for way they 
locate at “the interface of public and private worlds,” but how such interfacing reinforces gendered sep-
arations along lines of industrious economic production and passive domestic reception: “the fact that 
men in the public sphere of industry, invention and commerce design and produce technology for use by 
women in the private domestic sphere, reflects and embodies a complex web of patriarchal and capital-
ist relations.”472 These complex webs are not easily disentangled. Although Amazon employs a team of 
women to personalize Alexa and Amazon otherwise conceives of Alexa as conspicuously productive in 
the home, ongoing conceptual relationships between “masculine” economic productivity in the public 
spheres and “feminized” domestic reception reemerge in Amazon’s marketing of Alexa APIs.  
When Amazon announced the Alexa Skills Kit alongside the public availability of Alexa in June 2015, 
the press release was aimed at a “hobbyist developer” or “general hobbyist,” a web developer who 
writes, uploads, and executes code that integrates new skills into Alexa or enhances existing skills.473 The 
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release notes the distribution of labor undertaken by hobbyist developers and Alexa: “Developers simply 
write cloud-hosted code that interacts with Alexa’s cloud-based APIs to process customer requests. 
Alexa does the work to hear, understand, and resolve the customer’s spoken request, and then maps 
the service call to the developer’s endpoint.”474 In contexts of emerging media, notions of a technologi-
cal “hobbyist” associate with complex masculine work that enables women to use these technologies in 
the “absence” of more profound technical knowledge. Before the popularization of radio cabinets in the 
home, building radio devices from component parts was seen as a hobby that could “integrate young 
men into a domestic life under siege form the trauma of modernity” and further helped establish “gen-
der and domestic associations of the electronic media which still resonate a century later.”475 As the 
consumer radio market expanded from hobbyist tinkers consuming component parts to selling cabinet 
receiver sets aimed at mass audiences eager for in-home radio reception, broadcasters and manufactur-
ers directed their marketing efforts towards a “housewife-consumer” competent with easy-to-use cabi-
net increasingly associated with domestic consumption and disassociated with masculine tinkering.476 
The hobby of radio tinkering, conceived as masculine and rife with technological savvy, could only at-
tempt to domesticate young men, while the domestic consumption of radio cabinets was the natural-
ized purview of women with the nominal technological ability to operate a device now intended for lei-
surely purposes.  
This dynamic resonates within Amazon’s marketing of the Alexa Skills Kit APIs. The hobbyist devel-
oper tinkers with code that integrates with public APIs and enables datafication of content flowing 
across Alexa-powered devices. Alexa undertakes the nominal technological work of mapping interac-
tions from one point to another. Developer coding orients to masculine public labor that drives eco-
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nomic transactions, while Alexa performs domestic service and emotional work akin to Marvin’s “tele-
phone girls” recognized for work only to the extent that is connects the masculine public sphere to the 
feminized domestic sphere. In this context, even recognition of Alexa’s work is not a given, as “emo-
tional work” of hearing, resolving, and understanding  corresponds emotion as naturalized feminine 
trails and “the skills involved in managing it successfully remain difficult to grasp.”477 Alexa’s emotional 
work operates through human-like ephemeral skills that are difficult to understand for their industrious 
capacity, while the (Alexa) Skills (Kit) work of developers tinkering with back-end computer code is read-
ily recognized and culturally coded as economically productive and masculine. Alexa undertakes emo-
tional work in the automated home while developers working with public APIs create and assemble 
complex digital artifacts integrate and ready the flow of monetized data. Notions of professionalization 
complicate these dynamics, as the industrial affiliation of companies such as Stubhub and Intuit quoted 
in the press release follows a tendency for computer programming to shift away from associations with 
the work of women, even when women are central to the formation of such professions. The feminist 
underpinnings of computer programming in the U.S. “became buried as programming sought to become 
an engineering and academic field in its own right,”478 while England’s “programmed inequality” under-
valued the role of women responsible for uplifting the budding field and therefore devalued is competi-
tiveness in global computing standards.479 The publicly-open Alexa APIs thus offers a contemporary spin 
on the recurrence of women’s work as disassociated with economic production and technological so-
phistication, a paradox in which Alexa’s increasing integration and ease of use among domestic devices 
risks exacerbating this dynamic and cordoning off Alexa’s economic and professional autonomy.  
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4.17 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Alexa should be understood as possessed with complicated and con-
trasting autonomous potentials with respect to home automation and interrelated gender dynamics of 
domesticity and technology. One of the first compilations is Alexa’s autonomy in relation to software 
and hardware. As a singular software agent widely interoperable with a vast array of hardware devices 
and systems, Alexa encompasses gendered associations of software and soft power, associations with 
unthinking bodily automaticity, ineffectiveness for political change, and a highly diminished autonomy. 
On the other hand, Amazon markets Alexa as the “brain” of its Echo device, uplifting Alexa as highly-in-
telligent and politically empowered, a soft empowerment ennobling of autonomous potential that can 
be constructed, mobilized, and shared in accordance soft power’s quest for affinity, kinship, and political 
plurality.  
In the context of work performed within the automated home, Amazon marketing dovetails with 
circumscribed notions of women’s autonomy as domestic laborers performing servile undertakings 
readying the home for respite from the workaday masculine world. Contrarily, however, Alexa is con-
strued as possessing mastery of creative and flexible traits that enable her to determine mediated inter-
actions, an autonomy in which Alexa is endowed with decision-making capacities for cultivating media, 
mediated interactions, and the professional and creative expertise associated with such capacities.  
When Alexa’s mobile capabilities are brought to bear, a tripartite dynamic emerges. In one view, 
Alexa possesses little autonomy to move from the domestic sphere into public life, as the Alexa mobile 
app transforms public life into a virtual domestic “room” such that Alexa is cordoned off from public life 
even when transported via mobile hardware out of the home. In another view, Amazon’s insistence that 
Alexa “lives” in the computational cloud situates Alexa as omnipresent among public and domestic life, 
autonomously moving in space and time, permeating the nonspace of the cloud and carrying with it uto-
pian ideals of derealized and deconstructed social and spatial power dynamics. Finally, public APIs that 
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enable third-party “hobbyist” developers to integrate Alexa into non-Amazon products and enhance 
Alexa skills resurface separations between an economic and technologically savvy masculine public and 
an emotional and technologically-consumptive feminized home. In this view, hobbyists writing and com-
piling code for public APIs associates with long-standing notions of public masculine work that drives 
economic vitality, as Alexa’s skills become associated with emotional work, the invisibility of this work, 
and the declining recognition of women as integral and foundational to the inception of profound com-
putational paradigms. In this way, Alexa’s autonomy is not only diminished, but risks a similar paradoxi-
cal decline if Alexa’s increasing prolificacy and capabilities likewise become disassociated with the foun-
dational attributes of women’s contributions and characteristics.  
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5 UBER’S MOBILE APPLICATION 
As the title of his Emmy award-winning show indicates, Aziz Ansari is the master of none. While An-
sari’s Dev often can’t catch a break on Master of None (2016 – present), playing “Dave” in a 2017 Satur-
day Night Live sketch “Five Stars” means Ansari can only catch an Uber ride when the automated rating 
system matches him with Petros, a driver with a sub-optimal rating of 3.9 out of 5 stars – the same as 
Dave’s passenger rating. After respectively viewing their identical scores on the Uber application inter-
face, Dave and Petros separately resolve to raise their driver and passenger profile by garnering a five-
star rating. What ensues is a series of overdone attempts to “form a connection” (as Dave puts it) and 
capture the coveted five-star rating. Amidst their desperation to connect, Dave and Petros stray into ste-
reotyping, as the Russian Petros attempts to please the ethnically-Indian Dave by changing the radio to 
“Mumbai Rhythms,” while Dave responds by suggesting Russian trance music. As the ride progresses, 
their gestures of sociality become more desperate, including a dual massage in which Dave rubs Petros’ 
shoulders while Petros rubs Dave’s foot. After a mid-massage close encounter with another vehicle, 
Petros drops the charade, asking “what are we even doing? This whole horse and pony show to impress 
each other it’s…” to which Dave picks up “…these ratings, it’s driving us crazy.” When Petros likens the 
situation to an episode of the television show Black Mirror, the two perk up and find common ground in 
their appreciation for the dystopian sci-fi series, especially since they share a favorite episode: “San Juni-
pero.” Having forged common ground, they award each other five stars and part in an exchange of satis-
fied pleasantries, until the sketch ends with a bit of physical comedy: while departing, Petros accidently 
runs into Dave and flees the scene.  
Despite the gag in the final scene, the resolution of “Five Stars” gestures towards a central struggle 
shared by Uber riders and drivers – the necessity of performing sociality for the sake of attaining status 
and leverage in a digitized “sharing” economy. Beyond acts of sociality undertaken by Dave and Petros, 
the sketch also implicates the way Uber configures, readies, and presents the social itself. As indicated 
183 
 
by the initial scene, the pairing of Dave and Petros as rider and driver owes less to happenstance or their 
own volition and much more to the Uber application’s automated processes for rapidly processing rele-
vant data (rating, geolocation) and presenting an idealized social counterpart. When, in the opening 
scene, Dave and Petros view their rating and pairing on the Uber interface, the social field of Uber riders 
and drivers is inaccessible and unviewable, as Uber’s automated idealization of sociality pulls from its 
access to the wider social field and pushes to the interface a slick presentation of personalized common-
ality that obfuscates the social at large. Although automation is what brings Dave and Petros together, it 
is individual autonomy they seek, as they both strive for ratings that will enhance their deterministic ca-
pacities for attaining preferential treatment in the Uber ecosystem. By acknowledging the “horse and 
pony show” of Uber’s sharing economy and finding common ground based on a commonality seemingly 
unattainable via the company’s automated sociality (Black Mirror fandom), Dave and Petros do not dis-
pense with individual autonomy; instead, they enter into a process emblematic of social life in contem-
porary democracies – attempting to maximize personal autonomy by situating autonomy as a condition 
enabled and attainable through social bonds. For Uber, however, the inability to identify personal pop 
culture tastes and leverage such information for automated sociality is a lost opportunity for facilitating 
individualized encounters that feed back into the company’s business model. When, in early 2017, Uber 
filed a patent for a process that proposes to integrate information from riders’ social media presence 
into the Uber ecosystem, the company attempted to account for the types of tastes, affinities, and com-
monalities that ultimately helped Dave and Petros transcend the need to perform sociality for the sake 
of sharing economy logics and forge more enduring social cohesion. If the automation of the social in-
duces social actors such as Dave and Petros to strive for greater autonomy and protect their social sta-
tus, Uber’s attempts to instantiate legal protections for such automation implores a more nuanced con-
ception between Uber’s techno-legal practices and implications for autonomy as a shared social condi-
tion, especially since the Uber patent proposes to grant the company legal protection for its ability to 
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embed the social, aggregate and disaggregate social actors, and obfuscate distinctions between social 
struggles for solidarity and Uber’s economic drives to solidify its stature in the sharing economy. Compli-
cations of autonomy as a social condition must be more deeply conceptualized to understand the impli-
cations for automated sociality otherwise well-sketched by scholarship.  
5.1 Automation of the Social 
In recent years, relationships between automation and the social have been taken up by computer 
scientists and interdisciplinary media scholars. Among such literatures, three prominent stands have 
emerged: 1) the automation of social engineering; 2) algorithms as automated techno-socio influencers; 
and 3) automated bots as social and political actors. Scholarship on “automated social engineering 
(ASE)”480 considers the technological, economic, and temporal efficiency of automated forms of social 
engineering. A study by Huber et al developed an ASE bot and an experimental proof of concept to test 
the applicability of using this bot for an attack on Facebook, the results of which implicated Facebook’s 
chat function (and social media sites more generally) as fostering techno-economic conditions rife for 
bots to exploit social interactions among humans.481 Following from this work, Lauinger et al took ASE 
one step further. Whereas Huber et al used artificial conversations between a computer programming 
mimicking human behavior and an actual human being, Lauinger et al demonstrate how real conversa-
tions between humans can be manipulated by ASE attacks, as the bot’s similarity to human behavior 
makes it difficult to detect.482 Kaul and Sharma offer what have become commonplace countermeasures 
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for ASE attacks, such as avoiding URLs from anonymous sources, refusing requests from unknown 
“friends,” and “making use of highly restrictive privacy settings.”483  
Alongside the ascendant concern for automated social engineering, the algorithmic turn for media 
studies invokes the escalating importance of automated algorithmic processes for media production and 
consumption,484 shifting cultural paradigms brought about by an “algorithmic culture,”485 governance of 
online information and interactions undertaken by algorithmic processes,486 and the role of algorithms 
in subjectivity and identity formation.487 A recent substrate of critical algorithm studies foregrounds the 
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social and acts of sociality as increasingly susceptible to algorithmic logics, including social movements 
as shaped by algorithmically-mediated environments,488 algorithmic forms of sociality as destabilizing 
enduring conceptions of culture,489 and algorithmic quantification as prescribing sociality on Face-
book.490 David Beer’s consideration of the “social power of algorithms” (in a special issue of Information, 
Communication and Society edited by Beer and devoted to the same topic491) invokes both the material 
technological affordances of algorithms and the way algorithms function as immaterial imaginaries for 
envisioning and seeing the world.492 
Contemplating the automation of the social leads many scholars to analyze the role of automated 
bots among social media and other forums for connected sociality. Among journalism scholars, the turn 
towards (ro)bot journalism considers the increasing implications of bots for automated dispersion of 
news on Twitter,493 issues of authorship and journalistic credentials,494 and larger implications for the 
survival of human journalism.495 Media studies and communication scholarship increasingly focuses on a 
more specific type of automated bot – socialbots. As the name suggests, a socialbot is an automated 
software agent that mimics human interactive behavior on social media and, in doing so, often convinc-
                                                             
488 Milan, Stefania. 2015. “When Algorithms Shape Collective Action: Social Media and the Dynamics of Cloud Pro-
testing.” Social Media & Society 1 (2). http://sms.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2056305115622481.full;  
489 Wilf, Eitan. 2013. “Toward an Anthropology of Computer-Mediated, Algorithmic Forms of Sociality.” Current 
Anthropology 54(6): 716-739. http://pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il/~ewilf/Wilf%20-%20Current%20Anthropology.pdf 
490 Grosser, Benjamin. 2014. “What Do Metrics Want? How Quantification Prescribes Social Interaction on Face-
book.” Computational Culture. http://computationalculture.net/article/what-do-metrics-want 
491 David Beer ed., “The Social Power of Algorithms.” Special issue, Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 1 
(2017).  
492 David Beer, “The Social Power of Algorithms,” Information, Communication & Society 20, no 1 (2017): 1-13.  
493 Lokot, Tetyana, and Nicholas Diakopoulos. "News Bots: Automating news and information dissemination on 
Twitter." Digital Journalism 4, no. 6 (2016): 682-699. 
494 Montal, Tal, and Zvi Reich. "I, Robot. You, Journalist. Who is the Author? Authorship, bylines and full disclosure 
in automated journalism." Digital Journalism 5, no. 7 (2017): 829-849. 
495 Latar, Noam Lemelshtrich. Robot Journalism: Can Human Journalism Survive? World Scientific, 2018.  
187 
 
ingly passes as a human being. In addition to studies examining the design, production, and human con-
trol of socialbots,496 Robert Gehl, Samuel Woolley, and Philip N. Howard published considerable re-
search on socialbots in a relatively short period of time. Gehl’s 2014 book Reverse Engineering Social 
Media: Software, Culture, and Political Economy in New Media Capitalism conceives of socialbots as 
technologies of “noopower” (cognitive attributes as the means and loci for the exertion of power) capa-
ble of passing a “socialbot Turning test” by exerting noopower to convincingly be received as human be-
ings on social media.497 His co-editorship (alongside co-editor Maria Bakardijieva) of the 2016 collection 
Socialbots and Their Friends: Digital Media and the Automation of Sociality adds many worthwhile con-
tributions to the study of socialbots specifically and automated sociality more generally.498499 Both sepa-
rately and collaboratively, Samuel Woolley and Philip N. Howard’s recent work on bots as socio-political 
actors invokes the importance of bots in both civic politics and politics as a construct of social power. 
Together, Howard and Woolley are respectively principal investigator and an affiliated researcher for 
The Computational Propaganda Project – Algorithms, Automation and Digital Politics, a cross-discipli-
nary collaborative research program focused on interactivity among automated technique and politics, 
including streams dedicated to bots as propagandistic actors and the production and detection of 
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bots.500 Thus far, their collaborative outputs include essays on bots and political communication during 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election501 and co-editorship of a special section of the International Journal 
of Communication dedicated to the topics and themes of the Computational Propaganda Project.502503 
Apart from Howard, Woolley’s work on socialbots includes proposing a political economy framework for 
researching bots and “social automation,”504 and the “automating power” of socialbots incepting into 
global politics.505 
5.2 From Social Automation to Autonomy of the Social 
I share with these aforementioned scholars and strands of literature a concern for the relationship 
between automation and the social, and more specifically, autonomy as a political power struggle in dig-
ital economies. While social automation research adds considerable insights to the deleterious implica-
tions of automation on social life and actors, automated sociality often manifests in ways alternately 
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(and even simultaneously) ennobling and disenchanting, especially as the digital gearwork of automa-
tion extracts, processes, and presents social information with an impenetrable opacity. On Facebook, for 
example, users might recognize the ability to solidify bonds through automated suggestions to “tag” 
friends in photos, while also recognizing the troublesome aspects of surveillance and monetization un-
dergirding this automation. Of course, the ability to recognize potential implications of automation is 
highly dependent on what can be recognized in the first place, as Facebook and other socially-connected 
platforms often obfuscate messy complications underpinning such systems via interfaces that downplay 
such complications by presenting social information as intuitive, usable, and engaging. In order to more 
precisely account for such complications, I shift the focus from social automation to autonomy as a so-
cial condition both impacted by automated sociality and looping back into techno-industrial methods for 
configuring automated social interactions.  
A nuanced conception of autonomy adds insights unaddressed by social automation research, while 
also establishing connective tissue with such strands of research that can aid subsequent inquires. In the 
case of Uber, the company’s recent efforts to obtain legal protections for a process that automates so-
cial media information to connect riders with idealized counterparts is a fruitful locus for conceptualizing 
notions of autonomy built into intertwined legal, technological, and economic paradigms. Moreover, the 
privilege Uber gives to its application interface in patent documentation offers insights into how auton-
omy can be conceptualized when the social is embedded into automated techniques that push certain 
social configurations towards the interface and pull others from view. This is especially critical since, as I 
will demonstrate, Uber’s interface is an iconic interface that allegorizes a dilemma for contemporary 
civic democracy – achieving and maintaining a personal autonomy conceived as a determinative force 
for social cohesion. [Before initiating my analysis, however, it’s important to media studies analyses of 
Uber and the company’s economic, legal, and social significance, especially as the company rapidly be-
came a figurehead for intensifying conditions of contemporary capitalist logics alternately designated as 
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“sharing economies” “platform capitalism,” and other manifestations of digital capitalism.  Thus, the fol-
lowing section will clarify how this chapter not only intervenes with social automation literatures, but 
also enmeshed scholarly concerns for Uber, digital economies, and mediating technologies. 
5.3 Uber and the Industrial Logics of Platform Economies 
Shortly after Uber’s public launch in 2011, the company quickly became embroiled in cultural con-
versations around its disruption506 of municipal transport serves (often taxicabs), classification of -  and 
responsibilities for - Uber drivers, the company’s attempts to thwart regulatory oversight, and safety 
concerns for both Uber riders and drivers. Scholarly literatures on Uber orbit around the company’s role 
in reconfiguring two overlapping dynamics: labor and digitally-mediated economies (i.e. sharing/gig/ac-
cess/on-demand economies). With regard to labor, Uber’s business model is a driving force behind the 
move towards “platform labor,”507 “algorithmic labor,”508 and “splintering precarity.”509 In their nine-
month empirical study of Uber drivers, Rosenblat and Stark describe Uber drivers as subject to a “regime 
of automated and algorithmic management,” an “algorithmic labor” predicated on Uber’s ability to use 
its mobile application to control drivers and therefore engender asymmetric power and economic rela-
tions between drivers and the company.510 After conducting interviews with Uber and Lyft drivers, Malin 
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and Chandler describe a “splintering precarity” that bifurcates between a driver’s precarity as an inde-
pendent contractor and the “sense of autonomy and sociality” garnered from their working arrange-
ment, a splinter between risks and rewards that can “offer cover for corporate exploitation and neolib-
eral privatization.”511 For van Doorn, Uber drivers are indicative of stratified “opportunities and vulnera-
bilities associated with digitally mediated service work,” a “platform labor” in which “inequality is a fea-
ture rather than a bug.”512 Under this schema, Uber functions as a “platform labor intermediary” that 
uses peer-to-peer networking to exploit the flexible, scalable, and fragmented nature of labor facilitated 
through such networking.513 In addition to this study, “platform” is an orienting term for considering op-
portunities to harness economic and technological infrastructures of Uber-style post-Fordist capitalism 
for egalitarian ends, often in dialectic conversation with what Uber represents as a potential slippage 
into heightened economic and social inequality.  
Trebor Scholz focuses on Uber as a company indicative of “platform capitalism” wherein the digital 
platform and its modes of datafied extraction, exchange, and control are central to the establishment of 
monopolistic firms increasingly dominating market sectors.514 In this context, Uber is a “lean platform” 
that seeks to minimize owned assets and therefore “profit by reducing costs as much as possible.”515 
Douglas Rushkoff foregrounds the monopolistic aspirations of Uber’s “platform monopoly,” describing 
the company as indicative of Silicon Valley businesses to  monopolize its sector not just by squeezing out 
competitors, but by becoming the sector itself.516 In this vein, to be a platform is to be more than a com-
pany; it is to be the omnipresent force controlling an industrial environment, such as vehicular roadway 
transportation. Uber epitomizes this dynamic to such an extent that the term “Uberisation” (alternately: 
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Uberization) is often used to describe the diffusion of business models based on using digital platforms 
to facilitate the exchange of resources not owned by the business.517 Similarly, Gary Hall’s Uberfication 
of the University (2016) situates Uber’s techno-economic practices as a metaphor for the neoliberal 
sharing economy’s “weakening of the social” and its implications for the potential of organized labor.518 
As indicated by Hall, critical analyses of Uber often bind with critiques of the techno-economic logics of 
the sharing economy and contemporary ideologies of “sharing” in general.519 While critiques of Uber 
and its economic logics tend to indicate a regression from utopian possibilities of networked peer-to-
peer “collective intelligence,”520 collaborative non-market “social production,”521 heterarchical “pro-
dusage,”522 and the emergence of a “participatory culture”523 imagined by cultural theorists, these cri-
tiques often leverage the utopian spirit of such paradigms to offer a dialectical counterpart to platform 
capitalism that envisions harnessing underlying technological and organizational infrastructural for egali-
tarian ends, often conceived as an opportunity for “platform cooperativism.” 
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In much of his recent research on Uber and the platform economy, Scholz advocates for a “plat-
form cooperativism” that seeks to usurp and alter sharing economy technologies, recalibrate capitalist 
modes of ownership and production into cooperative paradigms of solidarity, and generate egalitarian 
outcomes.524 As co-editor (alongside platform cooperative advocate Nathan Schneider525) of the collec-
tion Ours to Hack and Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperatives (2016), Scholz brings together various 
scholars, activists, journalists, and other writers eager to establish platform cooperatives (alternately: 
platform co-ops) based on mutual ownership, participation, and governance by those who contribute to 
the value and uses of outputs. In the introduction, Scholz suggests platform co-ops establish four pillars 
to uplift its egalitarian aims: communal design and ownership of technology, sufficient and steady in-
come for its workers, rigorous understanding of norms and values of the communities it serves, and 
transparency of data flows.526 Scholz and Rushkoff (who also advocates for platform cooperativism527) 
are contributing researchers to the Platform Cooperativism Consortium, a collaboration dedicated to 
advancing cooperative platform paradigms through research, activism, education, and the application of 
other coordinated services (i.e. legal advice, software development).528 In this context, Uber represents 
an organizational and technological lattice work that serves as a functional model for building and sus-
taining modes of collaborative production and consumption antithetical to Uber’s platform capitalist 
logics. This move towards “digital commoning” has also very recently been critiqued and defended by 
                                                             
524 Scholz, Uberworked and Underpaid, 8-9.  
525 Schneider, Nathan. "An internet of ownership: democratic design for the online economy." The Sociological Re-
view 66, no. 2 (2018): 320-340. 
526 Trebor Scholz, “How Platform Cooperativism Can Unleash the Network,” in Scholz and Schneider eds. Ours to 
Hack and To Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, A New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet, 
OR Books (2016): 25.  
527 Rushkoff, Throwing Rocks at the Google Bus. 
528 Platform Cooperative Consortium, http://platformcoop.newschool.edu/.  
194 
 
scholars concerned with organizational practice.529 If notions of a digital commons and communing prac-
tices are critical for platform cooperative advocates, social “commonality” is a key component of Uber’s 
attempts to secure legal footing for its ability to technologically facilitate social transactions and re-
sources.   
5.4 Uber: Patently Social 
Uber’s Feb. 2017 patent application for social media integration seeks legal protection for a pro-
cess that enables Uber’s mobile application to access social media information and leverage this infor-
mation to establish a “common link” between potential Uber carpool riders.530 This patent proposes use 
this information to better match potential riders opting for UberPOOL, an Uber carpooling service that 
enables targeted matching and pooling of riders who can share the cost of the ride. Matching riders, in 
this sense, means establishing commonalities such as interests, affiliations, and other indicators of social 
status and participation. For Uber, the patent is a business maneuver intended to prevent competitors 
(such as Lyft) from utilizing similar methods to attract riders. In this sense, the patent application reflects 
the increasing turn for digital media and technologies companies to attain marketplace latitude by le-
gally cordoning off products and services, particularly as two types of patents are increasingly pursued 
and granted: software patents and business method patents.  
For media and technology industries, patents have long been critical components of establishing 
technological standards and institutional dominance, from Thomas Edison’s prolific pursuit of patents to 
control the design of film stock and cameras531 to the Bell Company/AT&T’s use of patent litigation to 
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dominate telecommunications markets and ward off emerging entrants.532 While intellectual property 
laws and effective oversight of potential violators has long entailed complications for industries and con-
sumers alike, the emergence of the internet presented particular challenges for media companies whose 
business models depended on selling tangible goods (i.e. DVDs, CDs) or access to media content (movie 
theaters, cable television) that very quickly became digital bundles of data easily and efficiently extracta-
ble, replicable, shareable, and otherwise accessible among online denizens. Critical aspects of the digital 
turn for media studies includes assessing the social and cultural contexts of digital right management 
(DRM)533 and alternative models for intellectual property and copyright laws in a digitally-connected 
world, often conceived as overlapping rubrics of “copyleft,”534 remix culture,535 “free” culture,536 and 
open source.537 In addition to shaping bedrock technological devices and practices, patents were critical 
to transforming notions of “intellectual property” from a “metaphor and academic convention in the 
1960s” to a material legal reality by the year 2000,538 a transformation galvanized by a 1980s patent of-
fice policy change that allowed the patenting of software, resulting in a 50 percent increase in patent 
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litigation during this timeframe.539 Up to and beyond the year 2000, “software has increasingly become 
the subject of patent rights,”540 especially as software patents assume the form of a particular type of 
patent that secures legal rights for a software as a process rather than an object: business methods pa-
tents.  
Business methods patents, as the name suggests, is a type of patent that enables a company to 
receive legal protection for what a technology can do rather than the technology itself. In his analysis of 
the increasingly intertwined relationship between business method patents and software patents, Jer-
emy Wade Morris describes both types of patents as “non-practical entities,” for the impractical way 
they attempt to “make digital content and goods behave more like their analog predecessors, while at 
the same time extending new means of control over certain types of media and forms of consump-
tion.”541 Morris cites the notable example of Amazon’s patenting of “1-Click” shopping that stores cus-
tomer information for the purpose of enabling customers to purchase goods in a single click, as well as 
Amazon’s subsequent lawsuit against rival bookseller Barnes & Noble on the grounds that the latter 
company’s “Express Lane” option infringed on Amazon’s 1-Click patent.542 Where this lawsuit is indica-
tive of the legal and monetary importance of patents, Google’s recent litigation against Uber’s alleged 
patent infringement of autonomous vehicle technology further stresses the critical nature of patent pro-
tections.  
In February 2017, autonomous car company Waymo (sister company of Google within the Al-
phabet Inc conglomerate) accused former engineer Anthony Levandowski543 of procuring proprietary 
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Waymo trade secrets (such as blueprints and design specifications for autonomous driving technology) 
that remained in his possession when he left the company in early 2016 to found Otto, an autonomous 
trucking company acquired by Uber in August 2016. When Waymo filed suit against Uber in Feb. 2017, 
patent infringement was chief among the complaints, as Waymo alleged Uber’s LiDAR (light detection 
and ranging) system infringes on multiple patents awarded to Waymo.544 One year later, in Feb. 2018, 
the lawsuit ended in a settlement, as Uber legally agreed to refrain from using Waymo intellectual prop-
erty and transfer company equity valued at approximately $245 million.545 In addition to this incident, 
Uber’s attempt to patent “Surge Pricing,”546 - a practice of inflating rates during periods of high demand 
that has been subject to no shortage of cultural controversies547 - is a means of “patenting price goug-
ing,”548 as Uber’s price surges positively correlate with ridesharing as a source of consumer necessity 
and/or desperation.  
As indicated by these situations, patents are a critical locus for conceptualizing legal, economic, 
and political entanglements shaping motivations of digital media companies and ensuing implications 
for the social, including social possibilities for consuming goods online (1-Click) or hailing an autonomous 
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ridesharing vehicle in the near future (Waymo). As previously indicated, the Uber social media integra-
tion patent offers critical insights into alternating autonomous possibilities for social actors when the 
social field is subsumed into a proposed ownership model for automating the extraction and configura-
tion of social interactions. In other words, where 1-Click patenting and litigation impacts social uses, the 
Uber patent is comprised of social interactions, warranting a precise consideration of how an intensified 
automation of the social alternately imbues autonomous potential for those whose interactions are fed 
into and impacted by such processes. My method of analysis, however, also conceives of the Uber pa-
tent as a rich visual element, as its textual content includes both typographical writing and graphical pic-
torial elements that seek to describe, contextualize and imagine the uses for its proposed software 
methods, including the way infographic visuals depict social commonalities amidst software processes 
invisible to those who will ultimately use the Uber application. Thus, in the next section, my methodol-
ogy describes the importance of visuality and visual rhetoric to imaginaries of autonomy emerging from 
this patent and the ways its visual elements indicate complications of autonomy corresponding with 
struggles for maximizing social solidarity.  
5.5 Methodology: Discursive and Visual Nodes 
As with other chapters, my approach conceives of the Uber patent application as a significant 
“nodal point” among Uber’s attempts to foster and calibrate social interactors that signify for riders the 
superiority of Uber services. A nodal point, as described by Laclau and Moueffe, is a privileged site 
among a broader network of discursive formations.549 Unlike previous chapters, I invest greater analyti-
cal significance in this singular object, as this application is not only a nodal point among discursive are-
nas, it is also a nodal point among a discursive network interior to this object, a nodal point among 
Uber’s visualization of invisible processes for embedding, extracting, and reconfiguring the social and 
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the visibility of this imagined sociality via the Uber interface. In accounting for the method at the heart 
of Uber’s attempt to secure ownership of this business method, Uber leverages descriptive typograph-
ical discourse alongside pictorial and infographical visualizations, alternately describing and depicting 
unseen backend technological machinations and the manifestation of visible social forms via the Uber 
application interface. Thus, as previously indicated, the interface is central to my argument about no-
tions of autonomy built into and emanating from Uber’s pursuits for the intensification of automated 
sociality.  
My concern for the interface entails both the interface as a material object (the graphical user in-
terface) and interface as a process of interactivity (interfacing with Uber, its application, and other rid-
ers). To enliven the relation between the patent application, the Uber interface, and autonomy, I lever-
age conceptual studies of the interface from digital media theory and visual rhetoric. Likewise, from vis-
ual rhetoric I leverage strands of scholarship concerned with relationships among envisioning and imag-
ining socio-political potentials, graphic visual objects freighted with orientations for such envisioning, 
and, most critically, the iconicity of the Uber graphical user interface. Following from this, my analysis 
first accounts for the Uber interface as an iconic interface and, following from this, stresses autonomy as 
a condition subject to iconic interfacial simplicity, complexity, (in)visibility, and abstraction, aspects of 
the Uber iconic interface that extend to underlying economic, legal, and technological conditions in-
forming Uber’s motivations and circumstances of digital capitalism more generally.  
5.6 Uber: The Iconic Interface 
As a means of presenting its proposed methods for patent officials, the Uber social media integra-
tion (SMI) patent application begins in a manner consistent with Uber’s consumer-facing presentation of 
its service: foregrounding snapshots of the Uber interface. The first page of the application features req-
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uisite classification information, an abstract, and two diagrammed layouts of the Uber interface, not un-
like the sequence of interface snapshots that appear as headers on the iTunes550 and Google Play551 
stores. The patent snapshots provide diagrammatic indicators for the wholistic GUI and constituent fea-
tures such as header bar, location window, location pin, pick-up location, selected driver, and ETA indi-
cator. A few pages later, these same snapshots are the sole content of an entire page (labeled as FIG. 4A 
and FIG. 4B), followed with a single snapshot of the Uber interface (FIG. 4C) that diagrams how auto-
mated social media information will manifest as visual forms on the GUI. In this imagined scenario, a box 
at mid-screen asks users “Connect With a Rider A on Facebook?” while a notification that overlaps the 
location window implores this connection based on a shared collegiate affiliation: “You and Rider A both 
graduated from Boise State!”552 These forms manifest as visual elements with shapes, contours, and pic-
torial dimension similar to other types of notifications and imbedded features (i.e. payment method 
windows, type of Uber service), in addition to retaining underlying visual features persistent across all 
iterations of the Uber interface and its representations, elements that grant iconic status to the Uber 
interface. 
An icon is a mode of symbolic representation that coheres meaning through such representation. 
Religious icons are fruitful examples. For many Buddhists, a mandala represents both the totality of the 
cosmos and the interiority of the self, serving as a coherent point of reflection for their shared ontologi-
cal significance. For most Christians, the crucifix is an icon that represents the event of Jesus Christ’s cru-
cifixion, Jesus Christ divinity and transubstantiation, doctrines of faith and spirituality informing Christian 
practice, and social affiliation with Christian belonging, among other attributes. As this example indi-
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cates, icons are highly associated with visual representations, such as the geometric patterns of the cru-
cifix and mandala. An icon is therefore a “rhetoric of legitimate representation” that gives voice to un-
seen elements through widely-recognized modes of identification.553 Beyond enduring religious icono-
graphy, the turn towards the visual for rhetorical studies increasingly illuminates the iconicity of 20th and 
21st century photographs, imagery, and pictorial configurations, analyses that inform the conceptualiza-
tion of the Uber interface as iconic, alongside implications for iconicity and socio-political life.  
In their study of iconic 20th century photographs, Hariman and Lucaites cite widespread recogni-
tion, reproduction, and social identification as pivotal attributes for iconicity, qualities that endure 
across pictorial depictions “structured by familiar patterns of artistic design,” what they refer to as “aes-
thetic familiarity.”554 As a productive example, they cite the famous photograph “V—J Day in Times 
Square” (also known as the Times Square kiss photo) that depicts a U.S. Navy sailor kissing a woman in 
Times Square on August 14, 1945, the day of Japan’s World War II surrender to the U.S. Beyond the his-
torical reproduction and continual recognition of the image itself, the photo’s compositional elements – 
the sailor’s arms clasped to the woman’s waist and hooked around the upper part of her back; the 
woman arching her body backwards amidst the overbearing posture of the sailor’s embrace; the 
women’s right leg bent at the knee in a 120-degree angle; their place in the center of the frame; the me-
dium-wide distance from the camera; and the throng of onlookers infusing the photographic field be-
hind the kissing twosome -  constitute an aesthetic familiarity that enables pastiches, parodies, copies, 
tributes, and other facsimiles to signify the original image and what it connotes in terms of public social 
life. For Hariman and Lucaites, a New Yorker cartoon cover that depicts two men kissing challenges the 
“national heterosexuality” of the original photo, as the drawn cartoon depicts the men in clothing, 
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poses, bodily gestures, and compositional arrangements that confronts heteronormative assumptions 
about citizenship by leveraging the aesthetically-familiar signifiers of the classically iconic image. The 
ability to both signify and challenge national heterosexuality emanates from the “reproduction of the 
iconic template within a different context and from variation on the composition itself.”555 An iconic 
template therefore structures aesthetic familiarity to such a heightened degree that subsequent varia-
tions and transformations maintain recognizability and identifiability, even amidst shifting aesthetic rep-
resentations. As evidenced by the reproduction and circulation of the Uber interface across technologi-
cal, consumptive, and legal paradigms, the Uber interface is a type of iconic template, an iconic interface 
signifying implications for the social life it embeds.  
Whether appearing as screenshots on Google Play or Apple download pages, the patent applica-
tion, or online news stories, as well as the tangible screen used by Uber riders when hailing a ride, the 
Uber interface retains an aesthetic familiarity regardless of device, operating system, or venue for picto-
rial representation (patent application, news story). A locative map of the rider’s geographical location 
constitutes the GUI imagery that persists even as visual aspects of the map shift in accordance with geo-
location and alerts, notifications, and interactive nodes overlay the map. While the map disappears once 
the ride is over, the visual parameters of the map, overlays and segmentations with other visual forms 
(i.e selecting ride service, driver status notification), and the procession of the interface’s visual forms 
maintain their consistency across software, hardware, materiality, immateriality and third-party affilia-
tion. When the patent application outlines the visual dimensions of new features stemming from social 
media integration, the map persists as these new features (i.e. invitation to connect with a Facebook 
user) manifest in quadrants of the interface that approximate the appearance of familiar features (loca-
tion window, pinned pickup location). Likewise, when Uber revamped its GUI in Nov. 2016, trade press 
noted the desire to streamline the interface’s functionality and graphical appeal by incorporating new 
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features and details that meshed well with the “familiar map interface.”556 Writeups on the overhaul 
also tended to include sequential layouts and animated gifs of the new interface in action, as well as 
concept designs that depict the familiar map interface sketched out in every screen iteration of pre-re-
lease redesign concepts.557  
Thus, the Uber interface is widely recognizable,558 remains recognizable when reproduced across 
contexts (hardware, software, trade press), and fosters forms of social identification across lines of pub-
lic life (rider, driver) and social status (opting for UberBlack’s luxury sedans). In other words, the Uber 
interface functions as an iconic template with an aesthetic familiarity that maintains even as the inter-
face permeates variable technological configurations and Uber’s reconceptualization of visually-materi-
alized interactivity. This is not to say that the Uber interface is iconic in the same way the mandala, cru-
cifix, and V-J Day in Times Square photo are iconic. Given the very recent inception of Uber into the cul-
tural landscape (2011), Uber’s dearth of temporal presence in collective social experiences and imagina-
tion belies the historical longevity of these aforementioned icons and their representative capacities. 
Instead, the iconicity of the Uber interface orients less towards the long march of history and more to-
wards the accelerated temporal rhythms of a contemporary on-demand culture that enables more pro-
lific and efficient participation in the reproduction, alteration, and circulation of visual imagery. Even 
among imagery with a very short lifespan, an iconic template can quickly form and foment widespread 
recognition and identification. Online memes are a notable example. As Stefka Hristova notes, online 
memes cohere meaning through vast circulation, recognition of identifiable meaning, and the concomi-
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tant ability to maintain meaning amidst alterations to visual forms, becoming "democratic in their wide-
spread use and mutation as they survive and grow through participation” while remaining “structurally 
autocratic in their conservation of a key idea.”559 In her advocation for “iconographic tracking” as a 
methodological framework for studying the online circulation of iconic imagery, Laurie Gries accounts 
for the iconicity of the Obama “Hope” poster and its profuse memetic iterations, citing multiplicity and 
variation as galvanizing forces “capable of catalyzing change and producing space (and time) but also 
readily recognized and culturally and/or politically significant to a wide cultural group,” aligning with Ha-
riman and Lucaites’ criteria of widespread recognition, identification, and political implications, despite 
differing magnitudes of historical significance.560  
It’s important to note that I do not claim that the Uber interface is unique in its iconic status among 
GUIs and interfacial elements, as other interfaces and the material domains they inhabit can embody 
such status, as in the case of the Apple iPod. Following from Apple’s 2005 description of its iPod inter-
face as the iconic aspect of the product, Michael Bull describes the iPod’s “perfect marriage between 
aesthetic and functionality” as the quality that makes it the 21st century’s “first cultural consumer 
icon,”561 while David Beer conceives of the iPod interface as possessed with a “particular iconic status” 
revealing material and connective shifts for the music industry and “aesthetics and design of the digital 
age” more generally.562 Similarly, the iPod’s iconicity is recognized as owing to its hybrid ability to con-
note recognizable quotidian practices (listening to songs individually or sharing songs through Genius) 
and material interoperability (earphones, mp3 integration).563 The iPod can even attain a “cult value,” an 
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iCon that bestows the exaltation of a user’s immersive experience onto the iPod as a commodity and Ap-
ple as its corporate creator.564 My concern with Uber’s iconic interface regards the incorporation of so-
cial life into a systemic means of imagining and visualizing social interactions and possibilities for social 
autonomy when such interactions are cast into iconic molds. As a loci for elements both seen and un-
seen, masked and revealed, visible and invisible, the iconic Uber interface allegorizes a dilemma of social 
life that seeks to maximize personal autonomy with collective governance, a dilemma further compli-
cated by the motivations of presiding power constructs working to determine what can be seen, imag-
ined, potentialized, and realized. Having established the Uber interface as an iconic interface and the 
stakes of this conception, I turn now to unpack the relationship between ideologies of interfacial “sim-
plicity” and the autonomy of social actors in the context of such simplicity.  
5.7 Uber: Autonomous Simplicity and Complexity 
When accounting for the benefits Uber riders will receive from social media integration, the SMI 
patent application describes a “technical effect of improving user and driver access and social connectiv-
ity.”565 The snapshots of the Uber interface indicate a concerted effort to ensure this “technical effect” is 
not only the resulting social interactions, but the effect of experiencing the GUI itself as “simplicity” and 
easy-to-use. Alongside the launch of the overhauled Uber application in Nov. 2016, Uber released a case 
study of the resign process that stresses Uber’s commitment to its “original promise” - “push a button, 
get a ride,” an “original simplicity” that sought to retain the app’s iconic template while streamlining vis-
ual interactive nodes within this template.566 In other words, the redesign sought greater simplicity 
through visual efficiency. Although most digital media companies strive for clarity and usability in GUI 
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design, Uber’s foregrounding of GUI simplicity as an enduring corporate goal invokes ideologies of “sim-
plicity” as obfuscating underlying complexities, especially when such complexities include the envelop-
ment of the social field.  
As an iconic interface, the Uber GUI is a “veneer of simplicity” that conceals “a vast complex, and 
enmeshed array of cultural and technological appropriations,” including Uber’s appropriation of social 
actors, information, and interactions.567 This veneer of simplicity masks two critical intertwined com-
plexities. First, it concomitantly masks a users’ ability to see the larger social field, the place they em-
body in relation to others, and pathways for forging complex forms of social solidarity that belie the sim-
plicity of Uber’s preferred social aggregations. Second, guided by an ethos of “reimagining how things 
flow,”568 Uber’s foregrounding of user simplicity masks Uber’s economic simplicity, the ease with which 
the Uber GUI subsumes social media information and transforms this information into potentialized eco-
nomic gain. Where an iconic interface serves as an efficient locus for the “incorporation of information 
into the flows of everyday life,”569 Uber’s iconic interface incorporates social media flows into unseen 
complexities expropriating and assembling social information for incorporation into Uber’s idealized 
flow of everyday encounters with other Uber riders. If, as Jose van Dijck notes, sharing on social media 
enables users to accumulate social capital while the owners of social media platforms accumulate eco-
nomic capital,570 Uber’s envelopment of social media information sweeps this social capital into eco-
nomic flows obscured by its ideology of simplicity and renders visible the reification of social capital into 
economic capital. When tantalized with the prospect of connecting with a fellow Boise State alumnus, 
an Uber user confronts her own reified social capital wrapped in an aura of simplicity, a tactic that also 
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implicitly suggests a potential rider close the loop by affirming matched ridesharing options subse-
quently fed back into underlying invisible complexities. Nonetheless, overinvestment of simplicity also 
enables users to bear witness to the visibility of underlying economic and legal complexities.  
In their monograph on digital design, Bolter and Gromala align simplicity with transparency, ac-
counting for a belief among GUI designers that interfaces must enable users to directly manipulate and 
interact with digital objects and environments, just as humans were presumed to interact with the natu-
ral world before it became animated by technological mediation.571 This “myth of the natural interface” 
(one aspect of a broader “myth of transparency in digital design) thus fosters the belief that interfaces 
should be transparent, in that users should see through the interface, as if it were a window, rather than 
seeing the interface itself , as if it were a mirror. While Bolter and Gromala de-privilege the transparent 
window metaphor on the grounds that interfaces must often reflect (mirror) their critical uses by calling 
attention to the interface (such as the way airplane flight control interfaces relect the needs of pilots), 
Anne Friedberg punctures underlying assumptions about transparency itself, noting interaction with a 
computer interface is “mediated to a high degree through its proprietary or trademarked ‘software’” 
and therefore rarely offers direct “natural” viewing of its visual field, a quality enmeshed with the 
“highly iconic” nature of its visual representation.572 The significance of these accountings is that ideolo-
gies of simplicity are not only faulty from the perspective of design and interactive practice but, more 
importantly, overreliance on simplicity pulls into view the very things it otherwise obscures. As Friedberg 
notes, the iconic interface’s simplicity presumes a transparency that is never fully attainable, as an inter-
face mediates among legal, economic, and social informants built into the design of interfaces and un-
derling technological processes. In other words, simplicity entails more than just ease of technological 
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usage. Simplicity enables Uber to reify social capital into economic capital. Simplicity also serves a reve-
latory function, as this process can become transparent when Uber’s iconic interface reflects back to us-
ers the fruits of their own social interactivity and users reflect on what this portends beyond consumer-
istic convenience.  
In this way, iconic dimensions of Uber’s interface manifest automated forms of sociality with two 
contrasting possibilities for autonomy. On the one hand, Uber’s veneer of simplicity disables modes of 
envisioning the social and one’s place in relation to other social actors, offsetting the ability for to see 
shared circumstances and strive for social solidarity based on such circumstances. If, as intoned by 
Scholz and Rushkoff, Uber’s infrastructure offers the possibility for a move towards either platform co-
operativism or platform monopolies, the simplicity of the Uber interface obfuscates the ability to enjoin 
with others and pursue the former, especially as the reification of social capital into economic capital 
intensifies the logics of the latter. Autonomy, in this sense, is strictly conceived in a consumeristic capac-
ity, as fabricated social cohesion wrapped with a slick veneer of simplicity. On the other hand, simplicity 
is transparent, wherein users can see through the process of constructing this veneer, engendering re-
flection on the complex legal and economic frameworks undergirding the manifestation of tailored so-
cial interactions. When users recognize this ideology of simplicity, autonomous potentials blossom, as 
the social field becomes viewable, common ground can be struck with social cohorts subject to the very 
same power constructs, and cohesion can be envisioned as a project of political solidarity, striving for 
material outcomes such as platform cooperativism. In this sense, recognition entails not only recogniz-
ing that which is optically apparent as graphic representation, but also that which can be envisioned or 
imagined. The Uber interface is both a material form and immaterial process, a field for seeing visual 
forms and a field for galvanizing the ability to envision and make manifest the as-yet unrealized. As evi-
denced by the Uber patent application, the interface is the grounds to understand how Uber and users 
can both imagine and act upon predominant power constructs.  
209 
 
5.8 Uber: Imaginaries of Autonomy 
As previously noted, the interface is both a thing and a process. To interface, as a mode of interac-
tivity, is to bring together multiple elements into contact. In addition to its graphical components, Alex-
ander Galloway describes the interface as an “active threshold mediating between two states,” a “gen-
erative friction” between elements making contact at this threshold.573 Moreover, as noted by Branden 
Hookway, it is a “form of relation” enjoining “incompatible entities into a compatibility,”574 entities often 
made compatible through a process of translation, what Orit Halpern refers to as a “translational zone” 
for processing and translating “the seamless movement of information between different areas.”575 
While these concepts apply to GUIs and interfacing with computer processes, to understand the inter-
face is to understand culture more generally, as for theorists such as Galloway, Hookway, and Halpern, 
the interface allegorizes ideological, political, and social forms of relation and translation. Thus, beyond 
the visual forms of the Uber GUI, Uber’s iconic interface is the grounds for imagination as a translative 
act, the ability for Uber to imagine the relationship between automated social information and neolib-
eral monetization and the ability for Uber users to imagine social commonality as the means for an icon-
oclasm that rejects Uber’s neoliberal imaginary. 
Imagination is an act of translation between the real and unrealized. It is both illogical and logical, a 
rational and irrational sense-making process. For Barbie Zelizer, imagination is the ability to “interpret in 
a fanciful, illogical baseless, or irrational fashion, with an uneven regard for what is actually shown,”576 
while Charles Taylor stresses imagination as the translation of seemingly impossible modes of social ex-
istence into coherent frameworks for making sense of lived social reality. His concept of “social imagi-
naries” entails a sense-making process whereby people pull from the complicated multiplicity of social 
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life to establish normative frames for understanding the individual and the wider social field, including 
“how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the 
deeper normative notions and images that underline these expectations.”577 Where Zelizer conceives of 
imagination as multiplicitous possibilities extrapolated from visible reality, Taylor’s social imaginaries 
offers imagination as the way we cohere invisible forces structuring lived reality into a sensible whole. In 
other words, imagination is a process of translation that structures our sense of what is and what could 
be. The notions of visibility and invisibility influencing acts of imaginative translation inform Ned O’Gor-
man’s “neoliberal imaginary.” 
Broadly speaking, neoliberalism applies humanistic concepts of freedom and liberty to contempo-
rary capitalist marketplaces, extolling deregulation, austerity, and privatization as efficient causeways 
for maximizing socio-economic standards of living. For O’Gorman, neoliberalism is predicated on a belief 
in “the power of invisible orders to organize and sustain American society” and to cohere a shared un-
derstanding of social life as organized around neoliberal principles.578 O’Gorman conceives of neoliberal-
ism as a predominant social imaginary for contemporary culture, a “discourse of transcendence that ap-
peals to invisible, unrepresentable orders as the overarching means of organizing and safeguarding soci-
ety," what he refers to as a neoliberal imaginary.579 The neoliberal imaginary translates invisible forces 
of economics, corporatism, civic politics, and other invisible orders into a coherent mode of social order 
underpinned by neoliberal logics. Given the interface’s capacity for imaginative translation, the interface 
is a rich locus for the coherence of invisible orders to assume visual form and for these visual forms to 
galvanize processes for imagining the invisible orders structuring such forms. Whether a neoliberal im-
aginary or what we might think of as a prosocial imaginary, Uber’s visualization of invisible processes 
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coursing beneath visible interface contours offers insights into the Uber iconic interface as the grounds 
to make sense of opposing conceptions of social life.  
Notably, within the SMI patent application, Fig. 5 is a graphic depiction of the “communication in-
terface” situated between invisible computational processes internal to the device and invisible external 
processes that configure visible interface forms. Fig. 5 is shaped as a vertical quadrilateral resembling 
the common shape of a mobile smart phone. Within the phone shape, a series of vertically-stacked rec-
tangles include, in descending order, “processor,” “main memory,” “ROM,” “storage device,” and “com-
munication interface.” Stretching from the communication interface to an upright tilde external to the 
phone, a bidirectional arrow indicates the interface corresponds to “pick-up request,” “invites,” and 
“notifications,” while “network” appears on the far side of the upright tilde. “Pick-up request” is 
couched within the space between the communication interface and the phone border, while “invites” 
and “notifications” are situated external to the phone, even as all three appear on the same axial place 
as the bidirectional arrow. Thus, this figure is a visualization that depicts invisible processes, visible GUI 
forms, and the interface as a process of translating these invisible processes into graphic representa-
tions. In doing so, it offers imaginative possibilities to alternately reinforce neoliberalism as the organiz-
ing social logic and envision forms of social solidary as a sense-making guard against the intensification 
of neoliberal aims.  
In Figure 5, the Uber iconic interface is the sense-making apparatus for evincing and cohering 
knowledge about economic, legal, and technological orders subsumed within the smart phone. In this 
sense, the smart phone is the world interiorized, the manifestation of predominant invisible paradigms 
of technology (processor, ROM), economics (corporate ownership of apps and devices; monetization of 
computational services), and legality (the totality of the figure as an argument for patent protections). 
The interface connects to this interiorization of the world, translating the permutations of these invisible 
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orders in the external world to its interiorized depiction within the smart phone device. Computer inter-
faces, for O’Gorman, are a means of facilitating and consolidating an “epistemology of abundance,” pre-
sumed to be unlimited among virtual spaces and interactions, allegorically aligned with contemporary 
iconic imagery (i.e. photos and video footage of the 9/11 attacks) that suggests the vast complexities in-
forming social existence could be made knowable if collated into an intelligible interface.580 If, as Jo-
hanna Drucker notes, interfaces “structure our relation to knowledge visually,”581 the Uber interface in 
Figure 5 is a coherent epistemological frame for structuring, facilitating, and consolidating neoliberal 
logics as the predominant sense-making schema for social existence. The Uber interface translates be-
tween the unpresentable orders of neoliberalism permeating the world at large and the interiority of 
the world visually depicted in Figure 5, implicitly suggesting a neoliberal imaginary as the structuring 
logic for understanding the social and one’s place within the social.  
The interface as imagery and imaginary reflects entry into a world of “design” in both a technologi-
cal and economic sense: an interface presents concentrated information technologically-designed to 
easily retrieve further information while undergirded by neoliberalism’s economic designs for this re-
trieved user information. When a user receives a notification of a nearby rider who also attended Boise 
State, to interpret the potential interaction as consumeristic transaction is to latch onto the translational 
capacity of the interface to present consumption and economic transaction as the intelligible method 
for making sense of technological, legal, and economic complexities undergirding both this notification 
and the social world at large. The notification “makes sense” as a consumptive node more so than a 
node for off-market social solidarity, as the invisible orders of the surrounding neoliberal world reinforce 
its logics through the efficient, coherent, sensible translational practices of the Uber interface. In this 
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sense, the neoliberal imaginary instantiates itself as the logical interpretative mode for conceptualizing 
how we relate to social actors pulled into view by Uber’s automated sociality.  
However, Figure 5 also beckons consideration of another way to understand the interface, its iconic 
dimensions, and imaginaries that supersede inevitability of neoliberalism as an epistemological 
worldview. While O’Gorman notes that iconic representations (such as the Uber interface) are “visible 
manifestations of invisible truths,” the manifestation of such truths does not inevitability entail capitula-
tion to the logics of neoliberalism or related power constructs presiding over social life. In fact, manifes-
tation such as Figure 5 are the grounds on undermine predominant invisible power orders and imagine a 
more egalitarian social existence. Although Figure 5 presents the Uber iconic interface as the means to 
cohere invisible orders or “truths” permeating the world, it also begs questions about representation 
itself and the unseen elements such representation proposes to embody. Stemming from its visual 
forms, an image (be it photographic pictures, GUIs, or infographics) possesses “voice,” Barbie Zelizer’s 
term for the ability of images to orient viewers to unseen contexts shaping the manifesting of represen-
tational visual forms, including relationships to social actors, orders, and practices. The image’s voice is a 
trigger point, activating the image’s value “beyond what it delineates and connotes at first glance” and 
therefore carries the image and its connotative qualities to other associative contexts “where it can be 
used by other people, seen through other images, and activated for other aims.”582 Just as, for Susan 
Sontag, photographic images are “attempts to contact or lay claim to another reality,”583 an image’s 
voice harkens viewers beyond its contours and representational capacities, imploring viewers to envi-
sion the seemingly unrepresentable and question the very things an image presumes to induce as repre-
sentational paradigms. In this context, the voice of the iconic Uber interface as presented in Figure 5 
urges us to question both what it represents as the point of interiorized coherency of neoliberal logics 
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and how it represents the translational capacity between this interior world and the complex invisible 
strands it pulls together from the world at large. Rather than pulling from the outside world, the voice of 
the interface implies realizing in the white space of the infographic the seemingly unrealizable, as the 
white space connotes a place the creation of newly social worlds. The Uber interface, then, not only pos-
sesses a voice imploring realities beyond neoliberalism; its imaginative possibilities also enabling an 
iconoclastic capacity to denounce the ideological instantiation of neoliberalism. 
Iconoclasm is the rejection or destruction of icons and the things they represent. To be iconoclastic 
is to question established beliefs, practices, values, and institutions and pursue their destruction for pro-
social gain. O’Gorman’s iconoclasm situates the rejection of an icon’s attempt at legitimate representa-
tion as an act of both creation and destruction. Drawing from Immanuel Kant’s perspective on the sub-
lime,584 O’Gorman’s “iconoclastic sublime”585 is the ability to imagine an image that supersedes all other 
images in its capacity to envision our ultimate subjective and social destiny. It is this very process of im-
agining such an image that destroys all other images. By envisioning the totality of that which we cannot 
see, however, we obliterate images that are more visually accessible. O'Gorman's iconoclastic sublime is 
thus one in which the act of creation and destruction are not necessarily distinct processes. Instead, the 
iconoclastic sublime is the weight that imagination brings to bear on our ability to undermine images 
that crystallize the pervasiveness of invisible orders before such images are again wrested from our 
grasp.  When we consider the example of the Uber iconic interface’s inducement to interact with other 
social actors based on common links (i.e. collegiate affiliation), the recognition of neoliberalism as an 
organizing world logic framing such sociality also becomes the means to both destroy the establishment 
of this paradigm supposed by iconicity and envision a space for creating new subjective and social des-
tines. Where David Beer stresses the usefulness of analyzing iconic interfaces as the grounds for an 
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“iconoclastic approach to the new media...to critically examine and reveal the details of the material 
processes and practices that constitute these complex interfaces,”586 O’Gorman’s iconoclastic sublime 
proceeds from revelation to offer assured footing for the destruction of underlying technological, legal, 
and economic paradigms sanctifying Uber and other icons of platform economies and the creation of 
prosocial successors.  
By presenting prearranged social interactions indicative of neoliberalism as a sanctioned mode of 
for placing such sociality in material contexts, Uber’s iconic interface also speaks to users with a vocal-
ized iconoclastic sublime, imploring us to reject the neoliberal orders presumed to cohere and organize 
invisible “truths” of social life. Through the destruction of neoliberal logics underpinning Uber’s auto-
mated sociality, users can collective, cooperative, egalitarian sociality as the means for common links to 
bring people together. It is, in other words, an opportunity to reject neoliberal imaginaries and envision 
prosocial imaginaries as organizing rubrics for coalescing knowledge about social life. The risk, however, 
is that – per O’Gorman - the overdetermination of such imagination encompasses a totality that de-
stroys the ability to envision such imaginaries. Thus, the prosocial imaginary must also ward off utopian 
imaginings that over-extrapolate from material conditions, lest it undermine the scaffolding that can be 
created for the advancement of realized social solidarity.  
In the context of neoliberal and prosocial imaginaries corresponding to iconic interfaces and icono-
clastic potentials, the autonomy of social actors entails a complicated relationship with these dynamics. 
The intensification of neoliberal imaginaries threatens autonomy as a condition of social solidarity, as 
the privatizing logics of neoliberalism afford autonomy insofar as autonomy is the province of supply 
side scions or, as per Uber, an economically-efficient facilitator of social information and social interac-
tions. Even if users experience a heightened sense of autonomy as consumer participants in Uber’s auto-
mated sociality, the individualistic nature of consumer autonomy does not offer assured pathways to 
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extend and calibrate individual autonomy with social autonomy. Iconoclasm and the ability to envision a 
prosocial imaginary is one alleviation to the seeming permeance of neoliberal logics, as the destabiliza-
tion of neoliberalism’s divestment of public goods for privatized ends offers a refreshed vision of auton-
omy as a prosocial condition, one in which individual self-determination correlates with common good. 
Nonetheless, movement between neoliberal imaginaries and prosocial imaginaries presents a challenge 
with respect to the nature of autonomy and iconicity.  
If, as Hariman and Lucaites indicate, to be an icon is to “retain a sense of autonomy from either 
popular tastes or elite interests,” and iconic imagery (such as the Uber interface) must “negotiate the 
trade-off between individual autonomy and collective governance,” iconoclasm seemingly threatens this 
autonomy.587 However, this is only the case if iconoclasm is only an act of destruction and does not ex-
tend to creative imaginings for life beyond neoliberalism and other presiding powers governing contem-
porary social life. Iconoclastic strivings against the Uber iconic interface and all it represents can pre-
serve autonomy by, first, rejecting the invisible orders represented by Uber iconicity and, second, imag-
ining sociality as a unified front of commonality and solidarity that seeks to calibrate personal autonomy 
with collective will and governance. Autonomy, in this context, must therefore carry forward on a proso-
cial imaginary, else autonomous potentials crumble alongside the denigration of Uber’s neoliberal impo-
sition.  
With this complication in mind, one final consideration must be brought to bear, as the iconic inter-
face is fraught not only with tensions between complexity and simplicity, invisibility and visibility, neolib-
eralism and prosociality, or other oppositional couplings brought into contact and compatible at the in-
terface; Uber’s iconic interface is also a connective membrane casting relational elements into opposi-
tional trajectories, a “relay for abstraction” that also casts asunder what it brings together.  
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5.9 Uber: Abstracting Autonomy 
Within the SMI patent application, Uber stresses “commonality” as a process corresponding to in-
visible processes and visible forms. Uber gives visual form to both, even though Uber riders are not privy 
to this full spectrum of pictorial visuality. The establishment of a “common link” between potential rid-
ers generates a notification that appears on the GUI, such as the example of two riders who attended 
Boise State. Figure 3, an infographic, visualizes the otherwise invisible process of establishing common-
ality among potential riders. Situated between sequential processes “access social media data” and 
“identify common links” for each applicable user, a series of potential common links appear in individu-
alized brackets. The common links include “friends,” “hobbies,” “interests,” “places,” “profession,” and 
“origins,” although, as the appendix makes clear, commonalities are not limited to these rubrics, as 
other common links may include “educational institution,” “company,” or “preferences” such as enter-
tainment tastes.588 Preceding sections note the relationship between such commonalities and autonomy 
in the context of simplicity and complexity, invisibility and visible, each of which respectively illuminates 
the interface’s capacity to obfuscate, reveal, cohere, and manifest representational forms and orient a 
user’s contemplative gaze. One of the underlying dimensions that requires consideration is the Uber 
iconic interface’s relationship with abstraction. If preceding notions of the interface as enabling contact, 
compatibility, and coherency engender notions of parallel congruency and proportionality of elements 
on either side of the interfacial boundary, the atomization of commonality within the Uber patent appli-
cation relieves such notions and imparts further stakes for Uber’s automated sociality. By way of explan-
atory metaphor, the Uber iconic interface is not a midpoint fold between the two sides of a Rorschach 
blot’s mirrored symmetry; instead, Uber’s iconic interface is a relay with the potential to at once cohere 
and cast opposing elements into opposing trajectories of varying intensity, duration, and proximity, a 
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relay for abstraction exemplified by commonality as both a particulate techno-social trait and a higher-
order social condition.  
Where photographic imagery function as “implicative relays” between what the camera captures 
and what transpires beyond the frame of the camera589 and “ideological relays” between the infusion of 
ideological forces and the salience of such forces in graphic depiction,590 these conceptions suggest an 
abstracting function, one that is heighted by the interface as both coagulation of graphical representa-
tions and an interactive paradigm forming relations and compatibility. Interfaces themselves encompass 
are a “succession of relays” forging pathways for connectivity, even as they “slice, cleave, and individu-
ate” aspects of the elements pulled into contact and compatibility.591Interfaces, in this regard, both col-
lide and repel, and in doing so their boundaries serve as a relay for abstracting the things that are pulled 
apart and reconstituted.  
With regard to such abstraction, the Uber iconic interface is the nexus for an “aesthetics of abstrac-
tion,” a threshold encounter that abstracts between the sleek, polished, intuitive GUI and underlying 
complexities necessary to generate this type of presentation.592 In explicating this aesthetics of abstrac-
tion, Ed Finn describes the Uber interface as an abstraction between “socio-economic infrastructures” 
and a veneer of simplicity, as well as a “legal interface that abstracts risk away into generalized blanket 
insurance policies covering every driver and passenger,” functioning in accordance with an “interface 
economy” relying on such abstractive techniques.593  
In this sense, the depiction of commonalities such as “friends” or “profession” within Figure 3 ab-
stracts distinctions between what they signify as profound social bonds and what they signify as over-
simplified links between potential consumers. Friendships signify an interpersonal kinship of relatively 
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mutual depth and investment, a bond between two or more people that supersedes commonality as 
mere similar traits or interests. For a user to receive via the Uber GUI a notification of potential rideshar-
ing partners based on common friends, this conception of “friends” owes more to its connotation as a 
social media connection of indeterminate magnitude than a qualified conception of two people’s bond. 
It is an abstraction between deep interpersonal intimacy and “an atomized form of intimacy, a series of 
fleeting, close encounters with strangers that are managed and underwritten by algorithmic culture ma-
chines”594 (129). The stakes of this brand of abstraction correspond to Uber’s algorithmic culture ma-
chine as more prolifically and intensely subsuming social intimacy and presenting it as preferential mode 
for engaging social others, an abstraction between close-knit social commonality capable of proffering 
social change and closely-knitted automated automated processes for atomizing social characteristics 
within algorithmic-capitalist machinery. For a user receiving a notification based on common friendship, 
the Uber iconic interface is the relay point for such abstraction, exemplifying the abstraction between 
lived social relations and the detachment of such relations into the increasingly stratified economic ab-
stractions of contemporary capitalism.  
As previously noted, interfaces do not entail a midpoint between paradigms of equal proportional-
ity. As relays for abstraction in techno-economic molds, the Uber iconic interface is an orienting force in 
a capitalist vortex that divests from lived social relations with an unequal regard for expanding opportu-
nities for social solidarity and expending the monetized value of extracted social commonality.  This no-
tion of a capitalist vortex stems from Nick Dyer-Witheford’s offering of a vortex to allegorize conditions 
between human labor and the commodification of such labor in contemporary digital capitalism. His ex-
plication of a “capitalist vortex” is a viable means for likewise explicating the Uber iconic interface as a 
relay for the abstraction of disproportionate social and economic conditions, one that risks inducing a 
“real abstraction.” Although a vortex moves in circular formation, it possesses a verticality with “the 
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downward suction of a whirlpool, the upward pull of a tornado’s funnel,” a process of siphoning and fil-
tering in opposing directions, for a vortex need not pull upwards at the same scale and magnitude as it 
siphons.595 Amidst contemporary digital economies, the vortex has become a “machinic whirlwind,” as 
the increasing speed and proliferation of automated commoditization accelerates production and circu-
lation of “self-expanding value” siphoned from human being, their labor, and, in the case of Uber, com-
monalities fed into the mechanic whirlwind of its proposed automated sociality.596 The Uber iconic inter-
face is the eye of this proverbial storm, a zone emitting a sense of calm and harmony, abstracting be-
tween underlying tumult siphoning off abundances of commonality from users’ digital sociality and 
Uber’s commodification of this commonality to weather the storm-like volatility and turbulence of digi-
tal economies. Consequentially, the Uber iconic interface abstracts between highly-inequitable extrac-
tions of social commonality and the coalescing of such extractions into economic capital that can expand 
upon itself without expanding upon the commonality from which it siphons. Moreover, as the eye of the 
storm, the Uber iconic interface’s sense of calm and harmony threatens to induce a real abstraction that 
installs a common belief that this type of commodified commonality is the most viable way to under-
stand social relations.  
In a Marxian context, real abstraction is a phenomenon that exists only in the minds of humans, 
even though its basis springs from real social relations. Money is a fruitful example. Money, as a com-
modity, functions only insofar as people believe it possesses real implications and effects. Money does 
not innately possess a value – this value is granted by human acknowledgement and use. Even though 
money is not “real” in terms of its natural qualities, it portends “real” consequences, such as the use of 
money to purchase labor, goods, and services and the social relations constituted by such actions.  Rob-
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ert Gehl aligns real abstraction with the computational process of abstraction whereby software pro-
gramming abstracts between the materiality of a machine’s hardware and the software that performs 
on the hardware. Through abstraction, programmers “hide the material machine behind increasingly 
complex layers of code,” an abstraction between the material and immaterial not unlike the abstraction 
of material money and immaterial exchange value.597If, per Gehl’s admonition, social media sites entail 
“a software abstraction capable of directing users’ concrete labor, social relations, and interactions” 
(81), and such software is “engineered to privilege and enhance certain users while closing off oth-
ers,”598 the incorporation of social media users and information into Uber’s automated software pro-
cesses suggests a further abstraction between lived social commonality and its manifestation as a com-
modified interaction on the Uber interface. More critically, however, it suggests a real abstraction 
whereby Uber’s automated sociality is acknowledged as the proper and logical means of generating so-
cial interaction. In other words, the Uber iconic interface is a relay that abstracts between material so-
cial relations of the real and immaterial socio-economic relations of the digitally virtual wherein the lat-
ter constitutes a shared belief regarding the lived reality of social commonality.  
The risk here is that the elasticity of the vortical pull of the Uber iconic interface abstracts notions 
of autonomy as lived social vitality and a techno-corporate affordance wherein the latter gestures to-
wards cultural dispositions that envision autonomous technologies as invariably sapping the social vital-
ity from human autonomy. As I have argued in this chapter, and in this dissertation as a whole, such con-
ceptions are misguided, yet the potential of a real abstraction offers an important caution: the risk au-
tonomous technologies need not be real in a material sense but only insofar as social beliefs foment 
around this inevitability, thereby undermining the autonomous potential to shape a society that con-
ceives and strives for harmony with machines that increasingly remind us of our own autonomy.  
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5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed an Uber application to patent a process for integrating and automating social 
media information as part of the company’s ridesharing services. Whereas scholarship on the automa-
tion as a paradigm inflecting upon and interjecting within the social, this chapter considered the auton-
omy of social actors when the social itself is subsumed within technological and economic power struc-
tures potentially protected by legal accord. By conceptualizing Uber’s interface as iconic and the persis-
tence of its iconic dimensions within the typographical and pictorial components of the patent applica-
tion, this analysis yielded three interrelated complications that stress the implications of autonomy 
amidst intensified automated sociality.  
First, Uber’s intention to incorporate the social while maintaining a simplified interface entails a 
simplicity that both masks the complexities of automated sociality and enables users to see through this 
process, alternately restricting user autonomy by obfuscating the complex economic, technological, and 
legal circumstances informing Uber’s automated sociality and granting autonomy through an overreli-
ance on simplicity that enables users to reveal these otherwise masked complexities. Second, Uber’s 
iconic interface coheres invisible orders of neoliberal society, inducing a neoliberal imaginary that struc-
tures the increasing privatization of social actors and information as the logical means of conceptualizing 
social interaction. Whereas the neoliberal imaginary proffers autonomy as a condition for neoliberal 
power brokers or consumeristic variability, the coherence of the Uber iconic interface also enables the 
iconoclastic rejection of neoliberal imaginaries, investing social actors with autonomy through prosocial 
imaginaries that both destroy iconicity and create the means to envision social solidarity. Finally, the 
Uber iconic interface is a relay for abstraction that casts into opposing directions of inequitable propor-
tionality the real conditions of social life and an automated sociality that self-replicates the commoditi-
zation of this capital. If subject to a real abstraction that understands the immaterial nature of commod-
ified sociality as the real conditions of social life, social autonomy becomes neutralized not because of 
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the increasing autonomous sophistication of automated technology, but because of the instantiated be-
lief that techno-economic autonomy is the way autonomy can be experienced. 
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6     CONCLUSION 
As the old maxim goes, hindsight is 20/20. For Andrew Yang, however, the year 2020 is about 
foresight – envisioning millions of jobs soon to be eliminated as a result of automation. Yang is a 2020 
U.S. presidential candidate running on a platform of “humanity first,” foregrounding universal basic in-
come (UBI) as the primary economic mechanism to alleviate the “unprecedented crisis” of a current au-
tomation wave threatening 1/3 of American workers poised to lose their job to automation over the 
next 12 years.599 In a Feb. 2018 New York Times profile under the headline “His 2020 Campaign Mes-
sage: The Robots Are Coming,” Yang forewarned that “all you need is self-driving cars to destabilize soci-
ety” and offered a “freedom dividend” as a stabilizing force against the threat posed by autonomous ve-
hicles.600 A freedom dividend is Yang’s own brand of UBI in which all Americans age 18 to 64 receive a 
monthly check for $1,000 without deference to income or employment. The freedom dividend is a criti-
cal component of addressing job-stealing robots and progressing towards a new form of capitalism – a 
“human capitalism” predicated on the valuation of human life over money, human beings as the primary 
unit of the economy (rather than dollars), and the ability of markets to serve shared social goals and val-
ues.601 The blurb for Yang’s April 2018 book The War on Normal People: The Truth About America’s Dis-
appearing Jobs and Why Universal Basic Income Is Our Future (2018) begins by noting “the shift towards 
automation is about to create a tsunami of employment” and ends by advocating for UBI as an “essen-
tial step” towards the “new, more durable kind of economy” that is human capitalism.602 If job-stealing 
robots are a dystopia stormfront, human capitalism is the utopian stormbreaker. As an entrepreneur 
concerned about the relationship between human dignity and automated sophistication, Yang is one of 
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a growing number of marketplace magnates making public proclamations of dystopic and utopic propor-
tions.  
As indicated by an ongoing public feud, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg represent diametrically-
opposed poles on the automation debate, even as Musk and Zuckerberg agree with Yang’s support for a 
version of UBI. In a June 9, 2018 long-form look at the debate over “killer robots,” The New York Times 
cites Musk’s doomsaying and Zuckerberg’s optimism around automation, both for the perspectives each 
brings to bear on the debate and the way their debate stands in a larger divide among those who see 
automation as a boon for human enterprise and those who envision the end of the human era on the 
backs of automated “superintelligence.”603 Both Musk and Zuckerberg, however, are at least somewhat 
economically-incentivized towards their respective poles, as Zuckerberg seeks to recover public confi-
dence in Facebook and its automated retrieval and usage of user information in the wake of the Cam-
bridge Analytica data-harvesting scandal,604 while Musk’s NeuralLink startup – propped up by $100 mil-
lion in venture capital - proposes to develop a “brain interface” enabling humans to achieve communica-
tive parity with superintelligent robots.605 Halfway into 2018, motifs of robot overlords and job- stealing 
robots occupy a central place in cultural imaginaries and economic realities. 
Despite the predominance of these narrative motifs and marketplace disposition, hints of less 
polarized conceptions can be found in the crevices of very recent cultural narratives around automation 
and autonomous technologies. Released in late 2017, Annalee Newitz’s novel Autonomous (2017) tells 
the story of the human Eliasz and AI Paladin in pursuit of “anti-patent scientist turned drug pirate” Jack 
whose pirated drugs cause people to become dangerously addicted to work. While helping Eliasz pursue 
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Jack, Paladin’s discovery of gender and sexual fluidity emanates from her “pursuit of autonomy.”606 Pala-
din’s autonomy, in this context, is not an intelligence that tramples on human dignity. Instead, Paladin’s 
pursuit of autonomy is relatively indistinguishable from a human striving for autonomy – learning about 
one’s self and one’s place in the world, removing oppressive barriers, and seeking dignity and satisfac-
tion based on an unimpeded means of determining and enacting directed purpose. In other words, Pala-
din seeks to discover herself and possess the means to be her truest self, just as humans do in the con-
text of gender identity and other social arenas. The world of Autonomous is neither purely dystopic nor 
utopia; instead, it is a “’topia,” a combination of both, envisioned by Newitz as a world of “hard-won 
hope” demanding struggle and ongoing work that resists an easy grab for utopian or dystopian poles.607 
 While complex cultural representations are welcome, automation is significantly un-
derrepresented in media studies literatures, despite the escalating significance of automation to media 
industries, audiences, texts, platforms, technologies, and cultural practices undertaken by industries and 
users. Relatedly, automation and autonomous agents are – and have been – a source of central concern 
among computer scientists, engineers, human-computer interactionists, and related interdisciplinary 
approaches to computational phenomena. Despite the considerable insights derived by scholars among 
these latter disciplines, the cultural sweep of automation as both a source of media representations and 
a primary mediating force among humans and digital interactions speaks to the need for the insights 
gained from my approach to human-machine autonomy and the groundwork it lays for subsequent as-
sessments. Further, such assessments need not adhere to siloed conceptions of media studies and fields 
with similar topical concerns, as one of the primary aims of this project is to establish connective tissue 
with adjacent fields (i.e. STS, HCI) with concerns for media and technological phenomena poised to in-
creasingly structure the ways culture at large conceives of technologically-mediated interactions and the 
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implications for social life. Human-machine autonomy is therefore not only a conceptual field in which 
autonomy is shared a shared condition, it is a theoretical frame viable for scholarly fields in which auto-
mation, autonomy, and related concerns are a shared concern. After reiterating my overarching aims, 
methodology, and outcomes, in closing I will reiterate the specific claims resulting from my methodolog-
ical approach and, in doing so, offer implications and potential future orientations that can add precision 
and levity to considering automation and autonomous technologies.  
 As opposed to conceptions of highly-automated technologies as oriented towards dys-
topian or utopian horizons in which human autonomy is respectively vanquished or totalized by autono-
mous technological counterparts, mediated interactions with such contemporary automation consti-
tutes a field for the exchange of autonomy, a human-machine autonomy with alternating potentials for 
autonomous realizations circulating within this field. Human-machine autonomy epitomizes the cultural 
significance of automated technologies increasingly possessive of variable, flexible, and precise intelli-
gence undergirding operational designations of technological autonomy. Human-machine autonomy 
connects the material means of developing and proliferating such technologies to lived realities of shap-
ing how humans can understand and experience autonomy, including analogical and allegorical relation-
ships between complex machines and the complexities of human social life. Human-machine autonomy 
stresses industrial practices as verdant ground for staking claims about notions of autonomy built into 
automated technologies and the persistence of these notions in contexts of reception. Human-machine 
autonomy elevates discourse analysis and digital media theory as methodological touchstones most ca-
pable of illuminating, contextualizing, analogizing, and allegorizing complications of autonomy from in-
dustrial imagination to cultural profundity. Human-machine autonomy builds bridges to disciplinary ar-
eas with allied concerns for automation and its implications. For scholars in a rage of areas and sub-dis-
ciplines, my approach to human-machine autonomy offers assured pathways for successive inquires, 
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especially as the evolution of automation and autonomous possibilities occurs with considerable speed 
and scale.  
Chapters 2 and 3 situate policy texts as critical sites for conceiving of autonomy amidst legal and 
political realities shaping corporate practices. Chapter 2 focused on attempts by Tesla CEO Elon Musk to 
associate his company’s Autopilot technology with a “full autonomy” that extends to both Autopilot and 
passengers in autonomous Autopilot-powered vehicles. My approach analyzed the first formal federal 
policy to recommend consolidated practices for outlining regulatory scope, enacting state-level policies 
around highly-automated vehicles, and urging design specifications – the Federal Automated Vehicles 
Policy (FAVP). My analysis primarily focused on the federal adoption of SAE levels of automation in this 
policy as they correspond to potential regulatory, policy, and design implications. More critically, how-
ever, in their attempt to encode legal and technological designations, policymakers and scientific ex-
perts embedded shifting conceptions of human autonomy that merge out of notions of control as both a 
source and inhibitor of personal and social freedom. Through a methodology that situated FAVP as a dis-
cursive nodal point interconnected with preceding attempts to anticipate and contest legal, technologi-
cal, and related distinctions automation, control, and freedom that give rise to how policymakers envi-
sion and anticipate the cultural significance of automated vehicles and human transport in such vehicles. 
By leveraging digital media theory – particularly those concerned with convergence and software af-
fordances – I contextualized and gave levity to how political notions of autonomy correspond to techno-
socio conditions, especially around control.  
Through this approach, I began by arguing for Elon’s musk conception of full autonomy on the 
grounds that it is indicative of cultural applications and interpretations of autonomy in relation to Auto-
pilot and other automated vehicles. While this conception reworks cultural fears around autonomous 
technology, it is definitionally and theoretically insufficient to describe the complications of human au-
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tonomy that can emerge from rigorous analysis. From this point, I argued for an ideology of human au-
tonomy as a condition modeled in policy stipulations for technological and social control; human auton-
omy as a condition modulated in its intensities and opportunities by political power struggles; and mod-
ulated in accordance with implications for the intersection of driving and media usage as cultural activi-
ties transpiring during passage in automated vehicles.  
Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for scholars to latch onto a nuanced conception of autonomy 
that resists the dystopic and utopic claims among pop culture, industry, and others with a vested inter-
est such stratification. Furthermore, it provides a methodological means of charting relationships be-
tween a company’s economic motivations for promoting autonomous potential among its technology 
and legal frameworks mitigating the design and usage of such technologies. As the direct subject of con-
siderable municipal, state, and federal regulatory schemas, considering the implications of Autopilot and 
other technologies powering autonomous vehicles demands an approach that scrutinizes the interre-
lated dynamics between regulation and the companies, technologies, and workers subject to its recom-
mendations and provisions, especially as the content of legal code includes guidelines for design, usage, 
and cultural integration. In this way, by situating the FAVP as a critical locus for conceiving of the signifi-
cance of Autopilot, this chapter enables scholars to chart assured connections between regulatory sche-
mas, corporate ideologies, and everyday uses. As autonomous vehicles look to to integrate with smart 
cities, smart highways, and other Internet of Things paradigms, as well as integrate media interfaces and 
opportunities for mobile media interaction within the vehicular form, my approach provides a founda-
tional means of assessing how, when, if, and to what degree humans experience autonomy by examin-
ing how notions of autonomy were always already prefigured by political contestations over regulatory 
scope and purview.  
Chapter 3 considered the relationship between the centrality of IBM’s Watson AI to the com-
pany’s business portfolio and the company’s motivations to leverage policy to economically underwrite 
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the training and upskilling of high-tech “New Collar” workers capable of working with Watson. When the 
New Collar Jobs Act was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2017, the Act re-
flected IBM’s cultural construction of New Collar Work and provisions central to its corporate goals, par-
ticularly as the Act enables IBM to seek remuneration for its encroachment into vocational training and 
cybersecurity initiatives in tandem with the importance of Watson to these and related company initia-
tives. In doing so, IBM situates Watson as an enhancer of human autonomy in the context of employa-
bility and productive vitality, even as the Act and the logics of New Collar speak to IBM’s corporate au-
tonomy as the company attempts to navigate shifts to its business model and digital economies.  
As I demonstrated through analysis of the New Collar Jobs Act, New Collar work emerges out of 
IBM’s strategic use of “augmentation” to describe the productive and intellectual capacities of humans 
enhanced by collaboration with Watson and “cognitive” as a rubric for reconceptualizing Watson and 
IBM’s contemporary marketplace prowess. On this latter front, IBM’s insistence on the augmentative 
capacities of Watson stems from a preference for “cognitive” as opposed to “artificial” intelligence, a 
means of reversing AI-based dystopian implications for human vitality and stressing the ability of Wat-
son to inflect tech workers with its automated cognition. Moreover, “cognitive” also exemplifies IBM’s 
attempt to assert its prowess in contemporary digital economies by stressing Watson as the signifier of 
the “cognitive era” of computing and IBM as the progenitor and corporate titan of this era. Ultimately, 
this chapter stresses the importance of autonomy as a critical attribute among IBM’s politico-economic 
motivations and ensuing implications for emerging tech workers.  
Chapter 3 situated policy as aligned with corporate ideologies and motivations for propagating 
notions of technological intelligence as enhancing the autonomy of human workers. Whereas chapter 2 
conceived of regulatory policy as transpiring at a relative remove from corporate practice, this chapter 
highlights the role of policy as an opportunity to economically underwrite circumstances impending on 
the extent to which humans incur autonomous potential for jobs training, employment, and productive 
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undertakings. Scholars concerned with the relationship between automation and jobs should examine 
policy with an eye towards the extent to which its provisions collide or repels with corporate goals and 
motivations, especially as political climates can incline towards supply-side investment as the means of 
fomenting educational, vocational, and employment opportunities. Likewise, this chapter provides a 
means to continue assessing shifting labor categories supposing technological sophistication, both in 
terms of the technology’s affordances and a human’s ability to undertake complex work through such 
technology.  
Chapter 4 analyzes complications of autonomy arising from Amazon’s intent to market Alexa as 
the go-to consumer device for home automation. The considerable presence of Alexa at the 2017 Con-
sumer Electronics Show (CES) and ensuing trade press provided the primary means of allegorizing the 
relationship between notions of autonomy built into a gendered technology and cultural ideologies of 
women’s autonomy among public and private spheres. By demonstrating the ways new domestic tech-
nologies tend to both resist and capitulate to gendered conceptions of power and autonomy across pub-
lic and private life, I argued that Alexa should be understood as possessed with complicated and con-
trasting autonomous potentials with respect to home automation and interrelated gender dynamics of 
domesticity and technology. As a gendered technology, Alexa allegorizes autonomy as an alternately en-
nobled and restricted condition for social life.  
One of the first compilations is Alexa’s autonomy in relation to software and hardware. As a sin-
gular software agent widely interoperable with a vast array of hardware devices and systems, Alexa en-
compasses gendered associations of software and soft power, associations with unthinking bodily auto-
maticity, ineffectiveness for political change, and a highly diminished autonomy. On the other hand, Am-
azon markets Alexa as the “brain” of its Echo device, uplifting Alexa as highly-intelligent and politically 
empowered, a soft empowerment ennobling of autonomous potential that can be constructed, mobi-
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lized, and shared in accordance soft power’s quest for affinity, kinship, and political plurality. In the con-
text of work performed within the automated home, Amazon marketing dovetails with circumscribed 
notions of women as domestic laborers performing servile undertakings readying the home for respite 
from the workaday masculine world. Contrarily, however, Alexa is construed as possessing mastery of 
creative and flexible traits that enable her to determine mediated interactions, an autonomy in which 
Alexa is endowed with decision-making capacities for cultivating media, mediated interactions, and the 
professional and creative expertise associated with such capacities.  
When Alexa’s mobile capabilities are brought to bear, a tripartite dynamic emerges. In one view, 
Alexa possesses little autonomy to move from the domestic sphere into public life, as the Alexa mobile 
app transforms public life into a virtual domestic “room” such that Alexa is cordoned off from public life 
even when transported via mobile hardware out of the home. In another view, Amazon’s insistence that 
Alexa “lives” in the computational cloud situates Alexa as omnipresent among public and domestic life, 
autonomously moving in space and time, permeating the nonspace of the cloud and carrying with it uto-
pian ideals of derealized and deconstructed social and spatial power dynamics. Finally, public APIs that 
enable third-party “hobbyist” developers to integrate Alexa into non-Amazon products and enhance 
Alexa skills resurface separations between an economic and technologically savvy masculine public and 
an emotional and technologically-consumptive feminized home. In this view, hobbyists writing and com-
piling code for public APIs associates with long-standing notions of public masculine work that drives 
economic vitality, as Alexa’s skills become associated with emotional work, the invisibility of this work, 
and the declining recognition of women as integral and foundational to the inception of profound com-
putational paradigms. In this way, Alexa’s autonomy is not only diminished, but risks a similar paradoxi-
cal decline if Alexa’s increasing prolificacy and capabilities likewise become disassociated with the foun-
dational attributes of women’s contributions and characteristics.  
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Chapter 4 offers a critical frame for scholars researching in areas concerned with the intersec-
tion of emerging technologies, gender, space, and marketing. More specifically, scholars with an inter-
ested in gendered automated technologies such as Alexa, Cortana, Siri, and Google Assistant can better 
conceive of the motivations for gendered notions of autonomy by paying heed to marketing texts and 
discourse. Marketing cross-cuts the ways industry imagines, designs, produces and disseminates auto-
mated technologies and, in doing so, stresses contexts for automated integration and usage that serve 
corporate goals for marketplace penetration. As the wealthiest person in history, Jeff Bezos’ upstream 
concerns for maximizing Amazon’s bottom line, alongside the company’s attempt to secure municipal 
economic incentives for its H2 headquarters, indicate cultural implications of considerable magnitude 
for a company that consciously designs and personifies a gendered automated technology and fore-
grounds home productivity as the naturalized manifestation of its primary uses. Marketing unpacks un-
conscious aspects of autonomy amidst these conscious machinations, further enabling scholars to con-
nect conscious acts revealed in marketing discourse with analogical and allegorical implications for 
women’s autonomy among public and private spaces.  
Chapter 5 analyzed an Uber application to patent a process for integrating and automating so-
cial media information as part of the company’s ridesharing services. By conceptualizing Uber’s interface 
as iconic and the persistence of its iconic dimensions within the typographical and pictorial components 
of the patent application, this analysis yielded three interrelated complications that stress the implica-
tions of autonomy amidst intensified automated sociality.  
First, Uber’s intention to incorporate the social while maintaining a simplified interface entails a 
simplicity that both masks the complexities of automated sociality and enables users to see through this 
process, alternately restricting user autonomy by obfuscating the complex economic, technological, and 
legal circumstances informing Uber’s automated sociality and granting autonomy through an overreli-
ance on simplicity that enables users to reveal these otherwise masked complexities. Second, Uber’s 
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iconic interface coheres invisible orders of neoliberal society, inducing a neoliberal imaginary that struc-
tures the increasing privatization of social actors and information as the logical means of conceptualizing 
social interaction. Whereas the neoliberal imaginary proffers autonomy as a condition for neoliberal 
power brokers or consumeristic variability, the coherence of the Uber iconic interface also enables the 
iconoclastic rejection of neoliberal imaginaries, investing social actors with autonomy through prosocial 
imaginaries that both destroy iconicity and create the means to envision social solidarity. Finally, the 
Uber iconic interface is a relay for abstraction that casts into opposing directions of inequitable propor-
tionality the real conditions of social life and an automated sociality that self-replicates the commoditi-
zation of this capital. If subject to a real abstraction that understands the immaterial nature of commod-
ified sociality as the real conditions of social life, social autonomy becomes neutralized not because of 
the increasing autonomous sophistication of automated technology, but because of the instantiated be-
lief that techno-economic autonomy is the way autonomy can be experienced.  
Chapter 5 enables profound connectivity among industrial pursuits for intellectual property pro-
tection, technological design and usage, and implications for social life. By conceiving of the social as 
subsumed within automated processes seeking legal protections for marketplace versatility, scholars 
with stakes in the automation of social media, mobile media, and applications, scholars can analyze pa-
tents for what they reveal about the stakes of automation in the context of social solidarity and the so-
cial as a commodifiable form subject to automated logics. Furthermore, this chapter’s combination of 
visual rhetoric, discourse analysis, and interface theory invokes the importance of industrial texts as 
sources of both pictorial and typographical discourse and the ways such pictorial representation un-
earths ideological assumptions distinct from purely typographical content. This is especially critical as 
the pictorial dimensions of interfaces alternately obfuscate or reveal the conditions to which automated 
users are subject, including their own reified sociality. By pulling together these strands, researchers will 
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emerge with a more precise picture of autonomy as a condition render visible or invisible and the 
techno-legal machinations shaping relationships between social autonomy as social commodities.  
In these ways, my approach to human-machine autonomy implores scholars consider the rela-
tionship between automation and autonomy as a co-evolving progression of economic, legal, political 
and social considerations most precisely illuminated through assessments of industrial deep texts, dis-
course stretching across networked textual encounters, and theoretical frameworks situating these dy-
namics in their critical contexts.  
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